

SEPTEMBER, 1909.

Vol. LIII. No. 379.

JOURNAL

OF THE

Royal United Service Institution.

Registered for Transmission to Canada by Canadian Magazine Post.



PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL.

Editor - Captain H. Garbett, R.N. (Retired).

All communications (except those for perusal by the Editor only) to be addressed to the Secretary, Royal United Service Institution.

LONDON :

**The Royal United Service Institution,
WHITEHALL, S.W.**

Telegraphic Address : "RUSSATUS, LONDON."

Printed by J. J. KELIHER & CO., LIMITED, 33, King William Street, E.C.,
And Craven House, Kingsway, W.C.

Sole Advertisement Contractor : Mr. C. GILBERT-WOOD, Dacre House, Arundel Street, Strand, London, W.C.
Telegraphic Address : "GILBERWOOD, LONDON."

All rights reserved.

Price Two Shillings.

AUTUMN AND WINTER RESORT.

**SOUTH
ASPECT.**

SEPTEMBER is a perfect Holiday month at PWLLHELI, on Cardigan Bay. The Winter climate is exceptionally mild. Roses are cut in open gardens at Christmas.

THE SOUTH BEACH HOTEL

is a First Class Hotel on the Sea Front at Pwllheli. It faces due south and enjoys

BRIGHT SUNSHINE all the year round.

**EVERY COMFORT.
EXCELLENT CUISINE.
GOLF LINKS NEAR.**

**EXCEPTIONALLY LOW TERMS, FROM £2 A
WEEK INCLUSIVE. A FEW ROOMS AT 35%
FACILITIES FOR SHOOTING AND FISHING.**

THROUGH CARRIAGES FROM LONDON EVERY DAY.

Write to the MANAGERESS, South Beach Hotel, Pwllheli.

The Army School

Near MAIDENHEAD

(APPROVED BY THE ARMY COUNCIL).

Head Master :

E. G. A. BECKWITH, M.A. Oxon.

(Late Exhibitioner of Winchester & Magdalen College).

IN 1905 the Army School was founded by the present Head Master with the object of supplying a need which has been admittedly felt for a long period, viz., an education especially adapted to the Army (Woolwich and Sandhurst) Curriculum, but resembling in all other respects that of a Public School.

In this way the pupils reap all the advantages of the best Private Tutors, i.e., small classes and individual attention (in so far as the Staff consists of specialists in the Army subjects), at fees within reach of the average officer's income, while a spirit of discipline and *esprit de corps* is fostered.

The average number of boys (12-18 years of age) is slightly over 40. The Staff consists of 9 Masters (7 Resident).

Since 1905 there have been over FIFTY Successes.

SUCCESES, 1907-1908 (JULY) :

WOOLWICH—ONE.
SANDHURST—ELEVEN.

QUALIFYING CERTIFICATES—SIXTEEN.
LEAVING CERTIFICATES (Woolwich)—THREE.

For FEES, &c. (reduced for Sons of Officers), apply to the Head Master.

Shannon

Card Index.

For ALL NAVAL AND
MILITARY RECORDS.

Used in the Admiralty and many other Government Offices.

Write for New Booklet, "System in a Nutshell,"
which gives a short description of the system.

SHANNON, Ltd., Ropemaker Street, London, E.C.



LIPTONS

The Largest Tea and Provision Dealers in the World.

MANAGEMENT OF CANTEENS A SPECIALITY.

TERMS, PRICES, REBATES, &c., ON APPLICATION.

ALDERSHOT—Elms Road.
PORTSEA—35, Queen Street.
DEVONPORT—Holman's Buildings.
DUBLIN—23, Merchant's Quay.
GIBRALTAR—Grand Hotel Buildings.
MALTA—39, Strada Reale, Valletta.

ALEXANDRIA—Rue Adib.
CAIRO—9, Rue Osselli.
CALCUTTA—321, Dalhousie Square.
COLOMBO—Prince Street.
BOMBAY—Apollo Street.
KARACHI—Nicolli Road.

Head Offices—CITY ROAD, LONDON.

CONTENTS FOR SEPTEMBER, 1909.

1. THE NEW GERMAN FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN," 13,200 TONS; 16,000-I.H.P.; SPEED, 18 KNOTS ...	<i>Frontispiece.</i>	
2. SECRETARY'S NOTES ...		1133
3. THE EXPEDITION TO SICILY, 1718, UNDER SIR GEORGE BYNG. CAPTAIN H. W. RICHMOND, R.N. (<i>Lecture</i>) ...		1135
4. THE FRENCH RAID IN IRELAND, 1798, AND SHORT SKETCHES OF OTHER ATTEMPTS AND LANDINGS ON THE COAST OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. COLONEL H. W. PEARSE, D.S.O. (ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Q.M.G. DEPARTMENT, W.O.) (<i>Lecture</i>) ...		1153
5. RASPLATA ("THE RECKONING.") COMMANDER VLADIMIR SEMENOFF, IMPERIAL RUSSIAN NAVY. TRANSLATED BY PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR, BY L.A.B. (<i>continued</i>) ...		1174
6. LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR APPLIED TO THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY. CONDENSED AND TRANSLATED FROM THE JAPANESE. CONTRIBUTED BY THE GENERAL STAFF ...		1190
7. THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA, 1808-14. VALUABLE NOTES FROM RECENTLY DISCOVERED DIARIES OF THE WAR, NOW BEING PUBLISHED IN <i>El Imparcial</i> OF MADRID. PRECIS BY MAJOR-GENERAL J. C. DALTON, R.A. (<i>continued</i>) ..		1202
8. THE JAPANESE ARMY IN 1908. TRANSLATED BY PERMISSION OF THE MINISTER OF WAR FROM THE <i>Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères</i> ...		1209
9. NAVAL NOTES ...		1220
10. MILITARY NOTES ...		1235
11. NAVAL AND MILITARY CALENDAR FOR AUGUST, 1909 ...		1247
12. CONTENTS OF FOREIGN PERIODICALS FOR AUGUST, 1909 ...		1248
13. NOTICES OF BOOKS ...		1253
14. PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY DURING AUGUST, 1909 ...		1255
15. RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF MILITARY INTEREST ...		1257

CAPT. G. P. A. PHILLIPS,

Prepares by Lecture or Correspondence

FOR STAFF COLLEGE ENTRANCE,
TACTICAL FITNESS, PROMOTION, and all ARMY EXAMS.

SMALL CLASSES ONLY.

OVER 750 SUCCESSES
IN LAST 2½ YEARS.

For particulars apply—
I, Albemarle Street, Piccadilly, W.

Graham & Latham

(LATE OF THE MORRIS AIMING TUBE AND AMMUNITION CO., LTD.),

CECIL COURT, CHARING CROSS ROAD.

SOLANO TRIANGLE TARGETS.


ELEMENTARY	No. 1	-	-	-	5/-	per 1,000
ELEMENTARY	No. 2	-	-	-	5/-	per 1,000
INSTRUCTIONAL	No. 1	-	-	-	7/6	per 1,000
INSTRUCTIONAL	No. 2	-	-	-	7/-	per 1,000
INSTRUCTIONAL	No. 3	-	-	-	6/6	per 1,000

SEND FOR SAMPLES OF ABOVE AND FOR

PRACTICE COURSE.

ROSS' CELEBRATED BRITISH MANUFACTURE.

PHOTOGRAPHIC LENSES. PRISM BINOCULARS. OUTFITS.



New "PANROS" Camera.

REFLEX,
KODAKS,
and other
improved
CAMERAS
with ROSS
LENSES.

OF ALL LEADING DEALERS.

Illustrated Price Lists, Free by Post.

ROSS LTD.

Optical Works—
CLAPHAM COMMON,
LONDON. S.W.



New MODEL.

**FULL TARIFF
SENT ON
APPLICATION.**

TELEPHONES:
1025 & 304 Kensington.
1317 Paddington.

Telegrams: "EMBASSIES, LONDON."

The Electric Landaulet Co. Ltd.
ESTABLISHED OVER 7 YEARS.

Branch Carage:
**SALISBURY MEWS,
CLOUCESTER PLACE**
(Near Great Central Hotel).

DINNER, THEATRE, & SUPPER,
till 1 a.m., 15s.

Carage and Offices:
**UPPER MANOR STREET
CHELSEA, S.W.**
(Near Town Hall).

Petrol and Electric Cars
on Hire for any Period.



The E.L.C. Gearless Electric Carriage.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

PRESIDENT.

Field-Marshal H.R.H. The DUKE OF CONNAUGHT, K.G.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

Admiral Rt. Hon. Sir J. C. DALRYMPLE-HAY, Bart., G.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S.

General Sir F. C. A. STEPHENSON, G.C.B., Constable of the Tower.

Field-Marshal the Viscount WOLSELEY, K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G. (1909).

Field-Marshal Right Hon. the Earl ROBERTS, VC, K.G., K.P., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., V.D. (1905).

Vice-Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of BATTENBERG, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C. (1906).

Colonel Right Hon. Sir J. H. A. Macdonald, K.C.B., V.D. (1908).

CHAIRMAN.

Lieut.-General H. D. HUTCHINSON, C.S.I.

VICE-CHAIRMAN.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir G. H. U. NOEL, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

Lieut.-General R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, C.B., Commanding Northumbrian Division Territorial Force

Lieutenant C. W. BELLAIRS, R.N. (retired), M.P.

Colonel the Lord BINGHAM, 5th Bn. The London Regiment.

Colonel J. H. BOB, C.M.G., R.M.A., A.D.C., Extra Equerry to H.R.H. The Prince of Wales.

Commander W. F. CARBONE, C.B., Royal Naval Reserve.

Vice-Admiral Sir C. CAMPBELL, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.

Colonel F. S. CLAY, C.B., V.D., Commanding South Midland Brigade, Territorial Force.

Colonel R. B. COLVIN, C.B., Essex Yeomanry.

Colonel C. G. DONALD, C.B., half pay, late Royal Fusiliers.

Rear-Admiral A. M. FIELD, F.R.S.

Major-General Sir T. FRASER, K.C.B., C.M.G.

Lieut.-Colonel Honble. T. F. FREMANTLE, V.D., The Buckinghamshire Battalion, The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.

Colonel J. A. L. HALDANE, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.M.O., War Office.

Colonel LONSDALE A. HALE, late R.E.

Colonel the Viscount HARDINGE, 5th Bn. the Rifle Brigade.

Colonel W. A. HILL, C.B., late 3rd Bn. The Gloucestershire Regiment.

Admiral of the Fleet the Lord WALTER KERR, G.C.B.

Colonel Honble. O. V. G. A. LUMLEY, Commanding 2nd South Midland Mounted Brigade, Territorial Force

Lieutenant G. H. MALTRY, M.V.O., R.N. (retired).

Major-General Sir G. H. MARSHALL, K.C.B.

Colonel F. I. MAXSE, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Coldstream Guards and 3rd London Brigade, Territorial Force.

Brigadier-General H. H. WILSON, C.B., D.S.O., Commandant of the Staff College.

Secretary and Curator.

Lieut.-Colonel A. LEXHAM, Royal Monmouthshire Royal Reserve Engineers, late 13th Hussars.

Editor.

Captain H. J. G. GARRETT, R.N. (retired).

Librarian.

Major C. H. WYLLY, late 1st Bn. South Staffordshire Regiment.

Assistant Secretary and Curator.

Captain B. E. SARGEAUNT, 12th Bn. The London Regiment.

Auditors

Messrs. WILDE & FERGUSON DAVIE, Chartered Accountants, 61, FORD STREET, E.C.

The undermentioned can become members by intimating their wish to the Secretary, and either forwarding to him their subscription, or giving him a written authority on their bankers or agents for its payment:—Commissioned officers of the Royal Navy, Regular Army, Royal Marines, Special Reserve, Reserve of Officers, Militia, Indian and Colonial Naval and Military Forces, Yeomanry, Territorial Force, Royal Naval Reserve, Volunteer Corps, and Cadet Battalions and Corps, as published in the Official Navy and Army Lists, together with retired officers of the same whose names are retained in the Navy or Army Lists, and Naval Cadets, and Cadets of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Royal Military College, Sandhurst, and Royal Military College, Kingston, Canada, on the recommendation of their commanding officers.

Officers retired from the various Services enumerated above, whose names do not appear in the Navy or Army Lists, are eligible for election by ballot on the recommendation, on personal knowledge, of two members of the Institution.

The terms of subscription are:—

Annual. £1 1s. 0d. entrance; and £1 1s. 0d. annual, payable on the 1st January each year.

Life. £15, payable in one sum.

Life. £15 15s., payable in three instalments of Five Guineas each; the first on joining the Institution, the others on the 1st January of each of the succeeding two years.

Members joining after the 1st October in any year are not called upon for any subscription the following year.

An extra payment of Ten Shillings entitles a member in the United Kingdom to the loan of Four Volumes at a time from the Library for a period of twelve months from the date of the subscription.

When a member desires to pay his subscription through his banker or agent, he should send to the Secretary a written authority as follows:—

To (Banker or Agents)

On receipt of this order please pay to Secretary, Royal United Service Institution, or order, my subscription to that Institution (according to the terms above).

Name in full.

Rank, Ship, or Regiment.

Address to which Journals and other communications should be sent.

The name of any member who fails to pay his annual subscription for two years is removed from the List of Members, but the member may be re-admitted as a new member on the usual terms.

Members of the United Service Institution of India on leave to the United Kingdom, and officers of the Colonial Naval and Military Forces who are temporarily in this country on duty, can become temporary members, and make use of the Institution on payment of Five Shillings per six months.

The Institution contains the best professional Library in the United Kingdom; an excellent collection of Maps and Charts; Reading and Smoking Rooms provided with the leading papers, periodicals, and writing materials; an interesting Museum; and a Theatre in which lectures upon professional subjects, followed by discussion, are frequently given.

The Journal, published monthly, is sent post free to all members. It contains the lectures given in the Theatre, articles on professional subjects, naval and military notes, book notices, &c.

NAVAL AND MILITARY BUSINESS DIRECTORY.



(By special appointment to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales).

JONES, CHALK & DAWSON.

TAILORS & MILITARY OUTFITTERS,
6, Sackville Street, London, W.

PHOTOGRAPHIC PORTRAITS by
G. PORTER-HIGGINS.

Late R.M.A., Woolwich.
Medallist: Exhibitor, R.P.S. Genuine Artistic Work.

Leighton Studios,
Redcliffe Road, South Kensington.
Particulars sent upon application.

LIPTONS

FOR

QUALITY.

"Country Life"

MILD,
5d. per oz.
MEDIUM—
4½d. per oz.

**Smoking
Mixture.**

Memorial Brasses & Bronzes.

J. WIPPELL & CO.

LTD.
EXETER, and 4 & 5, Duncannon St., LONDON.
A Fully Illustrated List on Application.

TO LET.

NAVAL AND MILITARY SCHOOLS, TUTORS, &c.

Mr. E. CARLISLE, M.A. (Cantab)

AND

Major M. H. GREGSON (late R.E.)

Prepare Candidates for all
Army Examinations at

5 & 7, Lexham Gardens, W.

CAPTAIN GALL AND

MR. GLADSTONE, M.A. (Oxon.)

(Late Captain Gall),

(Preparation by Lectures
or Correspondence.) **Army Tutors,**

90a, Gloucester Rd., South Kensington.

STAFF COLLEGE & PROMOTION
EXAMINATIONS.

Capt. G. P. A. Phillips

Prepares by Lecture or Correspondence.

1, ALBEMARLE STREET, PICCADILLY, W.

TO LET.

TO LET.

ALL ARMY EXAMINATIONS

Work now proceeding.

Col. E. KENSINGTON, p.a.c. (LATE R.A.)

29, MEDINA VILLAS, HOVE.

F. R. HORA, B.A., B.Sc.,

69, ST. AUBYNS, HOVE.

NAVAL AND MILITARY HOTEL DIRECTORY.

BOURNEMOUTH.

Royal Bath Hotel.

OVERLOOKING PIER.

The only Hotel on the East Cliff.

THE LAKES OF KILLARNEY.

The Royal Victoria Hotel.

ESTABLISHED 1830.

Lighted throughout by its own Private
Electric Plant.

RAMSGATE.

The Granville Hotel.

Beautifully situated on the high cliffs overlooking Sea
and Public Gardens. A magnificent position. The most
comfortable Seaside Hotel on the South Coast.
Excellent and complete Turkish Bath, with Sea Water
Plunge; also Ozone and other Baths. Hot and Cold Sea
Water in Bath Rooms. Electric Light everywhere.

BRIGHTON.

Hotel Metropole.

FINEST SEASIDE HOTEL IN THE WORLD.

GORDON HOTELS, Ltd., Proprietors.

NAVAL AND MILITARY PUBLICATIONS.

"THE CAVALRY JOURNAL."

QUARTERLY. Price 2s. 6d. Net.

Published by Authority of the Army Council, and under the Direction of General Sir J. D. F. French, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Colonel of 19th Hussars, Inspector-General of the Forces, assisted by Lieut.-General E. S. Baden-Powell, C.B.

JANUARY, APRIL, JULY and OCTOBER.

C. GILBERT-WOOD, Arundel Street, W.C.

"NATIONAL DEFENCE"

A Monthly Magazine. Price 1s. Net.

The Official Organ of the Council of County Territorial Associations, and of the National Defence Association.

All interested in the great problem of National Defence should read this invaluable Magazine.

TO LET.

"THE NAVAL POCKET BOOK"

(ANNUAL).

Edited by GEOFFREY S. LAIRD CLOWES.

7/6 Net.

W. THACKER & Co., 2, Creed Lane, E.C.

Just Published, Demy 8vo, 100 pages, with three plates, 10s. 6d. net.

THE THEORY OF THE RECOIL OF GUNS WITH RECOIL CYLINDERS.

By Professor F. RAUSENBERGER.

Specially printed from "Artilleristische Monatshefte."

Translated by ALFRED SLATER.

London:—CROSBY LOCKWOOD & SON, 7, Stationers' Hall Court, E.C., & 121a, Victoria St., S.W.

"The Journal of the Royal Artillery."

MONTHLY, 2/6 NET.

The Royal Artillery Institution, WOOLWICH, S.E.

"To preserve Peace be prepared for War." The Indian Volunteer Record And Military News.

London, Calcutta, and Bombay.

A Fortnightly Review of Indian Military Matters, printed in India.

"By far the smartest little service paper published in the Indian Empire."

EDITOR: CAPTAIN JAMES WYNESS.

London Managing Editor: C. GILBERT-WOOD, F.R.G.S.

The GILBERT-WOOD PRESS

Newspaper Proprietors, Publishers, Lithographic & Letterpress Printers, and Advertisement Contractors.

5 & 3, ARUNDEL STREET, LONDON, W.C.

Sole Advertisement Contractors to this Journal and also to most other Official Service Publications. Telegrams: GILBERTWOOD, LONDON. Telephone: 4680 Gerrard.

NAVAL AND MILITARY SOCIETIES AND CHARITIES.

MARINE SOCIETY.

TRAINING SHIP "WARSPITE,"

PATRON H.M. THE KING.

The Society, which maintains the Training Ship "Warspite" at Greenhithe, is supported by Voluntary Contributions.

Annual Subscriptions and Donations gratefully received by the Secretary, Lieut. H. T. A. BOSANQUET, R.N., Clarks Place, Bishopsgate Street, E.C.

THE 'ARETHUSA' & 'CHICHESTER' TRAINING SHIPS FOR POOR BOYS are much in need of Funds.

President - THE EARL OF JERSEY, G.C.B.

Gifts Thankfully Received by Secretaries:
164, Shaftesbury Avenue, London, W.C.

THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' FAMILIES ASSOCIATION.

To help the Wives and Families
— of Soldiers and Sailors. —

Secretary, 23, Queen Anne's Gate, S.W.

Metropolitan Drinking Fountain and Cattle Trough Association.

The Committee very earnestly APPEAL for LIBERAL HELP to continue a work which has done so much to promote Temperance and alleviate suffering.

CAPT. W. SIMPSON, Secretary,
70, Victoria Street, S.W.

TO LET.

CHARING CROSS HOSPITAL, STRAND, W.C.

The Council earnestly appeal for donations. The Annual Income from Invested Property is only £2,500, while the Expenditure is £23,000, the Balance being derived from Voluntary Contributions. Average number of Patients received yearly, 22,000.

NAVAL AND MILITARY MUSEUMS, &c.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE MUSEUM WHITEHALL.

This Museum, with the restored Rubens' Ceiling, and entirely rearranged, has now been re-opened to the Public.

GREENWICH HOSPITAL.

THE PAINTED HALL,
NELSON'S RELICS, &c.

NAVAL MUSEUM, interesting collection of Models, &c.

OPEN DAILY, 10 till 4.

The Adjustable Shelving & Metal Construction Co.

Ltd.

MANUFACTURERS OF



SPACE-SAVING FITTINGS


(BRITISH MANUFACTURE)

FOR

LIBRARIES, OFFICES,
— STORES, &c. —

SHELVING SPECIALISTS.

PLEASE WRITE FOR
OUR CATALOGUE.



30, Gwydir Chambers, High Holborn, LONDON, W.C.

THE GOLDSMITHS & SILVERSMITHS Company, Ltd.

*Illustrated and
Priced Catalogue
sent post free on
application.*

**Table Ware in Solid Silver,
Silver Gilt and Finest Plate.**

*Selections on
approval carriage
paid at the
Company's risk.*



**Perfection of
Workmanship.**

**Value beyond
Competition.**

*The Company's
productions can be
obtained only from
their Showrooms :*

**Wedding Presents, Presentation
Plate, Mess Plate, Cups, Bowls,
Prizes for all Competitions.
Special Designs Free.**

*The Company
has no Agent,
Branch, or Depot
anywhere.*

112, REGENT STREET, LONDON, W.




BARR AND STROUD'S PATENTS.
FIRE CONTROL INSTRUMENTS.

The above illustration shows a combined Deflection, Order and Range Transmitter controlling a combined Deflection and Range Receiver, and a separate Order Receiver.

These instruments are used for signalling Deflections, Orders, and Ranges, or any other desired information, from the Control Station on board ship to the various gun stations.

BARR AND STROUD,
ANNIESLAND,
GLASGOW.



THE NEW GERMAN FIRST-CLASS BATTLE-SHIP "SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN," 13,200 Tons : 16,000-I.H.P. Speed, 18 Knots.
 ARMOUR PROTECTION.—K. Steel belt, 9.8 inches amidships to 12 inches at ends; citadel, 7.9 inches (240 feet); battery casemates, 6.6 inches; barbets and hoods, 11 inches; conning tower, 11.8 inches; signal tower, 6 inches.
 ARMAMENT.—Four 40-calibre 11-inch Q.F. guns; fourteen 40-calibre 6.6 Q.F.; twenty-two 3.4-inch Q.F. guns; four small machine guns. Torpedo tubes, 6, submerged, one being in bow and one in stern.

J. J. K. & Co., Limited, London.



... ..

THE JOURNAL
OF THE
ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

VOL. LIII.

SEPTEMBER, 1909.

No. 879.

[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]

SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I. OFFICERS JOINED.

The following officers joined the Institution during the month of August:—

Lieutenant W. L. Palmer, 10th Hussars.
Lieutenant G. H. Sawyer, Royal Berkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant G. H. Worrall, Border Regiment.
Lieutenant A. H. M. White, R.N.
Lieutenant R. H. Rowe, R.G.A.
Captain D. A. Thomson, R.E.
Lieutenant R. S. Hopkins, East Yorkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant H. J. Soames, East Kent Regiment.
Sub-Lieutenant R. K. C. Pope, R.N.
Lieutenant J. N. Benbow, R.N.
Colonel P. S. Beves, Transvaal Volunteers.

II. ADDITIONS TO THE MUSEUM.

5376. Model of the Royal Artillery South African War Memorial to be erected in the Mall facing the Duke of York's Steps. The extreme width will be fifty feet, and the height of the central group, measured from the top of the steps to the summit, 26 feet 6 inches. The Memorial is being executed by W. R. Colton, Esq., A.R.A.

—Deposited by the Royal Regiment of Artillery.

6019. Seven Line Engravings, published by Colnaghi & Co. in 1812, by Charles Heath, after H. L'Évêque, entitled:—
"The Landing of the British Army at Mondego Bay."
"The Battle of Vimiero."
"The Bridge of Saltador."
"The Bridge of Nodin."
"The Attack of the Rear Guard of the French at Salamonde."
"Passage of the Douro by the Division under Lieut.-General Honble. Edward Paget."
"Passage of the Douro by the Division under Lieut.-General Sir John Murray."
—Purchased.

6022. An Original Copy of "Bell's Weekly Messenger" for 10th November, 1805, with an account of the Battle of Trafalgar and Lord Nelson's Death.—*Purchased.*

III. ARMY PROMOTION LECTURES.

A course of Lectures in Military History on the subject set for the November Promotion Examination will be given as heretofore. Further particulars will be announced in the JOURNAL for October.

IV. LECTURES.

The following list of Lectures has been arranged for the autumn:—

Wednesday, 6th October.—"Machine Gun Tactics in our own and other Armies, by Captain R. V. K. Applin, D.S.O., 14th King's Hussars.

Wednesday, 20th October.—"The Use of the Motor for the Transport of Troops," by T. Clarkson, Esq.

Wednesday, 10th November.—"Our Food Supplies," by Douglas Owen, Esq.

Wednesday, 17th November.—"Use of Ski, and Training of British Soldiers for Duties on Snow-clad Frontiers," by Captain H. V. Knox.

Wednesday, 1st December.—"The Army as a Profession," by Major A. B. N. Churchill, late R.A.

Wednesday, 8th December.—"How Airships are likely to Affect War," by Major B. Baden-Powell.

II. ADDITIONS TO THE MUSEUM.

370. Model of the Royal Artillery School, Aldershot, War Memorial, erected in the Mall facing the Duke of York's Steps. The extreme width will be fifty feet, and the height to the central group, measured from the top of the steps to the summit, as tall as the building. The Memorial is being erected by W. R. Cotton, Esq., A.R.A.

—Deposited by the Royal Regiment of Artillery.
Seven Line Engravings, published by Colnaghi & Co. in 1814, by Charles Heath, after H. E. Bouverie, entitled:—
"The Landing of the British Army at Montego Bay,"
"The Battle of Waterloo,"
"The Bridge of Sighs,"
"The Bridge of Nothin',"
"The Attack of the Kent Guard of the French at Solmsdoel,"
"Passage of the Dunes by the Division under Lieut. General Havelock, Edward Page,"
"Passage of the Dunes by the Division under Lieut. General Sir John Murray."—*Purchased.*

THE EXPEDITION TO SICILY, 1718, UNDER SIR GEORGE BYNG.

By Captain H. W. RICHMOND, R.N.

On Wednesday, 17th March, 1909.

Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir GERARD H. U. NOEL, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., in the Chair.

SIR GEORGE BYNG'S Expedition to Sicily with a squadron of English men-of-war is better known by the action of Passaro than by the succeeding events which occupied it for two years. The naval historians have generally treated the battle itself in some degree of detail, but have dismissed the combined operations in which the squadron was an all-important factor in a few sentences. Thomas Corbett's Tract of 1739 gives a very full description, as also does Cust's Annals of the Wars of the Eighteenth Century. Neither of these books are, however, commonly met with, and that fact, and the interest inherent to the Expedition, must be my excuse for making it the subject of a paper. The authorities other than the above, on which my description is based, are the logs of the ships and the despatches from Byng to the Secretary of State and the Secretary to the Admiralty, and the out-letters of the latter to Byng, all of which are in the Record Office.

The causes leading to the rupture with Spain in 1718 may be briefly recapitulated. The Treaties of Utrecht and Baden had given satisfaction neither to Austria nor to Spain; the Emperor refused to renounce his claims to the Throne of Spain; the King of Spain declined to transfer the provinces in Italy and Flanders ceded to the Emperor by the Treaty. The hostility between the two Powers was brought to a head in 1717 by the arrest of Don Josef Molino, the recently appointed Inquisitor-General of Spain, while passing through the Italian provinces. Cardinal Alberoni, who had been reorganising the Spanish State, and desired peace to complete his labours, was obliged to bow to the storm this insult occasioned, and determined to make war with the same energy as he had pressed his reforms in peace. A force of 9,000 foot and 600 horse, with a train of artillery and engineers, was embarked in 80 transports at Barcelona, and, escorted by 9 ships of the line,

6 frigates, and some small craft, passed over to Sardinia, which belonged to the Emperor. The real destination had been kept secret, the intention as given out being that the Expedition was intended for service in the Levant against the Turks and for the relief of the garrison at Mallorca. Sardinia was quickly over-run, a garrison was left, and the remainder of the troops returned to Barcelona.

This breach of the peace by Spain was quickly followed by remonstrances from England and France, who were guaranteees of the neutrality of Italy. Endeavours extending over many months were made to effect a settlement of the quarrel by diplomacy; every effort possible was made by England to avert war; a Triple Alliance, developing later into a Quadruple Alliance of England, France, Holland, and Sardinia, was formed for the preservation of European peace, and among the offers made to Spain was the restoration of Gibraltar. Alberoni in the meantime carried on secret negotiations, offering Milan to the Duke of Savoy as an equivalent for Sardinia, urging the Turks to continue their war with the Emperor, and endeavouring to form an Alliance with Charles XII. of Sweden and the Czar of Russia for a combined operation against England and the restoration of the Stuarts. Spanish preparations continued on a large scale, and in the spring of 1718 orders were given to fit out a British Squadron for the Mediterranean. Byng hoisted his flag on board the *Barfleur* at the Nore on 1st May, sailed from the Downs three weeks later for Spithead, and lay there a week; he dropped down to St. Helen's on the 1st June, and there embarked three regiments of infantry from the Isle of Wight, with whom he was not much pleased. "I find," he says, "a great many of them miserable creatures, and not fit to serve. The best of them I shall pick out to endeavour to complete our complements, and the best of what shall be left I will put on board the fire frigates in the harbour, and discharge the remainder."

Byng's orders were extensive and his powers considerable; he was made a Plenipotentiary, and his instructions were to promote all measures that might best contribute to the composing of the differences between Spain and Austria, and to prevent any further violation of the neutrality of Italy. He was to endeavour to prevent any further hostilities and to arrange a peace; but if the Spaniards attacked the Emperor's possessions in Italy or the island of Sicily, he was to use all his power to hinder them and to defend the territories attacked, employing his squadron as necessary for that purpose.

Byng sailed on the 3rd June, called at Gibraltar, and passed on to Malaga. He communicated the object of his coming to the Ambassador at the Court of Spain. The answer received was short and to the point: "His Catholic Majesty has done me the honour to tell me that the Chevalier Byng may execute the orders that he has from the King, his master. Escorial, 15th July, 1718. The Cardinal Alberoni."

Having spent four days at Malaga, he passed on to Minorca, where he landed some troops and embarked some others, and, expecting the Spanish fleet would be at Naples, he sailed at once for that port.

The Spaniards had sailed from Barcelona on the 8th June, the same secrecy as to their destination being observed as in the Expedition to Sardinia the previous year. The fleet consisted of 12 ships of the line, 2 fire ships, 17 frigates, 7 galleys, 276 transports and 123 tartans, in all 438 sail, carrying 36,000 men, 8,000 horses, and all equipment and stores, and arrived off Palermo on the 19th of June. The troops, under the Sardinian Governor, Count Maffei, evacuated the town, leaving a small garrison in the citadel, which soon surrendered, and the Spaniards took possession of the town and a new 64-gun ship in the harbour. Further troops and supplies continued to arrive during the next fortnight, and a strong force having been left in Palermo, the fleet and army were moved to Messina. The troops at once invested the town, the squadron anchoring in Paradise Road, and a division of two ships and a frigate were detached to Malta to block up the Sicilian galleys which had retreated there.

Byng arrived at Naples late on the evening of the 21st July, heard there that most of Sicily was already in the hands of the Spaniards, and sailed on the 25th for Sicily to look for the Spanish fleet, "which," says he, "when I see, you will hear further account of." His intentions as to what he was going to do were quite clear. Writing on 12th July to Mr. Craggs while on his way to Naples, where he hoped to find the Spanish fleet, he says: "If my good offices shall not prevail, since we cannot come time enough to prevent their landing, and they will not withdraw their troops, I intend to attack their fleet and render them useless from either covering their army or bringing more succours to them, which I take to be the design of sending this fleet under my command into these seas."

Sicily, it must be borne in mind, belonged still to the Duke of Savoy, who, now that his possessions were over-run, desired the assistance of the Emperor to defend what remained to him in the island. "Nothing is more obvious," says Byng, "than that if the Spaniards are permitted to seize the kingdom of Sicily and keep possession of it, it is in order with more ease to invade the Kingdom of Naples." With Messina taken, a good harbour would be in their hands for their fleet to lie in, and the transport of their troops to Calabria, and their maintenance there would follow as an easy matter.

On the evening of the 29th July he came off the point of Messina and sent his first captain, Saunders, ashore in the admiral's 12-oared barge, with a letter to the Marquis de Lede, representing the good offices the King had used to compose the differences between the Crowns, and proposing a suspen-

sion of arms. The fleet anchored at 9 p.m. in line of battle about a mile off the shore, between the lighthouse and Messina.

At 5 a.m. the next morning, Saunders returned with the answer, which was to the effect that de Lede had no powers to treat, his orders being to seize Sicily for the King of Spain. On hearing this, Byng weighed. He had heard that the Spanish squadron had passed through the Straits of Messina the day before, and that it was gone to Malta, and his intention was to anchor his squadron before the town of Messina and remain there to prevent, if possible, further hostilities.

The Spaniards lying off Messina had heard of the approach of the English squadron on the 29th July by a felucca from the Lipari Islands which had sighted them, and a council of war had deliberated what should be done. Among the admirals was a renegade Englishman, by name Camocke who advised neutralising the English superiority in guns by anchoring the squadron in Paradise Road, where, supplemented by batteries on shore, the strong current of the Strait would make any attack other than by boarding a difficult one. His advice was not accepted, but no better plan was produced. Hoping in a weak manner that Byng came with pacific intentions, the squadron put to sea in a scattered formation of three separated groups on the morning of the 30th.

At 7 a.m. on the 30th, Byng's squadron passed through the Straits; an officer from the Governor of Reggio came on board and told the admiral the Spanish squadron was in sight from the town, and Byng signalled to make all sail. He passed Paradise Road, where a great fleet of transports lay, which saluted the admiral with a general discharge of cannon, returned by Byng with 21 guns. At 11 o'clock the *Superb* made the signal for seeing a fleet, and a little later the whole Spanish squadron was in sight. Touch was kept with them, the *Grafton* and *Superb* being thrown out ahead and showing lights throughout the night, and at 4 o'clock next morning the Spaniards, very much separated, were seen. Six ships, detached to attack a division of six Spanish ships and a large number of small craft, were in action by 7 o'clock; by eleven o'clock the main body was in action, and a running fight, lasting till half-past six, followed, in which out of 29 ships of all classes, 15 were taken and 14 escaped, of which 4 were captured later when Messina fell.

In speaking of his reason for attacking them, Byng says: "I would have thought myself inexcusable to have suffered Sicily to be attacked, the Spanish fleet in my sight in order of battle pretending to engage my master's fleet, and let them go unfought to Spain in order to return with greater fleets and forces to execute their further designs in Italy, which they threatened to do." The greater fleets he referred to were new ships to the number of 10 or 12 building in the Biscay ports, to be ready in March to go to Barcelona and Cadiz for their arma-

ments, Sicilian ships and galleys already taken, or bound to be taken, and others the King of Spain was buying in Genoa and Venice, which would make up a fleet of 50 sail next summer, with which the openly talked-of invasion of Naples would certainly follow. "Further," says Byng, "the Spaniards have already seized British merchant ships to use as transports, interrupting our trade, and have taken seamen out of our ships, and with this fleet they propose to have next year, they will give laws in the Mediterranean even to our trade."

The first step towards the attainment of his object—but only the first step—had been taken by the destruction and dispersal of the Spanish squadron. There was still an army of 36,000 men to be dislodged from the island. The situation in the island was that the Sardinian troops, reinforced by 1,000 Austrians whom Byng had brought from Naples, held the citadel of Messina; the town itself was in the hands of the Spaniards. Sardinian garrisons still held Trapani, Syracuse, and Melazzo. The whole of the remainder of the island was in the hands of de Lede's troops, and the population was in favour of the Spanish Crown.

Byng could do nothing to dislodge the Spaniards without the co-operation of troops in the island; but the help of the squadron was necessary to protect the communications of those troops and prevent the arrival of Spanish reinforcements; a complete blockade of the island was thus demanded. The main bodies of the Spaniards were at Palermo and investing Messina, about 12,000 or 14,000 foot and 3,000 horse round the latter, the remainder in the vicinity of Palermo, and blockading Melazzo, Syracuse, and Trapani. Of Austrian troops there were not more than 7,000; another 6,000 were expected from the Milanese, but were not likely to arrive before October, when the season would be very advanced for opening a campaign. The approach of winter brought with it other considerations: bad weather and no port in which to shelter would make the work difficult for the squadron if Messina fell; and Byng wrote home saying he feared it would be absolutely necessary to winter abroad, "as," he says, "there will be so many services to do, in convoying the troops, ammunition and provisions over to Sicily, cruising to intercept the Spanish succours which must come by sea, and covering the Germans from the insults of the Spaniards, which would still happen should our fleet retire out of these seas; and the necessity of cleaning the ships of the squadron from time to time, which must relieve on these various services, will make the number not too many with us." The minimum number he required was 20 of the line, the Spaniards still having 17 ships in those waters, and by the nature of the services required, Byng's force was obliged to be scattered. "If," he says, "the strength was always to be kept together, probably a less number would do, but when there is a necessity to divide your fleet in several little squadrons, you may expose them to insult."

Byng urged the Austrians to attempt a sortie from the citadel of Messina and recapture their outer defences, as the citadel must otherwise fall. His suggestion was to carry all the Austrian troops across from Reggio and concentrate them in and about the citadel, to make a demonstration with the fleet to the northward and southward of the town in order to draw off some of the investing army by threatening their wings, and himself to lend 500 men from the squadron to hold the citadel, so that the entire garrison would be available for the sortie. However, the generals did not think this practicable, and on the 28th of September the inevitable happened—Messina capitulated, the garrison being allowed to march out with the honours of war and to be transported to Reggio.

In the meanwhile Melazzo had been inspected by General Wallis, who went round by sea in the galleys covered by two ships of the line. His object was to see how far it would serve for the assemblage of a large force when this should arrive, and as a base from which to operate either for regaining Messina or for attacking the communications of the Spaniards with the open country, whence they drew their supplies.

Byng's ships were now fully employed. Some were escorting the Messina garrison to Melazzo and to Syracuse, others were sent to Naples and Genoa to convoy the troops thence to Sicily; a division was stationed between Melazzo and Messina to prevent interferences by sea with the preparations at Melazzo, and all which could be spared were sent to Mahon to clean, that they might be ready as soon as possible for service again. The Spanish prizes taken at Passaro were sent under their escort.

Byng's intention was to cruise with a small division under him between Palermo and Messina until late October, after which it would not be safe, as he says, "for the bigger ships to lie on an iron coast where there is not one harbour to go to for relief, nor in these parts, save only Syracuse, which is on the other side the island, and much out of the way for the services required."

Camocke, who had escaped from the English at Passaro, had made for Malta, and, lying there, prevented the egress of the Sicilian galleys. Byng therefore went in October with five ships and brought back the galleys, threatening to destroy the Spaniards in the harbour if they interfered, and then sailed for Naples to confer with the Viceroy as to the further operations for the reduction of the island, arriving in the Bay of Baiae on the 1st November.

Here, indeed, his presence was urgently required. By the terms proposed by the Quadruple Alliance, Sardinia was to be transferred by the Emperor to the Duke of Savoy in exchange for Sicily; but Sardinia, which he was to receive, was altogether in the hands of the Spaniards, as was most of Sicily; and until he could obtain some guarantee that effective steps would be taken to put him in possession of Sardinia,

the Duke declined to allow the Austrians to make any settlement in Sicily or establish any magazines. Byng worked hard to obtain an agreement which should overcome these difficulties—the outcome of mutual distrust. He pointed out how impossible it was for the Austrians to make any headway in the island unless the two countries joined hands and acted together; but the Marquis de Breil, the Minister of Savoy at the Neapolitan Court, declined to give any orders for his troops to assist the Austrians until certain points were agreed to. These included the equal distribution of prizes, the putting of recaptured territory in Sicily under the jurisdiction of the Sardinian Governor, and an undertaking that the Sicilian galleys should not be called upon for service in greater numbers than the Austrians. At a meeting at Byng's house he urged de Breil to modify his demands, showing how impossible they rendered the whole operations, and, although from a military point of view he contemned the idea of sending an expedition to Sardinia as a separate undertaking from that going on in Sicily, yet in order to convince the Marquis of the good faith of the Allies, he advocated the raising of a second expedition for that purpose, and engaged at his own expense to pay for half the ammunition which the Duke of Savoy was to lend from Syracuse. "I was so sure," said he, "that His Majesty's intention was certainly to place the King of Sardinia in possession of that island, that I would take it upon me to be answerable for it, not doubting that the Powers that should find the necessities would indemnify me, and not let me suffer in my fortune for what I mean in their service." He also offered to furnish 30 or 36 cannon, shot, and 1,000 barrels of powder taken out of the prizes, for which he would prevail with the captors to take such security as the Emperor would give. He suggested that 6,500 Austrian troops should be embarked at Spezia, Vado or Genoa, whence he would convoy them to Sardinia, and then take the transports to Trapani and Syracuse, for 5,000 Piedmontese troops in the garrisons of those places, whom also he would carry to Sardinia, himself lending some mortars and cohorts from Mahon.

Byng's earnestness and energy had their reward. Although the expedition as planned was not carried out, mutual jealousies were relieved by his straightforward and whole-hearted dealings. He saw that the first thing to be done was to take measures to get the two countries to work in unison, even if from a military point of view the plan was a weak one involving a dissipation of force, instead of a concentration on Sicily followed up by reduction by similar means of Sardinia; and in writing to Craggs he pointed this out and urged that the Court of Turin should exercise a little patience and keep their garrisons in Sicily until the Spaniards had been beaten and Messina retaken.

In the meantime affairs had been critical at Melazzo; the transports bringing reinforcements from the Milanese had been delayed by bad weather, and took no less than 34 days getting

from Genoa to Naples. The Spaniards had made use of the time to entrench themselves strongly round Melazzo, and had been receiving reinforcements from Italy run across in French and Genoese ships. Provisions and stores reached them in the same way in neutral bottoms, under pretence of being laden for Malta. Added to this, Camocke, taking the opportunity of our ships being off Melazzo, and leaving Messina open, slipped across and got into Messina, while, owing to lack of stores at Mahon, the ships sent thither in August to clean had not yet returned, though they had been more than three months absent. In January bad weather drove the British squadron away, and prevented supplies from Calabria reaching the garrison. Camocke again seized his opportunity, came out, and by a stratagem nearly captured the supply ships in Tropea. Byng, at Naples, hearing of the straits to which the garrison was reduced, at once embarked provisions on board three ships which had opportunely arrived at Naples from Mahon, and sent them with orders at all risks to relieve it, and this they did when the troops were in their last extremity. Orders also were sent express to Reggio for Mathews to try and intercept Camocke; but none of the three squadrons were so fortunate as to fall in with him. The continual sea cruising in the winter had caused the squadron to suffer severely. Five ships were cruising off Reggio, four off Melazzo, two small ships were on the Riviera for the protection of trade, where Byng says: "The Consul at Livorne writes me they have saved the nation more than £200,000." Five others were at Mahon refitting, having relieved four which had come thence with Mathews and been sent to Melazzo with provisions. Byng himself now went to Mahon to expedite the work of repair, and in writing to explain how impossible it was to send ships home, as the Admiralty desired him to do, he points out again and again the numerous services the operations of a sea blockade demand, even though the enemy's forces be small.

Troops were now being got ready for the approaching spring campaign. It was expected that about 14,000 Austrian foot and 2,770 horse would be available for operations in Sicily against the Spaniards. In February the siege of Melazzo was breaking up, but the squadron had been unable to prevent the Spaniards getting reinforcements into the island. During Mathews' absence from off Palermo, four battalions were passed across from Sardinia, giving them 19,000 troops in that part of the island.

Writing in March, Byng says: "I may without vanity say had I not remained on the coasts of Italy and at Naples, Melazzo with that little army in it must have been entirely lost to the Emperor."

Byng did not remain long in Mahon; the stores there were in a very bad condition and delayed him and his squadron more than he liked, no fewer than 11 of his ships being laid up at the same time. During his absence Camocke had a narrow

escape of being captured, as a frigate—the *Pearl*—in which he was making his passage to Palermo was taken off Taormina, but he managed to get ashore. He had endeavoured to corrupt Captains Walton and Hamilton, offering them each £10,000, a peerage in the United Kingdom, and a Blue Flag if they would bring over their ships to the service of King James. He also approached Byng on the same question. The offers were treated with scorn and indignation by the recipients; and this is the last we hear of Camocke in this campaign.

In consequence of the failure to take Melazzo, the loss his troops were suffering, and the increasing difficulty of getting reinforcements which would follow when the squadron got to sea again in full strength, de Lede, the Spanish general, began making overtures to evacuate Sicily; but in this matter Byng had already made his mind quite clear, and he had no intention whatever of allowing the troops to leave the island and be set free to serve elsewhere, until the King of Spain acceded to the demands of the Triple Alliance.

On his return to Naples in the early days of April he received news of the intended invasion of England from Cadiz. Alberoni, finding his plans in the Mediterranean held in check by England, determined to try and make a diversion near home by means of a threat of invasion. The death of Charles XII. had removed the assistance he hoped for in the north; but with a reckless disregard of consequences he launched a small army of 5,000 men from Cadiz against England. To its failure and the subsequent operations on the Atlantic coast I will not refer here. A home squadron, under Sir John Norris, provided sufficient protection in the Channel, though it may be remarked that troops were brought over from the Netherlands and States General. The only effect on Byng's operations was that on hearing of the intended invasion he sent home two regiments to Plymouth at once.

The co-operation of the Sardinian troops had at length been agreed to, and a Convention of mutual assistance, arrived at largely by Byng's influence, was signed on the 22nd April. On the 24th April the Austrian general to command the forces in Sicily arrived at Naples, where 13,500 troops were assembled, the Melazzo garrison numbering about 8,000 more; and their employment formed the subject of an immediate conference. They might either be carried to Palermo, leaving a sufficient garrison at Melazzo, and thence advance to the eastward on Messina, or they might land near Melazzo and act in conjunction with the garrison, and so advance on Messina. The latter plan was urged by Byng, as it struck sooner at Messina, where the remains of the Spanish squadron lay. The capture of the port would relieve any anxiety as to the part those ships could play in the future, and would provide a much needed harbour for shelter. The destruction of the Spanish ships was still to Byng a matter of importance for another reason, namely, that the armament at Cadiz might be intended to join the ships

at Messina; this Mathews' small squadron would be unable to prevent, especially if they first made a junction with the recently built ships in the Biscay ports. The Duke of Berwick, however, with a body of French troops, assisted by a small British squadron, had already started on the expedition in which he burnt the ships at Port Passage and Santona. Byng did not know what might be happening, and could not but view with apprehension the possibility of the incursion of a fresh concentrated squadron among his units scattered in small detachments on their several services. However, "if they went," says he, "towards England, I am told there has been some pretty smart Protestant winds in those seas, such that I am in no pain for what they can do against England, especially since you have that great strength at sea (Norris with a squadron was cruising off the Lizard) that I am informed are looking out for them," and he hopes "the Duke of Berwick has been sincere in his intention to put an end to the ships building at Passages."

On the 22nd May he sailed from Naples with the transports carrying 12,000 foot and 3,000 horse, escorted by 7 of the squadron. The Spanish squadron in Messina was being watched by 4 more; 2 were at Gibraltar, and 8 still at Mahon delayed by want of stores. The passage was short; Count de Merci, the Austrian general, who embarked on board Byng's flagship, went on ahead when they got near Sicily to confer with General Zumjungen, the commander at Melazzo, and on the 27th the fleet and transports anchored between Pattee and Olivetta, which is not far from Melazzo. The disembarkation of the troops began at daylight next morning, and the whole force was landed by 8 a.m.—a good piece of work—and marched up to and occupied the heights of Olivetta. On their arrival the Spanish army holding Melazzo decamped, and not being strong enough to engage the Austrians, fell back. The fleet moved round to Olivetta and there landed the field pieces and other stores without interference, and next day dropped round to Melazzo and landed the remaining horse—about 600—and all the transport of the army.

The Spaniards fell back into the difficult country between Melazzo and Messina and occupied a strongly entrenched position at Franca Villa; their further retreat might be either to Messina, Syracuse or Palermo, Franca Villa being the junction of the roads to these places. Intercepted letters indicated that Messina was their destination, and in consequence Byng had already taken the precaution to get all the galleys, both Austrian and Sicilian, massed in the Straits to intercept supplies of all kinds from Catania to Messina. The lack of ships was still hampering him, those at Mahon not having yet returned owing to the slowness with which their careening proceeded through lack of stores and caulkers, though more ships were badly wanted to shut out succours coming to Palermo from Spain and Italy.

After landing the troops, a small force of 2,000 foot and 120 Dragoons was passed over to the Lipari Islands under the convoy of 2 galleys and 2 frigates. The Liparese opposed the landing, but it was soon effected and the castle taken. "The Liparese," says Byng, "are a nest of robbers, and cruise upon and infest our embarkations."

A close watch on Messina was now kept by the Squadron under Mathews; it was noticed that the ships inside the Mole were getting ready to sail, but the blockading squadron lay observing them with such care that escape was impossible.

The advance of the Austrian army began on the 17th June. Byng, joined at last by three more ships and the bomb vessels, moved round the coast, taking with him the transports and the ships with provisions for the army, towards Taormina, the point for which the Austrian general intended to march. His stores would thus be ready for him on his arrival. Three days later de Merci attacked the Spanish army in a strong position in the hills round Franca Villa, with the result that he advanced his forces about 8 or 10 miles, but lost 2,500 men, and found himself unable to proceed any farther on account of the strength of the Spanish position, their troops well entrenched and their front protected by a river. Merci himself was wounded, communication between Melazzo and Franca Villa was cut by the armed peasants, and the situation was critical. Directly Byng heard from the commander of the galleys off Messina that this severe action had taken place he sent his flag-captain to the Governor of Melazzo and begged him to send two battalions from his garrison to assist in establishing the communications between the army and the transports at Taormina. The general at once sent what was asked for, as well as 1,000 newly arrived recruits, and these Byng embarked without delay and carried round to Taormina, where General Wackendon with 3,000 men and 500 horse had been sent in advance to open the communications with the army and supply provisions from transports in the anchorage. The reinforcements thus rapidly provided were of value; an attempt by the Governor of Messina to cut the communications, by means of a sortie with the garrison, was frustrated.

The same evening that Byng made these arrangements he received a letter from de Merci, asking him to come and join him at the camp and to consult on what should be done in the critical juncture. Byng at once embarked in a galley, previously dispatching an express to Naples to the Viceroy pressing him to send at once all the troops he could spare from that kingdom, "for," said he, "the whole of our affairs in Sicily depend on this action." He landed the next day and rode up to the camp to view the situation of the armies. Merci, wounded, lay in his tent; despondency had taken the place of over-confidence, and the strong position held by the Spaniards and the lack of troops sufficient to storm it induced him to propose placing his troops in cantonments and awaiting re-

inforcements, which he begged Byng himself to go to Naples and endeavour to procure, suggesting that those destined for Sardinia should be diverted to Sicily. A council was held next morning, all the generals and Byng being present. He expressed himself greatly averse from the proposition of keeping the troops inactive, the effect of which would be to give heart to the enemy, and pointed out that the way to Messina was still open. If Messina were taken, not only would it give the people a good impression, but, what was even more cogent, it would give a port for his ships and an admirable base of operations. He pointed out that the experience of keeping two squadrons at sea last winter, the one in the Straits of Messina and the other securing the communications of Melazzo with Calabria and Apulia could not be repeated without a sheltering port. The destruction of the Spanish ships there would set free his own, which he could then employ better on the coasts of Spain, "which," he says, "would straiten the enemy and obstruct their sending succours to Italy"; or, in other words, that it was easier to stop the Spaniards at their point of departure than on an extended coast.

The conference over, Byng returned to his ship and hurried away to Naples, where he at once had an interview with the Viceroy, Count Gallas, impressed on him strongly the critical nature of the situation, and urged that the Sardinian expedition should be deflected to Sicily and other troops for Sardinia provided. Writing to Stanhope, he begged him to press the Emperor to give orders to carry this out, in order, he says, "either to have the port of Palermo or Messina in his hands before the summer is over, for if he has it not it will be impossible, I think, to keep ships cruising on that coast without a port to go to. . . . If we do not have Palermo or Messina (the latter I could wish), I do not see how it is possible in the winter season to prevent the Spaniards being supplied from Spain or Italy, or the communication kept open with Calabria." Further, as far as the expedition to Sardinia was concerned, the nearest way to Sardinia was through Sicily.

Besides urging these points with the Austrian Viceroy, he argued similarly with the Sardinian Minister at the Neapolitan Court. Added to his difficulties, the Admiralty were pressing him to send home ships, and his replies contain lists of the disposition of the squadron, with a request that the Admiralty will give him their opinion as to how it should be employed, as they appear to think he does not require all the ships he has. Yet even what he had was insufficient entirely to prevent the Spaniards getting troops into the island; in July the division off Palermo captured three ships carrying 800 reinforcements from Sardinia. The arm of the fleet was, however, far reaching. The *Dragon*, commanded by Captain Scott, being detached at Lisbon, found there four transports getting ready for sea, which he stopped, and the troops were obliged to be disembarked and marched back through Portugal.

Having made his representations to the Powers at Naples, no more could be done till the assent of the Courts was obtained, and Byng returned to Messina in the end of July. During his absence Taormina had been captured by General Zumjungen, and the Austrian army, having forced two other passes without great difficulty, were now encamped on the south and south-west sides of Messina, but were not sufficient to invest the town completely. However, on the 8th of August, Messina opened its gates and the Spanish garrison retired into the citadel. The end was now near, and the blockading squadron was moved close in to prevent the escape of the Spanish ships, on which the latter struck their yards and topmasts, "so that I think we shall not hear of them at sea this summer."

The question as to whom these ships should belong on the fall of Messina was now imminent, and I cannot do better than quote Byng's words: "Though the King in his great goodness has been pleased to give to his seamen such prizes as he shall take, and thinking we shall have a just claim to those when the citadel shall fall, yet the King of Sardinia's Minister laying claim to those which were his master's ships, which are two of the best of them, and the Emperor's officers may think that they have a right to them as falling within their port. To avoid all disputes I have desired General Merci that a battery may be raised to destroy them, and have offered some carcasses to endeavour to burn them. He has promised me they shall be destroyed, and then I am sure we shall be at the expense of no more squadrons to attend them." There is no suggestion in any of his letters of destroying every maritime rival of Great Britain in the Mediterranean; his object was to get the work done, and to effect this unanimity was essential. Disputes about prizes could only cause friction and weaken the combined forces, and Byng spared neither trouble nor his own pocket to make matters work smoothly. It must be borne in mind that in any case some of the prizes would have fallen to the fleet, and his share of the prize money might have been, with a lesser man, a consideration affecting his actions.

On the 10th August he heard that his efforts at Naples had been successful; the troops from the Milanese intended for Sardinia were to be sent to Sicily. Matters at Messina being satisfactory, Byng felt his presence no longer necessary there, and always wishing to be where he could most assist the common cause, he sailed next day for Genoa to hasten the transportation of these troops. He left 6 ships in the Straits of Messina, 4 off Palermo, 3 were at Mahon cleaning, 5 were on transport convoys, 2 cruising for protecting trade on the coast of Genoa, and 2 conveying store ships home.

On his way he called at Naples, where he was able to stir up the ill-prepared Neapolitan Government, and then sailed for Vado. The troops were not ready, and he was delayed three weeks in Vado Bay. By the 28th September they had arrived and been embarked, and he sailed at once for Messina,

and found on arrival on the 9th October that *Merci* had carried out his wishes, and four of the biggest Spanish ships were sunk. His arrival was opportune; *Merci* was in such want of powder that the progress of the siege was delayed, and the powder vessels sent on ahead by Byng were most welcome. De Lede had retired to Lentini, to the southward of Catano, and does not appear to have hampered the operations which now progressed with redoubled vigour. The completion of the work of transporting the troops from Genoa left free some of Byng's ships, and he at once detached the *Orford* and *Rupert* to the Gulf of Rosas to assist the Duke of Berwick, whom, he was informed, was operating in those parts, and "so soon as Messina shall be taken," he told the Admiralty, he would be able to send home three more ships.

Messina citadel surrendered on the 18th October, and the Spanish garrison was embarked on transports and carried to Augusta. De Lede fell back and established his main body in a formidable position at Castro Giovanni.

Although Messina was taken, the difficulties were not yet over for this year's campaign. The district had been stripped by the Spaniards, and it would not support the Imperial army, so that the hoped-for project of wintering there was not to be realised. The Spaniards held the great reserves of grain in the Palermo district, and, although an advance on Palermo was the movement most to be desired, it presented great difficulties. To march there with de Lede in his strong position on the flank at Castro Giovanni, was impossible. The transports could not carry the whole army, as most of them, the settees and tartans, were unsuitable for use in the winter weather now approaching, and to send the troops round one-half or one-third at a time was to expose them to attack in detail. Trapani, standing on a neck of land, although it might be held against an attack, could quickly be starved out, as there were no supplies in the district, and until supplies could be collected and magazines formed, it appeared that matters were at a deadlock.

Once more Byng saw and provided the way out of the difficulty. Although Trapani had no provision, grain could be got from Barbary, and he proposed sending as many troops as the transports would carry to Trapani and supplying them with provisions from Tunis, the nearest port on the African coast. One difficulty remained: the Austrians had no money, and the Moors would not sell except for ready money. This was solved by Byng, who collected and advanced them a sum sufficient to pay for a present supply.

Affairs were got in train at once. A man-of-war and two transports went to Tunis for grain, and the embarkation of the first half of the army began. These sailed on the 11th of December, and were safely landed at Trapani; the operation was answered by Lede, who moved his army in the direction of Palermo, leaving a garrison at Castro Giovanni, and took up a position between Monreale and Carini to cover the Caricatori, or grain supplies.

Byng sailed with the transports on their second journey on the 14th January, and reached Trapani after a bad passage of 15 days. He found the Spanish Army about 12,000 strong on lines from Allano to Castel Vitrano, the Imperial Army of about 10,000, between Trapani, Marsala, and Mazzara; both were weakened below their full strength owing to the numerous garrisons they had detached, and the Spaniards were said to have lost about 7,000 men in the field and by sickness.

Having seen affairs in a satisfactory state, Byng returned to Naples, there to arrange measures about victualling and stores, leaving Saunders in command at Trapani with five ships and two bombs. The Austrian advance began on the 12th February. De Lede, finding his chances of success very small, proposed to evacuate Sicily on the condition of taking his troops back to Spain, and to this the Austrians were prepared to assent, as it would put Sicily into their hands without further trouble; but the English Admiral could not look upon the setting free of a large army, which might be employed against England or France, in the same light, and refused to assent until the King of Spain should have acceded to the whole demands of the Quadruple Alliance. The advance, therefore, continued after a discussion of the proposal, and more troops were brought round from Melazzo by sea.

Byng left Naples in March, and returned with powers to treat for the evacuation. When he returned the Austrian camp was at Castel Vitrano, and the Spanish army was falling back before de Merçi, in the direction of Palermo. The Austrian advance along the coast was assisted by the fleet which coasted along supplying the troops with provisions and necessaries, and carrying the heavy guns for the reduction of Palermo.

On the 20th April, the fleet reached Mondello Bay; here de Lede communicated with Byng and tried to arrange for a suspension of arms by sea; but Byng, suspecting an artifice to detach him from the Austrians, declined to make any arrangements in which they also were not concerned.

On the 26th, a division of Austrians under Nypperger assaulted Monte Pellegrino, supported by the fire of three ships, and attacks took place on all parts of the Spanish lines. On the 2nd of May some Austrians surprised a redoubt which commanded the line of the camp, the garrison of which, as Corbett puts it, was "taking a siesta according to the custom of that nation," and a general attack on the whole line was about to take place when a Felucca arrived, bringing orders to de Lede from Spain for an unconditional evacuation of Sicily.

On the 6th of May, the Convention was signed and arrangements begun for transporting the troops: the first lot of Spaniards—12,000 foot and 600 horse—were ready to sail on the 10th of June, and another equal number was taken away in August, when Byng sailed for Cagliari to settle the evacuation of Sardinia and its transfer to the Duke of Savoy. The squadron returned to England, and Byng, having completed "everything

I had in command for His Majesty's service," sailed for Leghorn, thence to go to Hanover to report his proceedings to the King.

The description I have given of this expedition is, of course, a very sketchy one. The whole of the history of this little war still remains to be written in detail, and my purpose has been merely to bring out, as fully as the time at my disposal admits, that part of the combined operations dealing with the invasion of Sicily, and the share taken by the British squadron under Byng. One cannot read his despatches without receiving a profound impression that Byng was a commander of a very fine type. At no part of the proceedings do we find him unprepared for whatever eventualities occur. Personally, I do not agree with the criticism that he showed a lack of scruple in attacking the fleet of Spain off Passaro before any declaration of war had been made. His orders were clear that, if the good offices of his King, in attempting to compose the differences between the King and Emperor were not accepted, he was to use the whole power of the fleet to resist all who should invade Italy. He came and found Sicily in the hands of the Spaniards; he attempted to obtain a cessation of arms, and received a blunt "No" for an answer. His orders were to use the whole power of his fleet to prevent an invasion; but the invasion had already begun, the Treaties had been broken, and the territory of a friendly Power, for the safety of which his King was a guarantee, had been seized in a time of profound peace. As an invasion could not be prevented, Byng could at least oppose its spreading; and no possible way existed other than the disablement or destruction of that which enabled invasion to be carried on—the fleet.

Again, the purpose of England at this time is spoken of as directed towards an establishment of her naval superiority at all costs. This appears to me a most unfounded deduction; she had certain treaty obligations to fulfil; she endeavoured, by diplomacy, to avoid war; and, if her purpose were to maintain a naval superiority by the immediate crushing of any rising naval Power, it is incomprehensible that she should have offered two important naval bases in the Mediterranean, without compensation, to that very Power. Byng's action in insisting on the destruction of the ships in Messina, is quoted as a further proof of this motive. His reasons, as set forth in his despatches, do not bear out this supposition in the smallest degree; there were ample reasons for decisively making an end of these ships. Disputes as to their possession, which would weaken the feeble ties holding the allies together, were at all costs to be avoided; his decision as to their destruction was made in July or August, at the beginning of the siege. The citadel did not fall till October. How long it might hold out Byng could not predict, but so long as it did so, a close blockade would have to be maintained to prevent the escape of those ships. A spell of bad weather, such as had driven Walton away for a

fortnight, might well recur in the late autumn, and enable this squadron to get away and join the ships which, information told him, were fitting out in Spain. The arrival of a concentrated squadron, even a small one, must be a grave consideration to any commander carrying on an extended blockade of scattered ships; a corresponding calling in of his single units would be necessary, and the whole outlying coast be thus thrown open for the entry of reinforcements to an army already larger than that of the allies. And, as I said before, the motive of self-interest might counsel an opposite course to that which he took.

To my mind these operations, from beginning to end, are most interesting, and show Byng in a very high light, whether as a commander, an ally, or a diplomat. His unfailing energy and resource, his readiness at all times to assist the common cause without hesitation, and his fine military instinct, all shine out in his despatches. There are many combined operations, some in which the naval and military forces have been of the same nation, and some in which two or more nations have been allied, which present a less pleasant picture of harmonious co-operation; and the ultimate success of this combined expedition to Sicily of three Powers was very largely due to the harmony in which they pursued their common aim. The man who had the largest share in securing this harmony, influencing the councils in camp and in court, reconciling the conflicting interests alike of seamen, soldiers, or statesmen, was undoubtedly the British Admiral, Sir George Byng.

Captain CHARLES SLACK :—I think this is a most desirable subject for the Institution to discuss, and if more papers on similar expeditions could be brought before us, I am sure it would be to our advantage. I think the lecturer is to be congratulated on the excellent paper he has given us, because he has had to make many researches to supply the details given in the lecture, and there do not appear to be many books available for the purpose. Not only naval and military but political points suggest themselves in a lecture of this kind. Captain Richmond has told us that he has only casually treated the subject, but I think so much of the paper that he has produced, that I feel sure that he could write a most excellent book on the subject with the details he can obtain from the Admiralty and other sources. I hope he will not think I am putting too much work before him, but I do think that if the history of this expedition was to be put into book form it would be appreciated by the naval and military public.

The CHAIRMAN (Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir Gerard H. U. Noel):—I think it is very doubtful whether any of us have before taken the view which has been described to us of this expedition. We have heard of the Battle of Passaro, which was hardly a battle, but simply a British force chasing a greatly distributed and broken-up fleet, evidently very unprepared for attack. You will remember an incident with regard to that battle which is often quoted. There was a certain Captain George Walton, of the *Canterbury*, who wrote a letter when off Syracuse on 5th August, 1718, describing the action. As has been pointed out by Professor Sir T. K. Laughton, it is a badly expressed letter, but it ends as follows: "We

THE FRENCH RAID IN IRELAND, 1798, AND
SHORT SKETCHES OF OTHER ATTEMPTS
AND LANDINGS ON THE COAST OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM.

By Colonel H. W. PEARSE, D.S.O. (Assistant Director
Q.M.G. Department, W.O.)

On Wednesday, 24th March, 1909.

Lieut.-General H. D. HUTCHINSON, C.S.I., in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN :—I am very sorry, and I am sure you will be sorry too, that official duties have prevented Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien from taking the Chair to-day as had been arranged. I have had, in consequence, at short notice, to throw myself into the breach. However, I hope that will not affect the interest of the lecture itself, the subject of which seems to be very *à propos* to the topic of discussion of the day, viz., the supremacy of our Navy. I will now ask Colonel Pearse, who is probably well-known to most of you as an experienced writer on military subjects, to deliver his discourse.

LECTURE.

IT is an old saying that history repeats itself, and this, for reasons that are fairly obvious, applies particularly to military history. The great leaders from time immemorial have studied the methods of their predecessors. Napoleon himself, that great and original genius, said that to learn the secrets of war it was necessary to read and re-read the history of the campaigns of the great commanders. Then, again, the frontiers of all countries having been originally determined by their defensive qualities, the localities of the initial stages of all wars have been and must be much the same. As is well known, so many campaigns took place in the low countries, that that region was long known as "the cock-pit of Europe," and it is interesting to note in this connection that Waterloo, the last great battle fought in this region, took place within a short distance of one of the Duke of Marlborough's battle-fields. Similarly, an extraordinary number of campaigns took place in the north of Italy in the plot of country which the old military writers styled "the Quadrilateral." There is use in the knowledge of these facts, for a knowledge of the history of the wars of the past enables us to estimate fairly accurately the probable conduct—at any rate, in their early stages—of the wars of the future, and to anticipate almost to a certainty the

scenes of their operations. I think, then, that a little time devoted to the raiding expeditions sent by France to operate in Ireland and England in the years 1796-98 will not be wasted. Those raids were, it is true, despatched in peculiar circumstances, and they were consequently defective in many respects. Still, they were not devoid of effect, and a study of their history will help us to realise the probability, or, as I hold it, the certainty that other raids, stronger, better organised, and better timed, will be directed against us hereafter in a period of difficulty.

The French expeditions originated thus: The Directory, which declared war against England in February, 1793, was in its early years too fully occupied by internal difficulties to embark on active operations against her, although from the first the revolutionary leaders looked upon this country as their arch enemy. By the middle of the year 1796, however, the Royalist insurrections in La Vendée and Southern France had been quelled, and the Republic had at its disposal the naval resources of both Holland and Spain, at that time considerable naval Powers. It seemed, therefore, to the Directory that the time had come for a blow against England. Their first design, strongly supported by Bonaparte, was an invasion of England itself; but this project, tempting as it was, was abandoned on financial grounds. France at the moment could not lay her hands on the funds necessary for so extensive an operation. The next best method appeared to be to assist Ireland, which was known to be preparing to revolt, and whose national leaders constantly appealed to the French Republic for assistance, and promised to put 280,000 rebels in the field if France would furnish them with arms and leaders, and throw a small but efficient force into Ireland as a rallying point.

Negotiations continued for a long time. France at first offered to send 25,000 men, under General Hoche, one of the most talented of the young generals of the Republic, but the Irish delegates at Paris considered that a force of 15,000 men would be sufficient, if supplemented by arms and ammunition for the rebels, and this help was eventually promised.

The naval position of England at this juncture must now be considered. It was by no means unfavourable.

England had in 1796 a great fleet, consisting of many powerful squadrons commanded by a body of admirals who had risen to their posts during many years of warfare. In this year, too, and particularly at the end of it, at the time of Hoche's expedition, our hands, from a naval point of view, were unusually free, and an exceptionally large proportion of the fleet was in home waters. This was because the operations of the army on the Continent had been abandoned, and no great undertakings were on foot in the West Indies. Consequently there were no naval lines of communication to be guarded. Finally, just as the French were completing their preparations for their Irish expedition, our fleet, for reasons on which it is unnecessary here to dilate, had abandoned the Mediterranean. "On December 1st, 1796, the Mediterranean was evacuated. For the first time

for generations not a single ship of the line lay or cruised in the waters of the Mediterranean."

It seems that at no time since England and the French Republic had been at war had the British fleet so free a hand for the defence of the shores of Great Britain and Ireland; at any rate, as far as external complications were concerned.

Nothing daunted, the French War Department set about its preparations, every detail of which was regularly reported by secret agents to the British Government. It was at first intended that the Irish expedition should sail from Brest in two divisions, each with its own escorting squadron, the first squadron being ordered, as soon as it had landed its troops, to sail with all speed for India, there to make a diversion by aiding Tippu of Mysore, the powerful Muhammadan ruler of the south who was at war with the English.

This plan was presently abandoned by desire of General Hoche, and it was decided to send the whole expedition at once, instead of in two divisions. The concentration of the escorting squadron was delayed by our fleet, but by 16th December all had assembled at Brest, and the expedition sailed that day with a fair easterly breeze. The naval force consisted of 17 ships of the line, 13 frigates, 6 brigs, and 7 transports (43 vessels in all). The troops numbered 18,000, with a large quantity of guns, ammunition, and other stores. They had, however, an inadequate supply of provisions for prolonged operations.

As this expedition, in spite of its successful concentration and start, resulted in failure, its history need not be told at great length.

Suffice it to say that from the first every move of the French squadron was watched by the English frigates, and full information sent to the admirals in the Channel. By dawn on 17th December the greater part of the expedition was clear of the coast and was unmolested, but the *Fraternité* frigate, carrying Admiral Morard de Galles and General Hoche (the naval and military commanders) was missing. Rear-Admiral Bouvet, the second in command, opened his sealed orders and learned that he was to make for the coast of Cork and cruise off the coast there for five days and await orders.

Bouvet steered due west till the morning of the 19th, when he altered course to the north. Soon after this change of course he fell in with some of his missing consorts, and by noon had with him the whole of the expedition except one 74, three frigates, three brigs, and two transports; that is, he had with him 34 vessels. Two days later (21st) Mizen Head was sighted, and soon after the admiral made the signal to prepare to anchor in Bantry Bay.

So far the expedition had been fortunate, and although the weather now changed and became unfavourable, General Grouchy, the senior military officer present, ordered the troops to land. Wolfe Tone, who was with Grouchy, states in his

¹Sir W. Laird Clowes' "History of the Royal Navy."

Memoirs that the troops could easily have landed when they first arrived, and that the opportunity was lost by the indecision of Admiral Bouvet. He adds that Grouchy often lamented to him that he had not thrown Bouvet overboard and landed the troops. The weather, however, became worse, the ships either voluntarily put to sea or were driven from their anchors, and when on 29th December the weather had become fair, Admiral Bouvet found himself nearly alone near the coast and headed for Brest, which he reached on 1st January, 1797.

Not long after Bouvet had left Bantry Bay, Admiral Morard de Galles and General Hoche arrived there with two ships, but could of course do nothing. On their return journey to France these ships, the *Revolution* and the *Fraternité*, on two occasions encountered English vessels, first meeting two frigates and afterwards being chased by Lord Bridport's fleet, but they got away safely and entered Rochefort on 14th January.

The losses incurred by the expedition in its return passage were, however, very heavy. Four large vessels had been wrecked, the loss of life in one ship alone (the *Droits-de-l'Homme*) being upward of 1,000 men. She was wrecked while fighting a severe action with two English frigates. Among the few survivors was General Humbert, whom we shall meet again. Two other vessels foundered in the storms that I have mentioned, and seven were taken—a total loss of 13 ships.

General Hoche's expedition, then, although it reached its destination with little loss, resulted in failure.

A few words may conveniently be said here as to its intended co-operation with the rebellion that was at the time preparing in Ireland.

The chief seat of activity in December, 1796 was the north. The plan urged by Wolfe Tone, the most able of the Irish leaders, was that some of the swiftest ships, carrying 2,000 troops and some light artillery, should sail wide of the coast and land the troops near Belfast. The whole north would then rise. Tone thought that all the troops in Ireland would then be sent to quell the rebellion and to deal with his 2,000 men, and that the fleet might also be withdrawn from the south. The road being thus clear, he proposed that the remaining 16,000 troops should be landed at Cork and march on Dublin, raising as they went the rebels of Waterford, Wexford, and Wicklow. The plan was not a bad one, and had it been carried out, the rebellion of 1796 would have been a much more serious one than that of 1798, bad as the latter was.

Hoche, however, as we have seen, failed, and General Lake, who was sent to reduce the north of Ireland to order, succeeded in his task. The rebellion was checked for a time, but broke out in 1798, again largely in consequence of promises of help from the French Republic. This help came in the form of another expedition, that commanded by General Humbert, which, as we shall see, did succeed in landing in Ireland; but before describing its adventures we must glance at the naval situation at the time of its setting out, and devote a few words to the curious episode

of the landing at Fishguard on 23rd February, 1797. This, again, though absurd in its history, was the unopposed landing of a French raiding party 1,200 strong, and on this occasion the landing took place on the north coast of Pembrokeshire. The troops were of bad quality, and had no fight in them, promptly surrendering to the Cardigan Militia and other local troops. Their written instructions, however, were serious enough. They were signed by Hoche, and were to burn Bristol, raise insurrections, and do what harm they could. In Wolfe Tone's Memoirs he says that the burning of Bristol would have cost England £5,000,000. What would it cost now?

Hoche, it may be added, died in Holland in 1797. Just before his death he was planning to cross over from that country with 14,000 French troops, which he had at his disposal, for an expedition to Ireland. Hoche, however, according to Wolfe Tone, wished to land at King's Lynn, in Norfolk, with 14,000 men and maintain himself there till the arrival of 14,000 more, which were ready to sail from France; then to make a dash for London.

Tone condemned this scheme. His own plan was to land with 12,000 men only, with six days' provisions, at Harwich or some point even nearer London, and then to make a forced march of three days on the capital. He believed that once in London, all the desperate characters, including thousands of Irishmen, would join them, and they could make their own terms by threatening to burn London. These schemes were less wild than they appear at a first glance, as the mutiny in the fleet was taking place at the time, and we were undoubtedly dangerously exposed.

We must now turn to the naval situation of 1798, which had considerably changed since 1796, and England had become relatively much stronger in the twenty months that had elapsed.

Spain and Holland were both at war with us, as I have already said. On 14th February, 1797, Sir John Jervis had defeated the Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent, inflicting heavy loss, and on 11th October the Dutch fleet was defeated off Camperdown by Admiral Duncan. Both Spain and Holland were thus disposed of for the time. As in 1796 England was employing little or no strength in the Mediterranean and in the West Indies, and in addition to the victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown, which of course greatly improved our position, the disaffection in the fleet had been brought to an end. In the following year, 1798, with which we are more concerned, the naval situation was, therefore, quite favourable. The only change—a very important one, it is true—was the despatch to the Mediterranean of 12 line-of-battle ships under Nelson. The army was, however, in very low water. The force in India had been considerably increased in consequence of the war with Mysore, and the terrible loss of life from disease in the West Indies had caused at home a great reluctance to enlist. The army was much under strength, and in Ireland, in spite of the imminent risk of rebellion, there were next to no regular troops.

Still, to turn our attention to the prospects of raids, the naval situation in home waters was, as I have said, distinctly favourable, and Lord Bridport, who, with several admirals under him, commanded in the Channel, had a great force at his disposal. It was well known to our Government, too, that the French Directory was pledged to co-operation with the Irish rebels, and there was no lack of anxiety in high places nor of vigilance in Lord Bridport and his subordinates.

It is, I think, fair to say that if in any year of our history it should, from ample warning and ample naval defences, have been impossible for an enemy to throw an expeditionary force on our shores, 1798 was that year. This is what happened.

The threatened rising in Ireland, which in 1796 had brought about the despatch of Hoche's expedition, developed in 1798 into open rebellion.

Apart from their natural sympathy (as Republicans) with the cause of rebellion, it was obviously to the advantage of the French Directory to lend every possible assistance to a rising which was calculated to hamper Great Britain in her other undertakings. As in 1796, however, the French were not able to complete their arrangements at the right moment, and the Irish rebellion of 1798 came to a head, ran its course, and was crushed by General Lake at Vinegar Hill before the intended expedition could be got ready. News, however, travelled slowly, and General Humbert set out at last, quite unaware that the golden moment had slipped past.

It had been intended that two independent expeditions should be sent on this occasion, one from Rochefort and one from Brest. Owing to a deficiency of funds, the arrangements at Brest were not completed in time, and the Rochefort division, numbering 1,100 men under General Humbert, set forth alone. It carried with it a large supply of arms and ammunition for the Irish rebels, and sailed from Aix roads on 6th August, 1798. It was conveyed in four ships of war, commanded by Commodore Savary.

The expedition was sixteen days at sea, and on 22nd August anchored off Kilcummin Head, at the mouth of Killala Bay, in co. Mayo. The troops landed practically unopposed on the same evening, and Commodore Savary returned to France, anchoring on 7th September in the mouth of the Gironde.

In Sir William Laird Clowes' "History of the Royal Navy," from which the above particulars are taken, the incident is thus treated: "That Savary escaped the attention, both going and returning, of the very numerous British line-of-battle ships and cruisers in the Bay and at the mouth of the Channel, and of the considerable squadron of frigates on the Irish station is, upon the whole, surprising; but it must be borne in mind that the expedition was one which in itself was impotent, either for good or evil."

Sir W. L. Clowes goes on to explain his meaning by relating the experiences of the second and larger expedition, consisting of ten ships, under Commodore Bompard, carrying 3,000

troops, which sailed from Brest on 16th September, with the object of joining hands with General Humbert, whom we have left for the moment at Killala.

Commodore Bompard's squadron, in which was Wolfe Tone, unlike that of Savary, was watched from the start, but nevertheless made its way to the Irish coast, heading for Lough Swilly. This was done because Bompard knew that Humbert intended to work northward from Killala.

Whether or not Bompard could have landed his troops at Killala is not quite clear from Laird Clowes' narrative; but, speaking subject to correction from a naval authority, it seems that he could have done so on 11th October. At any rate, he was not brought to action until the following day, when Commodore Sir John Borlase Warren fell upon him off Lough Swilly with a squadron of considerably superior strength. Bompard, after a gallant fight, was defeated with a loss of four ships captured and heavy casualties in killed and wounded.

We will now return to Humbert's expedition, characterised by Sir William Laird Clowes as "impotent for good or evil," which we left landing unopposed at Killala on 22nd August, 1798. The French troops numbered 82 officers and 1,017 of other ranks, under the command of General of Brigade Humbert, an experienced and practical soldier. The rank and file of the expedition consisted of veterans of the armies of Italy and the Rhine, who behaved throughout their service in Ireland with exemplary steadiness and moderation.

Humbert had with him muskets and ammunition for 4,000 Irish whose services had been promised by the revolutionary leaders, and about one thousand came forward on 23rd August and were hurriedly equipped and armed. Horses also were provided for the officers, the artillery, the transport, and for a party of 57 cavalry soldiers who formed part of the expedition. Sufficient carts and cars were collected for the carriage of supplies for the small column. Humbert saw at once that he had arrived too late, and that his landing place had been badly chosen. Connaught showed no enthusiasm, for the very recent losses of the rebels in Wexford and the other eastern counties had taken the heart out of the United Irishmen, who but six months earlier had boasted that they could put 280,000 men in the field. Reinforcements, too, had arrived from England in the shape of four regiments of Regular infantry and 12,000 Militia, and Lord Cornwallis had close on 100,000 men at his disposal, given time to collect them. (I must remind you that these 100,000 men were almost all Militia and Yeomanry, the latter very recently and hurriedly raised; the artillery, though of good quality, was very weak, and the Regular cavalry had been so long scattered in small detachments over the country as to be in a very unsatisfactory state.)

This large but weak garrison had, under political pressure, been very badly posted as regards defence by Lord Carhampton, who was Commander-in-Chief at the beginning of the Irish

troubles. Sir Ralph Abercromby had begun the task of concentration during the few months of his command, and General Lake had carried on this work, but still to collect any considerable force in the West of Ireland was at the moment of Humbert's landing a work of time. Humbert therefore found that no force of dangerous strength could reach him for several days, and being a bold and enterprising soldier he decided to advance, trusting that some unexpected successes might encourage the Irish to come to his aid in large numbers, and that meanwhile Bompard's expedition, whose arrival he daily expected, might join hands with him. To aid its landing, and as a base for himself, Humbert formed a *depôt* of 100 men at Killala, under an officer named Charost, who almost immediately obtained enough Irish recruits to exhaust his supply of arms. These men were, however, of poor quality, and showed no desire to take the field. The bold spirits of the neighbourhood had doubtless all come in on the first day.

Humbert wasted no time in inactivity, but on 24th August, the second day after his landing, sent a detachment under Colonel Sarrazin, his second in command, to reconnoitre the town of Ballina, about six miles to the south-east of Killala. Finding that no serious opposition was yet prepared, General Humbert advanced with his main body and occupied Ballina in the evening. The French troops that advanced numbered 1,000 men, and were accompanied by armed Irish, whose strength has been variously stated at from 1,000 to 2,500 men. Having made some prisoners, the French returned to Killala.

The news of Humbert's landing reached Dublin that same day (24th August), and British troops were now rapidly approaching the scene of action. Major-General Hutchinson (afterwards Lord Donoughmore), who commanded in Connaught, had not waited for orders but had promptly collected the available troops from Galway, Tuam, Gort, and Athenry, and on the day that Humbert occupied Ballina was at Castlebar, some 26 miles to the south, with about 1,600 Militia and Yeomanry, 80 men of the 6th Regiment, and a detachment of the Royal Irish Artillery with 11 guns. There was on the same date a smaller force, some 1,200 men, under Major-General Taylor, even nearer to the French. Taylor had been ordered to join Hutchinson at Castlebar, but had taken up a strong position at Foxford, 16 miles from Castlebar and only 10 from Ballina. Lord Cornwallis himself was marching from Dublin towards the invaders, collecting troops as he went, and sent Lieut.-General Lake forward to assume the command in Connaught. Lord Cornwallis had been unable so far to learn what was the strength of Humbert's force, and he had been informed that other expeditionary forces were either on the sea or preparing to embark. He was therefore naturally uneasy at the advanced positions taken up by General Taylor and General Hutchinson, and desired to have a man on the spot with more war experience than Hutchinson, the senior of the two. Lord Cornwallis has

been accused of timidity in dealing with Humbert's expedition, but it must be remembered that the British Government had been warned in March by their secret agents in France that 275,000 troops, under all the leading generals of the day, including Bonaparte, were ordered to be within 24 hours' march of the French coast. The best informed military opinion in England was at the time that 40,000 troops, with the requisite proportion of guns, could be landed in Ireland.¹ Lord Cornwallis therefore had to take his measures with caution.

General Lake arrived at Castlebar at 11 at night on 26th August, and assumed command. He ascertained from Hutchinson that his troops were posted in readiness to meet an attack from the direction of Foxford. Hutchinson believed that this was the only practicable line of advance for the French, who must, as he thought, cross the river Moy by the bridge at Foxford, and the inference is that he had not examined the ground between himself and the French. It would not be fair to blame him for this omission without a full knowledge of the circumstances. It is quite possible that he had no opportunity of reconnoitring; his time was certainly short. Whatever the reason, the fact is clear. Neither Hutchinson nor anyone on his staff was aware that his position could be turned. The population for the most part was hostile to England and friendly to the invaders. Humbert therefore received the information that was denied to Hutchinson.

We will now return to Humbert, whom we left at Killala on the night of 24th August. On the 25th he resumed his advance at eight in the evening, and marched for four hours towards Castlebar. He then heard that General Taylor was at Ballina, in his rear, and fearing an attack on his base at Killala, hurriedly turned in his tracks. On reaching Ballina, Humbert found that Taylor had retreated to Foxford, and he therefore made a halt of 10 hours to rest his weary troops. At 3 p.m. on 26th August, Humbert again advanced towards Castlebar; but this time instead of moving along the high road to Foxford, which he knew to be blocked by Taylor, he marched, guided by an Irish priest, across the hills, following a little-known track, and came in view of Hutchinson's position before Castlebar, at about six in the morning of 27th August. The surprise was, however, not complete, for a loyal yeoman, whose farm was close to the mountain road, was visiting his cattle at 3 in the morning and saw a column of troops in blue uniform marching rapidly. He at once mounted his horse, galloped into Castlebar, and gave the alarm. The troops were quickly got under arms and placed in position on the heights above the town in the following order:—In the first line were the eighty men of the 6th Regiment, the Kilkenny Militia, and a detachment of the Prince of Wales' Fencibles. The guns were slightly in advance of the line. The Fraser Fencibles and the Galway Yeomanry formed the second line; and the mounted troops (part of the 6th Dragoon Guards

and the 1st Fencible Cavalry) were drawn up in line with them. The reserve, 4 companies of the Longford Militia, was posted in a valley, in rear of the Kilkenny Militia.

At 8 a.m. the French arrived within range of the British guns, and Humbert, halting his column under cover of the ground, rode forward and made a hasty examination of the British position. He then, without hesitation, advanced to the attack, placing his Irish Volunteers in the centre, with a weak French battalion on either flank. He held in reserve his third battalion and his mounted men, now about eighty in number.

The British guns, well and steadily served, opened an effective fire, directed chiefly at the French battalions in the first line, both of which were checked. The Irish in the centre pressed forward bravely, but being received by a heavy fire from the guns, at close range, broke and dispersed, taking no more part in the fight. The check of the French was of very short duration, for Humbert, seeing that the Irish Militia opposed to him had opened a wild and harmless fire, at once brought up his reserve, whereupon the battalions of the first line, veteran soldiers, quickly rallied. Sarrazin, the second in command, placed himself in front of the Grenadier battalion (which was on the left of the first line) and, bringing the bayonets to the charge, rushed forward with the Grenadiers in open order, followed by the remainder of the French troops. When they arrived within 150 yards of the British force, the Militia broke and fled in uncontrollable panic, leaving the guns to their fate, in spite of the efforts of all the officers and of the non-commissioned officers of the Longford Militia, who stood their ground after the regiment had broken. The detachment of eighty men of the 6th Regiment behaved well, and the Royal Irish Artillery, under Captain Shortall, were also steady to the last. Of the mounted troops a small body of Yeomanry, under Lord Roden, alone behaved well, the remainder quitting the field in a disgraceful and causeless flight, for the French were, of course, unable to make any effective pursuit. Deserted by the cavalry and by a great part of the Irish Militia, who openly joined the French, a few brave infantrymen rallied in response to the appeals of their officers, and, firing as they went from the successive walls and enclosures, formed up for a stand on the bridge of Castlebar. They had with them one light gun, manned by the survivors of the Royal Irish Artillery, which was placed on the bridge. The French, coming up, attacked this small party, which was eventually compelled to retreat after losing half its number. The British loss at Castlebar was returned as 53 killed, 34 wounded, and 279 missing—the last-named having fallen in the retreat or deserted to the enemy. The French casualties were 186, chiefly caused by artillery fire, and were heavy in proportion to their strength.

It is impossible to say positively what caused the misconduct of the troops at Castlebar, and their subsequent panic flight to Tuam, 30 miles from the battlefield. Something must, doubt-

less, be attributed to disaffection, for, according to French statements, 500 of the Kilkenny and Longford Militia deserted and joined them during the action; but sufficient explanation of the defeat is to be found in the superior quality of the French troops and the weakness of discipline of nearly all Hutchinson's force. There was really no great disparity of numbers between the two forces, and to Hutchinson's heterogeneous force, hurriedly gathered together and strangers to one another, and, in some cases, to their commander, the sight of Humbert's veterans rapidly advancing on them with their bayonets at the charge, must have been appalling. The "rages of Castlebar" are an unpleasant memory, but we need not use too hard expressions in regard to the troops who were beaten that day. There were traitors among them, but many were loyal and brave.¹ They were defeated because they met in the open field better troops than themselves.

We need not dwell on the history of the flight to Tuam. There General Lake succeeded in rallying his troops, and at once sent news of the defeat to Lord Cornwallis, who was at Kilbeggan with 8,000 men. Cornwallis advanced at once to Athlone, and, on 30th August, was at Ballinamore. On 4th September, he arrived at Hollymount, within 13 miles of Castlebar.

Up to this date Humbert had not moved after his victory, for he had been disappointed in his hope of a general rising of the country in his favour. Hundreds of recruits, it is true, had joined him, but they were ignorant and undisciplined, and could not be made quickly into soldiers by officers who did not know their language.

The approach of Cornwallis, however, made further delay impossible, and on the morning of 4th September Humbert set out, marching rapidly towards Sligo. Here he hoped to approach Bompard's expedition, the fate of which we know, but which he expected to land shortly in that direction, and he hoped to raise a rebellion in that part of the country where there were few British troops.

Lord Cornwallis had blamed neither General Lake nor General Hutchinson for the disaster at Castlebar, but entrusted to Lake the command of Taylor's force from Foxford, in addition to the loyal remnant of Hutchinson's force. With this body of troops Lake was directed to follow in Humbert's track, but as contradictory reports of the strength of the French had been received, he was told not to hazard a general engagement. Colonel Craufurd, afterwards a famous Peninsular soldier, was despatched with a small body of Yeomanry to harass the French column and keep touch with it. Lord Cornwallis himself marched towards Carrick-on-Shannon, in order to prevent a possible dash towards Dublin.

¹ They were the fathers and brothers of the men who, under strict discipline, fought so loyally and well for England in the Peninsular War.

Humbert's column approached Sligo early in the morning of 5th September, and here met with an unexpected check. He was opposed at Collooney by a small part of the Sligo garrison, which, under Colonel Vereker, had taken up a strong position there to check the French advance. Both sides were mistaken as to the strength of their enemy, Vereker believing that he only had to deal with a small detachment from Humbert's column, while Humbert assumed that Vereker's troops were the advanced guard of a large force. Vereker had, in fact, with him no more than 270 of the City of Limerick Militia, 30 dragoons, and 2 guns, but with this small force he held his position for an hour, and then retired in good order. His casualties were 9 killed and 22 wounded, and those of Humbert were said to be between 70 and 80. Colonel Vereker and his small force behaved admirably.

Leaving Sligo on his left, Humbert marched on at 10 p.m., spiking and abandoning his captured guns, and by noon on 6th September, he had reached Manor Hamilton, 22 miles from Collooney.

At this point Humbert changed his directions in consequence of exaggerated reports which reached him of risings in Longford and Westmeath. He, therefore, headed for Granard, and the British troops were thus enabled to surround him.

Marching south from Manor Hamilton, Humbert arrived at Drumkiern at 7 in the evening of 6th September. Here Colonel Craufurd, who had clung persistently to the French column, demanded a capitulation, which was refused, and at 9 next morning Humbert crossed the Shannon at Ballintra, Craufurd seizing the bridge before the French had time to destroy it behind them.

On the same day Major-General Moore (afterwards Sir John Moore), was despatched by Lord Cornwallis with 2,000 men and placed under General Lake's orders, so that Lake was now strong enough to attack. Lord Cornwallis himself was at French Park on the 6th, intending to cross the Shannon at Carrick, and to move up the left bank of the river. Cornwallis did, in fact, begin to cross the Shannon on 7th September, on which day, at 6 p.m., Humbert arrived at Cloone, with Craufurd still hanging on his flank, and closely followed by Lake's force.

The French infantry, which had shown the remarkable marching power of that army, was now exhausted by constant night marches in wet weather, and though a rapid move eastward was his only chance of escape from the converging columns of the British, Humbert was compelled to give his men a night's rest. At 5 a.m. on 8th September he again set out, heading for Granard, but at dawn that day Lord Cornwallis had arrived at Mohill, almost in view of the French, and Humbert was at last brought to bay.

Lake now received orders to attack the French rearguard, and bringing up his infantry at the best pace they could set after constant marching for four days and nights, he despatched some of his mounted troops to strengthen Craufurd, who at once

attacked the French rearguard near Ballinamuck. The rearguard, 200 strong, was compelled to surrender.

Lake then attacked the main body with his infantry, and after half-an-hour's fighting, Humbert's whole force surrendered. A French narrative, which appears to be very accurate, gives Humbert's numbers at the time of his surrender at 96 officers and 844 men, and agrees with General Lake's report in saying that the Irish portion of the force numbered 1,500 men.

Humbert's achievement was, in many respects, a remarkable one, though, from want of the expected co-operation of the other expedition, it soon ended in failure. Single-handed, however, he had kept the field for 17 days with eleven hundred Regular troops, very weak in mounted men and artillery, in a country garrisoned by 100,000 men.

It is true that Humbert failed in his main undertaking, which was to place himself and his troops at the head of an Irish national rising; but this was through no fault of his, for he was sent with an insufficient force and at the wrong moment. Still, he undoubtedly created a diversion, which occupied the garrison in Ireland for a considerable time, and might have had most serious results, and he deserves much honour for his courage and enterprise, and also for the admirable discipline which he maintained.

Humbert was well treated by our Government, and was soon released from captivity. He was in no way discouraged by the fate of his expedition, for he immediately offered to repeat his exploit, provided that he were given a force of 12,000 men.

In presenting for your consideration this sketch of the four French expeditions against Ireland and Great Britain in the years 1796-98, I do not propose to overstrain the parallel between those raids and the raids which will be attempted when, hereafter, England is again engaged in war with a European Power.

The French raids were launched by the Republic at a time of great difficulty, when the Revolution had destroyed the resources and organisation of France, and when stores and money for war did not exist. The Directory were misled, too, by false information sent them by the Irish rebels.

With all these drawbacks, we see that the raids of Hoche, Humbert, and Bompard all reached the Irish coast; that the filibustering raid against Bristol landed in Wales; and that Hoche was ready and anxious to attempt a landing in Norfolk.

True it is that all these raids failed of their intended effect, but this was because they were badly managed by the Directory, which had its hands full of other undertakings, to which they attached greater importance.

We can expect no such good fortune in the future. Raids will be directed against us again at a time when (as in 1796-98) we have few regular troops in the United Kingdom, and these raids will not fail, as did those which I have sketched,

from inadequate strength or from want of co-operation. They will not stand, as did the expedition of Hoche and Bompard, at the mercy of wind and tide. The crossing of the narrow seas is now a matter of hours—then it was the affair of days and even weeks. As for the probable strength of the raids of the future, we must look to the great forces available and the fact that three or four times the strength of Humbert's Expedition can be conveyed in one large ship of the present day.

If hereafter our navy is unable, as it was in 1796 and 1798, to prevent hostile expeditions from reaching our shores, we may then be certain that the consequences will be infinitely more serious than they were then.

The lessons of the French raids are many, and will suggest themselves to you, but I may be allowed to point out two as of special importance. The first—a naval point—that these crossings were effected, not by surprise, not in consequence of a naval disaster, nor in the absence of the fleet in distant waters, but after full and repeated warnings, and at a time when our Home Fleets were exceptionally strong, and were commanded by famous seamen.


The second point—a military one—is even more clear. The sad story of "the races of Castlebar" stands as a permanent illustration of the impotence of badly-trained, under-disciplined troops, against a force of veterans.

The story of the French raids, which I have very imperfectly told to-day, surely warns us that in future wars we must expect similar but better organised and more formidable raids; that we must expect them, or some of them, to reach our shores, and that we must have a highly-trained, highly-disciplined, and thoroughly effective defence force always ready to deal with them. This is the duty specially committed to the Territorial Force, which, in the absence of the regular army at the seat of war, wherever it may be, will be solely responsible for home defence. To fit itself for this arduous and vitally important task, sets before the Force, as a clear duty, the attainment of a high standard of efficiency for war. That they may be enabled, by timely preparation (for the discipline that makes an army is not the work of weeks or months) to reach that standard, must be the fervent hope of every Englishman who can understand the plain teachings of history.

Lieutenant A. C. DEWAR, R.N.:—All officers must be very much interested in the question which Colonel Pearse has brought before us to-day. I think there can be no doubt as to the possibility of a fleet of transports of a certain size crossing the North Sea, or any other sea, without being observed by our ships. I daresay some of you have read a very interesting article which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for February on the subject of invasion. The author endeavoured to prove that transports could not cross the sea without being observed; but there was a very transparent fallacy underlying the whole of the article. It treated of nothing but a force of, I think it was, 150,000 men—a very large force, anyhow; and it said nothing about these smaller



PLATE I.



forces of 12,000 or 15,000 men, of which Colonel Pearse has been speaking. Most of us are now agreed that, under certain weather conditions, forces of that size could cross the sea without being seen by our fleets. Having crossed the sea, it is merely a question of the time the enemy would take in landing their troops. If we could get our torpedo and submarine flotillas, or any other ships, to attack them while they were landing, well and good; if not, the repulsion of the attack would depend entirely upon the military and the forces they had at their disposal. I would also like to ask whether it would be necessary nowadays to send any troops to resist a force landing at such a spot as Sligo Bay in Ireland? An enemy landing there could not do very much damage.

Captain B. E. SARGEANT (12th Battalion The London Regiment):—As the lecturer has alluded to the raid in Wales, which directly concerns the island on which we live, perhaps a few words with regard to that raid might be of interest. The expedition, consisting of two frigates, one lugger, and one corvette, with a force of 1,400, sailed out of Brest, and first anchored at Ilfracombe, where the raiders did considerable damage by scuttling several of our merchantmen. They did not leave until the North Devon Volunteers appeared, and then they set sail, crossed the Bristol Channel, and landed at Fishguard. They chose a position which was very difficult for landing. The cliff was fairly steep, and it is recorded that they only gained the summit by climbing up on their hands and feet, throwing their muskets in advance. The enemy appeared on the morning of the Thursday, and by the evening of the same day a large local force was ready to receive them. This force, Colonel Pearse has told us, consisted mainly of the Militia, but I should like to ask Colonel Pearse whether I am not correct in saying that the bulk of the force was comprised of Fencibles, who exactly corresponded to the Territorials of to-day? There were 300 Fencibles from Newport and Fishguard, and 100 from Pembroke. There were also Lord Cawdor's troop of Yeomanry and 200 of the Cardigan Militia. The whole was under the command of Lord Cawdor, to whom the entire raiding party surrendered without a shot being fired. There also existed at this time what were known as armed associations, and perhaps it might be of interest to some if I said a few words about them. One portion of these associations was comprised of armed men, who corresponded very much to the Volunteers. The other portion, though unarmed, was considered to be able to do useful service by performing the duties of pioneers, drivers and boatmen, and it was also supposed to drive to places of security for their own troops the cattle and sheep, and to harass the enemy, as far as possible, by destroying bridges, burning crops, etc. It had also to look after the women and children, and perform other duties of that kind. It seems to me that at the present time some attention might be given to this matter, especially in connection with men who have seen service in the Territorial Force. There are many men of a non-military age who might be able to render services similar to these when required. They would, of course, have to be properly enlisted and given a uniform, and they would parade for instruction so many times in the year. I do not wish in any way to advocate or associate myself with the present mania for forming rifle clubs. I think these clubs are doing a tremendous amount of harm. They seem to me to be mere shirking places for men who ought to be in the Territorial Force, and they are interfering very largely with the recruiting of that force. The men join these clubs because they do not wish to endure the discomfort of discipline

and other sacrifices which obtain by joining the Territorial Force. I do not think such rifle clubs are to be encouraged. The men comprised in them would be worse than useless in time of need, for they would not submit to discipline. Of course, I do not wish to say one word against Rifle Associations, which are very different things. The late Volunteer Force and the Territorial Force owe an immense amount to the Rifle Associations throughout the country for the good they have done to them in furthering their shooting, especially to the National Rifle Association. There is a great difference between Rifle Associations and Rifle Clubs. The Rifle Clubs in many parts of the country, I am sorry to say, are largely run by publicans who encourage them so as to sell their liquors to the men who join.

T. M. MAGUIRE, M.A., LL.D. (Barrister-at-Law, Inner Temple):—As no one seems to be very desirous of dealing with this Irish topic, I think I may venture to say a few words; but first, as a Celtic native of one part of Ireland, whose Sept fought for centuries against the English, a part which, in case of war, Lieutenant Dewar would apparently abandon, and as having relatives in the other province which he would leave naked to our enemies, I most warmly urge on the audience not to abandon any part of Ireland. Quite apart from any duty to our fellow subjects, consideration of strategy, ever since the consolidation of the English and other monarchies at the close of the 15th century, all through the 16th and 17th, and, as the gallant lecturer has proved, in the 18th century, Ireland, especially when a large proportion of the natives were hostile, has been of great strategic importance. Even now, I take it, that any naval men here present will agree with me that the ports of Ireland, like Berehaven, Loch Swilly, Queenstown, and Galway Bay might be of vital importance. If we lost for a while command of the Channel, Ireland as a flank position, enabling our mercantile marine to get safely round to Glasgow or even Liverpool, and thence supply Southern England by rail, would be of no small service. Indeed, Ireland might become, especially in case of a war with the United States, as important, with regard to Great Britain, as the British Isles collectively are with regard to Europe at large; they are great outlying works, as it were, commanding the whole of the western entrances to European Seas. Therefore be warned by the lecturer's clear account of a few raids to put all your houses so in order that no other Power may be tempted to follow the example of the French, 1796-1798; at any rate, I beg of you not to hearken to our able naval friend, Lieutenant Dewar. Now as to the excellent speech of Captain Sargeant, I am in a difficulty about the Rifle Club. It has been my rôle in several capacities "to teach the young idea how to shoot," and accordingly I have recently become a target for his attack as having become a Vice-President of a Rifle Club. I see he disapproves, but then I agree with him that no Rifle Clubs, no half-drilled Militia, such as evaporated with speed at Castlebar, no Gambetta levies, no Spanish Guerrillas, no hordes of Cossacks, no Tyrolese marksmen ever have saved a State; nothing but a race of military men, thoroughly well trained and equal in every respect to a possible adversary ever saved a State. Not even my fellow Clansmen—fierce and brave warriors, animated by religious zeal—and helped by Spain at her best, could save Ireland from Queen Elizabeth's forces. My namesakes and the O'Donnell's, and O'Neill's, and all the Irish opponents of the English, 1590-1600, the victims of Cromwell at Drogheda, 1649, and of William III. at the Boyne, 1690, and

of Aughrim, and of Limerick, and the rebels of 1798, even helped by brave Frenchmen, fell in turn; but after desperate struggles, 150,000 perished, 1796-1800, alone. I wish Mr. O'Donnell, who knows more about this matter than I do, would throw some light on the strategy and tactics of Irish Irregulars. Why, but for Wellington's Regulars, the Spanish could not have held out one year after their small triumph at Baylen, which was soon followed by the disastrous defeat of Ocana. Now as to sea power, it is vital to England, but sea power alone never saved any nation; it must be supplemented or complemented by an army. Captain Sargeant was not full enough in his account of the raid on Wales. In point of fact the forlorn gang of *enfants perdu* were more frightened by the appearance of crowds of Welsh women in red cloaks and tall hats, whom they mistook for the advance guard of armies, than by the Militia. But in 1798 we had unquestioned sea power; we had just defeated the Dutch Navy at Camperdown, and the Spanish Navy at St. Vincent, and were about to defeat the French Navy at the Nile, and yet Bonaparte brought an expedition across the Mediterranean to Egypt, which he conquered, and French expeditions landed in Ireland. I have preached this doctrine again and again, and in vain; but I now hope even M.P.'s will soon see the force of Colonel Pearse's lessons and warnings. The gallant lecturer says that many members of the families of the rebels of 1798 fought with rare distinction in the Peninsula and at Waterloo. I bethought me of the wild cry of the men of Connaught when they drove back the columns of Massena at Busaco "Faugh-a-Ballaugh." What about the North British Celts? What about Waterloo?

"And wild and high the Cameron's gathering rose
The War Cry of Lochiel, which Albyn heard,
And heard to have her Saxon foes
With the breath that fills
His mountain pipe, so fills the Mountaineer
With the fierce native valour that instils
The stirring memory of a thousand years."

Where are the mountaineers of the hills and of the glens? Lost in the slums of Glasgow! Where is the granddaughter of Sweet Highland Mary? A slave in a machine-worked mill! We are losing our manhood and our womanhood. The fountains of our future race are being choked with the rubbish of the Manchester School. I followed with intense interest the records of Ireland and the designs of Hoche. Attack London! We must take precautions to make such an invasion not only unpracticable but also unthinkable. Why, any good raid on our Isles now which, from a financial, social, and credit, and food supply point of view, or from the point of view of distribution of population, bear no resemblance to their condition in 1796-1798, would do us more harm than it would do France or Russia if six fully equipped German corps passed the Moselle or the Niemen. Make up your minds to make your naval and military position absolutely secure. Your resources are now fourfold relatively to what they were as against Napoleon. Meanwhile, alas! for the Celtic races; and alas! for the Empire which has such soldiers. It has withered up by the banks of the Shannon and by the shores of Lough Neagh, and by the walls of Antoninus; and the septmen of Ireland and the clansmen of Scotland are gone! I have seen thousands of them wending their way to the Western main—"a melancholy band"—to build up greatness in America. I would, if prayers availed, pray to see my namesakes with the O'Neill's and the O'Donnell's fighting, to the death occasionally,

and, as a rule, living a natural and healthy life, and rearing healthy children, than to see them becoming adjuncts of mechanics, as I have seen them recently in the rich and dreadful manufacturing towns, shades of decay and death, in Lancashire. We have had wars and raids, and we may have wars again, but we will not be ruined by them. We will be ruined by ourselves—by luxury, ignorance, and games. Look at the mothers! Not fit to bear children! Why, when I was a boy 100,000 Irishmen, "all tall men of their hands," served under the Union Jack! Where are their successors? Where are the successors of the Highlanders of 1813? Where are the bold peasantry of England—her pride and the "nerve of her army," as Bacon says? Gone! I beg my audience to remember that the only security against raids and invasions is a race of military men. Now we breed generations of men without brains or bodies, not one in three fit to be a soldier. Had I time and a map I would illustrate all the strategical problems of Ireland, and all its invasions, and all the invasions of England. But my time is up, and I must content myself with thanking the lecturer for the information which he has given us about a fateful period of European, and especially British, history, and for his lessons and for his warnings.

Colonel J. A. ANSTICE, C.B. (4th Battalion Shropshire L.I.):—I am sure we shall all join in heartily thanking the lecturer for his very able and exhaustive lecture. He has treated of a subject which must be in every man's mind at the present moment. There are two points on which I should like to venture to make a few remarks, to a certain extent they are local ones. There was one very interesting part of the lecture, where the intended raid on Pembrokeshire was mentioned, and part of the scheme of that intended raid was the sacking and the burning of the City of Bristol. I believe at that period the value of the City of Bristol was put at something like five million pounds. The lecturer asks us what would be the present value? I shall not attempt to answer that question, but I merely mention this particular locality because I have the pleasure at the present moment to be the Chairman of the Gloucestershire Territorial Force Association, part of whose area is the City of Bristol. Now, I do venture to say—although it may be a piece of vanity on my part—that at the present moment the forces of the County of Gloucester, which includes the City of Bristol, will be up to their authorised strength, namely, something like 5,000 men. We combine a force of all arms. As to what we are worth when we are formed is a matter I leave to military experts to answer. Still, we have carried out our mission as far as we can, and on the 31st of this month we shall be able to present a force numbering 5,000 towards the defence of the Empire. I am very glad to notice that at the close of the lecture, when we get towards what is commonly called the peroration, the lecturer does not, in a wholesale manner—like so many lecturers—condemn the Territorials, saying they are not worth anything. All the lecturer does is to give us wholesome and sound advice, and asks us to bring our troops up to military standards as soon as we can. I do believe that the Territorial Forces of this country will reach that standard, and I hope other counties will follow the example of Gloucestershire in this respect. There is one other point. Captain Sargeaunt spoke of rifle clubs, and he rather condemned them wholesale. I do not quite agree with him. I think rifle clubs have their mission to fulfil. Of course, there are dangers in regard to them which have to be avoided; we do not want to bring a lot of young men into these rifle clubs who ought to be in the Territorials—

that we all agree about. But I still think they are useful things for young boys who are too young to join the Territorials, and they are also very good things for men who are too old; they can go and teach the youngsters how to shoot. I believe that, under proper supervision, these rifle clubs will do a good deal. I speak as a very old Volunteer. I have never been in the Regulars, but I have had something like 45 years' experience in the Volunteers. I am one of those who belong to the class of men who do what they can, in their humble and undemonstrative way, for the defence of the Empire, and who work for nothing. We in Gloucestershire have tried to build up a force and maintain a force which may or may not be sufficient to repulse the organised strength of an enemy; but we have carried out our mission as far as we can, and I have every hope we shall come up to the scratch. I feel sure we shall all cordially thank the lecturer for his address, and for the word of encouragement he has given to the Territorials.

Captain CHAS. SLACK :—I cannot agree with what the last speaker has said about rifle clubs; I rather agree with what Captain Sargeant has said in reference to them. These rifle clubs are not organised, and therefore their value is very much depreciated. Until they can be turned into Territorials I do not see how such clubs can be regarded as a practical force. With regard to the lecture, the prominent feature which comes out in it is the want of communication and information, which both sides seem to have required to have met with any success at all. That state of things will not compare at all with the present conditions of warfare. We have now telephonic, telegraphic, and heliographic communications everywhere, and it does not appear likely that any hostile enemy can take up a position against this country without it being known almost instantly.

Colonel H. W. PEARSE, D.S.O., in reply, said :—There are very few remarks which I need make in reply to what has been said. Lieutenant Dewar agrees with me that expeditions will be able to land in the future as they have landed in the past. It is quite clear that they can, and the army will have to deal with them. That is exactly the intended point of my lecture—that we must have a large and efficient force to deal with such expeditions, because the expeditions of the future will be large, will land at the same time at different parts of the country, and will do a great deal of mischief. Therefore the sooner they are crushed the better. Captain Sargeant, I think, quite correctly described the history of the Fishguard Expedition. I dealt very briefly with it, because as it happened, the expedition proved ineffective. I quite agree with him in his main contention that no forces but those under proper military discipline are trustworthy for the defence of the country. With regard to Dr. Maguire's interesting remarks, I fully agree with him as to the vital importance of the defence of Ireland to the safety of England, and I am sure that importance is fully recognised by those whose duty it is to lay our military plans. I also cordially agree with him as to the effect on our military strength of the wholesale emigration from Ireland, which has weakened that country so seriously. I must thank Colonel Anstice for his appreciation of the intention of my lecture, which, as he says, was to hold up an ideal of training for the Territorial Force. He gives us a very interesting suggestion as to the proper use of rifle clubs, which, as he says, may do valuable work in training those to shoot who are not old enough to go into the Territorial Force. In regard to men who are too old for the Force, they could, as

he suggests, devote their energies to training the young to shoot. I also agree with Captain Slack and Captain Sargeaunt, that there are rifle clubs and rifle clubs, and some of them, no doubt, do harm.

THE CHAIRMAN (Lieut.-General H. D. Hutchinson, C.S.I.):—In rising to close this discussion, I will say first that I am sure you are all agreed that Colonel Pearse has given us a most interesting lecture; and that the facts he has related to us, and the reflections to which they give rise, must send us away full of serious thoughts. This lecture was prepared by Colonel Pearse long ago—I do not know how long ago, but certainly long before the surprises and alarms of the last few days, which have set so many tongues wagging, and have given statesmen, soldiers, sailors, and citizens, of every degree, and of every shade of political belief, so much to think about, and discuss. But the coincidence, the delivery of this lecture dealing with raids (*successful* raids) on our shores, with the news that our naval supremacy is not so assured as we have always fondly believed it to be, lends special interest and emphasis to it; and I hope, therefore, it will be widely read, as soon as it is printed in our JOURNAL, that all men may realise that nothing is impossible in war, that accidents will happen, and that the best laid plans “oft gang a-gley”; and that therefore the most thorough and earnest preparations are necessary to guard against such accidents. Of course, it is common knowledge that raids on our coasts, more or less successful, have often occurred in the past. We have been raided in turn by Normans, and Danes, and French, and Germans; and, humanly speaking, what has been done before, may be done again, or certainly may be attempted again. But, as Colonel Pearse has indicated in his lecture, the next raid that is made will probably be something far more serious than any this country has been exposed to hitherto. These are days of steam and machinery, and of science and perfected strategy; and although the personal factor will always count for something, still, science and steam will probably count for more, and we must always consider that fact. In the successful raids, of which Colonel Pearse has given us such a clear and interesting account, we have seen how the hostile ships and transports have made their way to our shores, and landed their troops, practically without mishap, notwithstanding the fact that our Navy at that period was mistress of the seas, and had ample intelligence and notice of the enemy's plans and intentions. A still more remarkable instance of a great military over-seas expedition avoiding hostile fleets, and successfully attaining its objective, is afforded by the spectacle of the French under Napoleon, in 1798 (the very year of Humbert's successful raid), transporting 40,000 men, with all their stores and equipment, to Alexandria, and landing them there without mishap, notwithstanding that Nelson himself with a powerful fleet was scouring the Mediterranean in the effort to intercept them. It is for you to consider whether in these days of steam and electricity such expeditions and such raids have a better, or a worse chance of success? It is for you to consider what numbers, and what *quality*, of troops would now be employed in such raids? And, finally, it is for you to consider whether the nation has done, or is doing, all that is right, and all that is necessary, to repel any such attempt that may be made? I am afraid the answer to that last query can hardly be in the affirmative. It is written, as you know, “When a strong man armed keepeth his Palace, his goods are in peace.” Well, we are strong. Nobody will deny that. But are we armed? Are we prepared, in a great and national sense, to meet every contingency that may arise? Is there not a tendency in the present age, when some-

thing has got to be done, to get someone else to do it for you? For instance, we do not play football ourselves, but we go in our thousands to watch others play. And, similarly, when it comes to soldiering, when it is a question of the defence of these shores, which history tells us have never been, and probably never will be, secure against raids, is there not a tendency to let the other man do the fighting, while we do the shouting? I think this lecture must raise in us the doubt that as a great nation we are not doing all that we ought to do in this matter; that we are not grasping the nettle; that we are not fairly facing all the facts. I submit that the essential point to realise is, that each of us has a *personal* responsibility in this great question of home defence, and I hope this excellent lecture by Colonel Pearse will help to point this moral, and will help to educate the nation in the creed that national service, and national military training, are alike the duty and the privilege of every British citizen. It only remains for me, on your behalf, to tender to Colonel Pearse our very hearty thanks for the trouble he has taken to give us a most interesting and instructive afternoon.

Commander W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R. :—Before we separate, I will ask you to pass a very hearty vote of thanks to General Hutchinson for presiding this afternoon, and also for his valuable remarks. At the same time, perhaps, I may be permitted to say that I am one of those who have consistently held that raids on the United Kingdom are quite possible, and that I never put faith in the statement made by a leading statesman some years ago, that such were practically out of the question. Indeed, they would seem to be more feasible to-day than they were at the end of the 18th century, owing, as General Hutchinson has said, to the existence of enormous vessels, independent of the wind, and capable of being propelled at a high rate of speed. The passage across the North Sea is a short one; the tonnage for the transport of troops, as distinct from munitions of war, need not be so large as is sometimes stated, as the men for such a limited period could be packed like herrings in a cask; and there would not be any great difficulty, in consequence of the frequent haze or mist in the North Sea, in evading cruisers, if the transports sailed independently for some rendezvous.

RASPLATA.

("THE RECKONING.")

By *Commander VLADIMIR SEMENOFF, Imperial
Russian Navy.*

Translated, by permission of the Author, by L. A. B.

Continued from August JOURNAL, p. 1065.

CHAPTER VII.

THE EFFECTS OF THE "GREAT EDICT"—THE SUCCESS OF 15TH MAY—DISARMING OUR SHIPS—BATTLE OF KINTCHAO—LITERAL EXTRACT FROM MY DIARY—"HYDROPHOBIA"—ADMIRAL VITYEFT—SQUABBLES BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY—REVIVED HOPES OF SAILING—MYSTERIOUS INCIDENT OF 15TH JUNE.

THE organisation of the Japanese intelligence service, especially as regarded spies, was simply ideal. They knew our most secret orders—if possible, before our own ships. Need I say that they knew the contents of the "Great Edict," which had been only carried about in the town and port on the very day of its appearance? Henceforth they no longer dreaded any interference on our part. They disembarked their army with guns, transport, provisions, etc., etc., just as at peace manœuvres. The enemy became careless in a manner which was simply exasperating. From 3rd to 10th May, the Japanese had kept their transports behind their protective booms and a ring of guard-ships. Then they still dreaded possible attacks from us, and dared not begin operations on a large scale. During that time their squadron blockaded Port Arthur during daylight, so as to be able to frustrate at once any offensive attempt on our side. But it remained on the horizon and dared not approach within range of the guns of the coast batteries and of the battleships.

After 10th May the hostile squadron invariably approached quite close, in marked contrast to its former caution. It was as if the enemy knew the order we had received: "Don't fire for fear of provoking a bombardment."

The executive officer of a ship is the senior of her officers. An enormous difference exists between his position and that of the captain, although he is the captain's first assistant. This is the reason why my diary contains not only my personal views

and impressions, but the reflex of what went on in the minds of all officers not in independent command. I once wrote in it (I am quoting textually, without any "editing") :—

"It must be confessed that the fleet is a luxury for Russia. Why a fleet if we have no seamen? Possibly there are many who are glad that Makaroff is dead, for now we no longer rush into senseless adventures. We spare ourselves and our ships. But what will be the effect of this? A ship rotting away in port is worse than one which sinks in battle. In the latter case she has at least done something, has had some object." Many others thought like I did.

During this time of general apathy and inactivity (if one does not count the construction of land batteries) the captain of the *Amur* performed a plucky action. This officer had apparently been annoyed at the very free and easy behaviour of the Japanese. Consequently, he was only awaiting a favourable opportunity to run out and sow a few mines, where the enemy generally cruised with so much impunity.

This favourable opportunity presented itself on 14th May. A light fog came on, and the Japanese disappeared from view. The *Amur* went out and also disappeared in the fog. After a little more than two hours she returned, safe and sound. On her return journey to Port Arthur the *Amur* took in very clearly some Japanese wireless messages. However, she saw nothing. It was to be hoped that she also had not been seen. A very important point was the fact that it had not been possible to make sure from the shore where the *Amur* had gone.

I have already mentioned the extraordinary assurance with which the Japanese cruised amongst the mines we had laid out for them. Somehow they never came upon them. They certainly kept in their pay amongst the Chinese inhabitants of Kwantung not only ordinary spies, but experienced pilots, who were able to note all the movements of our ships on a chart. Besides which there was another way. They had only to obtain a copy of our secret instructions. This was perhaps the simpler plan of the two.

We were at breakfast on 15th May, when the officer of the watch sent down to report that the Japanese squadron was in sight. No one paid any attention to this. This was strictly in accordance with our latest orders. Suddenly we heard the sound of people running about on deck, some loud exclamations, and then what sounded like distant shouting, which penetrated to all decks below. "The Japanese are on top of our mines!" shouted the quartermaster at me, instead of making a proper report.

There was great excitement on deck. The men went aloft. Every one tried to get up as high as possible, in hopes of getting a view of something over Golden Hill, Lighthouse Hill, and Tiger Hill. The gunnery lieutenant forgot his rheumatism and went into the foretop. The sub-lieutenants climbed higher still.

Loud cheering was suddenly heard from Golden Hill and the adjoining batteries.

"Another one! Another one! She has sunk!" shouted our people from aloft.

At first we could not believe this. Then semaphores began to work everywhere, and the signal station on Golden Hill hoisted the signal: "A hostile battleship sunk." The fact could no longer be doubted.

"Out! Let us go out and destroy all the rest!" people were shouting everywhere.

I still believe to-day, as I believed then, that we could have destroyed them. But how were we, without steam, to get out into the roads? The brilliant, the only favourable opportunity of the whole war was missed.

The official reports of this scene, described by me with such minute accuracy, say that it was easy for the senseless crowd on board the *Diana* to shout: "Let us destroy the rest!" As a matter of fact, it would have been impossible to do so—they maintained.

Well, let us see.

According to the Japanese reports the battleships *Hatsuse*, *Yashima*, and *Shikishima*, as well as the light cruisers *Kasagi* and *Tatsuta*, steamed past Port Arthur that day in single line ahead, at a distance of 10 miles. The *Hatsuse* sank fifty seconds after she had struck a mine. The *Yashima* also hit a mine. She was kept afloat with difficulty. (The ship never reached Japan. She sank on the way there.) One battleship and two small cruisers were left. They rendered every assistance to the badly damaged *Yashima*.

At this time we had at our disposal the perfectly intact battleships *Peresviet*, *Poltava*, and also the *Sebastopol*. The latter had been damaged during the evolutions on 12th March. (She had a crack in her outer skin and one of her propeller blades was bent.) None the less she could have gone out just as well as she did on 18th March and 10th April. Besides, we had our cruisers, viz., the armoured cruiser *Bayan*, the protected cruisers *Askold*, *Pallada*, *Diana*, and *Novik*, as well as four gun-boats and two destroyer flotillas.

I maintain that this force of ships could have destroyed the remainder of the Japanese ships, provided they had been ready for sea at 11 a.m. on 15th May, and had gone out at once.

Those in command at Port Arthur had, however, already lost all faith in the possibility of such a success. Perhaps also they were too much penetrated with the idea, which had been industriously circulated, that we were unable to make a move of any kind until the, as yet highly problematical, reinforcements from Russia had arrived out. At any rate the squadron was not ready for sea, nor was the order given to raise steam at the moment of this occurrence. And yet one battleship (*Peresviet*) and all the cruisers had water-tube boilers; they might have been ready in half an hour.

Only just before 1 p.m. the destroyers were sent out. They were to harass the enemy, and if possible to attack him. At the same time the cruisers were ordered to raise steam. It was too late. The enemy's armoured cruisers had already arrived for the protection of the damaged battleships. They chased away our destroyers with ease, and when we were ready to go out, all that was left of the Japanese were some small puffs of smoke on the horizon.

This failure to act was worse in its effects than actual losses.

"We can never do anything. Where is this to end?" was the cry of the more excitable amongst us. "It was decreed by Providence," replied the philosophically minded ones. But all were now of a sudden agreed that we had nothing further to hope for from the future. There remained nothing more for us to do but to bow to the truth of the "Great Edict." Never have I seen spirits fall so rapidly. By and by, it is true, they went up again, but only because every one had resolved to fight to the finish as in duty bound, in any case and under any circumstances.

It was precisely on this day that the Japanese army of invasion finally cut off Port Arthur. What would have been its fate if we had, I don't say destroyed, but merely scattered the hostile squadron, in its then state of confusion and discouragement? We could have sunk the fleet of transports and, under the protection of our guns, destroyed the provisions which had been stored up at Pitsevo.

It is awful to think of all this now!

On 16th May we had rumours of some insignificant fighting north of Kintchao. Our side had merely delayed the enemy, and then retired to their "impregnable" position on the narrow neck of land.

On 17th May the signal to raise steam was made twice, and twice we had to put out fires again. Eventually only the *Novik* and the destroyers went out. They returned very soon. What they did I could not find out.

The success of 15th May, of course, produced a lively interest in mines. Talienwan Bay had already been completely blocked with mines at the commencement of the war. On 18th May the *Amur* was sent out to place mines also between Talienwan and Port Arthur, opposite the small bay called the "Kurort," near Dalny. The *Novik* and the destroyers were sent out to protect the *Amur*. When the "Greyhounds" appeared, the *Askold* went out in support. The ships indulged in a long range action, without, however, producing any effect. Of course, this particular enterprise could not possibly have any results later on; the Japanese had seen everything.

About the middle of May we started sweeping for the mines laid out by the Japanese in the outer roads with redoubled energy. On their side the Japanese worked with all their might to lay out double as many mines as we had fished out.

For instance, during the night of 20th May, three small steamers appeared in the roads and busied themselves there. They were lit up by the searchlights from the forts and fired at by the batteries and the guard-boats at the entrance for about half an hour. Our people maintained that one steamer had been blown up. When next morning our boats set out to sweep for mines, they found forty peculiar wooden frames floating about on the water.¹ This number, of course, corresponded with the number of mines thrown out by the steamers. But we only found five mines—not a very comforting result.

In view of the enemy's great boldness, orders were issued for the guard-boats hitherto stationed in the mouth of the harbour to be replaced by a cruiser.² We were the first to be employed thus. On the evening of 21st May we secured the ship to the buoys in the entrance itself, near the shores of Tiger's Tail Peninsula.

From our inactivity at the time of the catastrophe of 15th May, and during the succeeding days, the Japanese had evidently drawn the conclusion that we were quite harmless. For nearly a week they, at any rate, never came in sight.

Meanwhile, the effects of the "Great Edict" began to spread to such ships as were perfectly ready for sea and for action. From the *Diana* a searchlight was removed and put up at our position at Kintchao. With the searchlight we had to detach to the shore a sub-lieutenant, two leading torpedo-men, two torpedo-men, and two stokers.

On 24th May the *Diana's* ward room was in a state bordering on open mutiny. The officers were swearing in their choicest terms.

The younger members were the most violent: "We won't allow it; we'll stop it by force; we'll never agree to such a thing," was heard on all sides.

The following was the cause. Naturally, the assurance that the guns which had been removed from the battleships under repair to the forts were only lent for a short time was merely to sugar the bitter pill. That was only to be expected. These guns remained away permanently, as the Defence Scheme of Port Arthur only existed on paper. The constructors promised to complete the *Retvisan's* repairs by 2nd June. Now the rumour was being circulated that the secondary and light Q.F. armament which the *Retvisan* had supplied to the forts was to be replaced by those of the *Diana* or *Pallada*—the ship thus disarmed being laid up.

¹ A species of sledge on which the Japanese launched their mines overboard.

² To place a cruiser as guard-ship in the roads, as in Makaroff's time, was not risked. But then the Viceroy had himself abolished the arrangement.

On 21st May we received a new captain.¹ Our old one got a better command. He went to the *Tsesarevitch* (this battleship was completed soon after the *Retvisan*). I thought it my duty to inform the new captain what the general feeling was on board; I did not conceal from him the fact that I shared the views of my messmates, although, of course, I would carry out any order received from my superiors. My satisfaction was great indeed when I found the captain was in no way astonished at my report; he quietly stroked his pointed beard, and said: "Why all this excitement? I should like to see them start on this disarming of the *Diana*. Just let them come along." This was said with so much assurance that I went into the mess and said: "Gentlemen, it is all nonsense; we are not going to be disarmed."

They all believed me, and peace reigned once more.

On 25th May the Japanese began their attack on Kintchao, the key to the Kwantung peninsula. On that day we from the early morning had constant requests for men to transport guns and war material by rail to these positions; more and more men were thus employed. Out of our (reduced) complement of 456 men we eventually had 283 on shore. They only returned after midnight. Towards 9 p.m. on 25th May a thunderstorm made its appearance; it was still far off, and we mistook the thunder for the firing of distant guns. By midnight it had reached us; it was accompanied by an almost tropical downpour.

On the morning of 26th May we heard that this thunderstorm had done great damage at our land front; the greater part of the shell which had been stacked in readiness had exploded or become useless. Lightning conductors were now to be erected: this had not been thought of before. At day-break signal was made to the *Poltava*, *Peresviet*, and all cruisers, the *Amur* and the destroyers to get up steam. Presumably we were to go out in support of our troops who were defending the neck of land; at least that is how we understood this order. The evening before (25th May) the gun-boats had received orders to go to Taliénwan: however, only one of these, the *Bobr*, had sailed. The remainder, no doubt in accordance with the spirit of the "Great Edict," were calmly making good defects in engines and boilers, and were therefore not ready for sea; their captains were superseded. It was too late; this unjust severity could not put things right.

The *Bobr* got out safely through the mines and appeared on the morning of the 26th in the north-east portion of Taliénwan Bay. From there she fired at the Japanese, who were attacking our right flank. The enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. At 11 a.m. the signal station on Golden Hill made the general semaphore—"The fleet is informed that the enemy's attack has been repulsed. The *Bobr* fought brilliantly."

¹ Prince Lieven.

To many it appeared strange that the *Bobr* returned to Port Arthur the same day having (of course by "superior orders") left the position where she had been of such service. We received her with cheers, but involuntarily we felt bitter doubts.

Why was the *Bobr* withdrawn? Why, on the contrary, were the *Gremyashchy*, *Otvajny* and *Gilyak* not sent out to support her? These vessels had got their engines into working order again and were ready for sea. Why was the sailing of the cruisers and destroyers which already had steam up countermanded? From information which reached the squadron a fierce battle was raging at Kintchao. Our army was fighting brilliantly; on the other hand, eye-witnesses told of much that was praiseworthy on the Japanese side. The prowess of our adversaries was universally admitted.

Later on I received some details from a military officer, who had been decorated with the Cross of St. George¹ for an act of bravery witnessed by hundreds. "Do you know," he said, "there was a moment when I was thoroughly frightened. The enemy came on like a savage horde. I was posted with my battery behind the left flank, with orders to prevent it being turned at low water. The battle begins: we can't join in, but get hit and suffer losses, very considerable ones, in fact. An ugly situation—but never mind, we keep still, but boiling with rage. Just you wait, we think; when our turn comes we'll give it these fellows; we are in splendid spirits. At last we get our chance: the tide had fallen and the enemy is trying to turn our flank. What their strength was at the beginning I can't say. Probably they had already suffered losses on our front. What we had before our guns appeared to be a battalion, but they had colours, and had therefore once been a regiment. The enemy wheels towards the beach and straight at us: the men only advance with difficulty, wading in water up to the chest. The bottom is slippery clay; we open fire: nearly every shot is a hit; whoever is hit in the leg falls and is drowned, none of them rise again. They become fewer and fewer, but on they come. The colours move about, they pass from one hand to the other: Still they are advancing. 'Load with shrapnel!' I shout. 'Faster! Faster!' I no longer know what I order. Then I myself worked a gun—our losses were heavy. The wounded drag themselves along and help to pass shell; even the dead horses seem to come to life again. Only with the last man did the colours sink into the water; only then did I realise what we had felt at the thought—'The enemy will be on top of us at once.' When everything was over and we only had the smooth surface of the sea before us, there were many volunteers to look for the colours. We thought that the flag might float up: it did not. The last bearer did not let go his

¹ In Russia the Commander-in-Chief has power to confer decorations on the spot.

grasp. The flag lies buried with him in the deep mud. We could not find a trace of it. Soon after the enemy's gun-boats arrived and commenced to fire at our left flank. They worked well; our traverses, which had been strengthened, were simply blown away by them."

As is known, General Fock gave orders during the night to evacuate the position. The evacuation had not been prepared for. We had intended to maintain ourselves on the isthmus several weeks longer. The result was utter confusion; the same troops which had only just repulsed the attack of the enemy's best forces like heroes, retired in complete disorder as after a defeat.

"If we retire, we are being pursued; if we are being pursued, the enemy is at our heels"—thus argued the rank and file. The result was that we fired on our own supply columns. Once it was still worse: two regiments skirmished against one another and nearly had a battle by themselves.

The same night the first destroyer flotilla was got ready in a great hurry and sent out into Society Bay (Society Bay lies to the west of the isthmus of Kintchao). They were to attack the Japanese gun-boats, which had fired at our left flank and thus supported the attack of the right wing of the Japanese army.

This expedition of our destroyers ended disastrously. The gun-boats were, naturally, not found (as a matter of course they had gone to sea for the night). When the *Vnushitelny* was looking for them amongst the islands she grounded on a rocky patch. She had to be blown up so as not to fall into the hands of the enemy.

All these days passed like a fever. Our painful uncertainty was only intensified by the wildest rumours, which told now of victories, now of defeats.

I have promised my readers to do my best to reproduce all our impressions and feeling during these awful days with photographic accuracy. But how difficult this is! We had lots of work, and work which was both heavy and hateful. We had to surrender our guns and mount them in the battery on the land front. For these days my diary only contains single short sentences (sometimes several entries in the twenty-four hours). Between the lines of these one can read my bitter indignation. I nearly went so far as to curse everything. I will reproduce them without comment.

"May 29.—I feel wretched: I don't feel inclined to write any more. We are giving up the fleet. The squadron and the fortress, lost beyond hope, are to be saved, and for this purpose we are disarming the ships. How senseless! It is flying in the face of all reason. Yes, with a ship her whole crew goes down; on shore not so—that is where the shoe pinches. Kuropatkin is to drive the Japanese into the water: that sounds fine, but what do the results of Turentchen and Kintchao promise? We ought to go out and fight, not sit here in idle-

ness. A battle is said to be impossible because the forces are unequal: are they so in reality? And if they were? Then we must force our way through to Vladivostok. They say this would be like flight; that we must not desert our comrades here. All very fine—what heroes we are! not in the least conceited! Kutusov sacrificed Moscow, and thus saved the army and Russia; we are sacrificing the squadron, go on shore and try to save Port Arthur. It looks like self-sacrifice on our part. In reality we thus have greater chances of saving our lives: one can't be drowned on shore. Then *Diana* surrenders two 6-inch and four 12-pounder Q.F. guns, but that is nothing, much worse is in store.

"11.30 p.m.—The moon is shining; out in the roads a Japanese destroyer flotilla is passing from east to west. Probably they are laying out mines. 11.52.—*Gilyak* and the other vessels in the entrance open fire. The distance is from 40 to 50 cables (8,000 to 10,000 yards). The batteries are also firing. 12.8.—The Japanese have gone. Probably they have completed their task. They came notwithstanding the moonlight night, just as if to mock at us; we never tried to chase them, we are suffering from hydrophobia.

"June 2.—The cruisers and destroyers are being prepared for an expedition. It came on foggy, and only the destroyers sailed for the Gulf of Petchili. It is quite incomprehensible. In a fog we can't go out—one can't see anything; in clear weather we also can't go out—the enemy would see us before we saw him. Our nerves are so unstrung that we see a bad omen in everything. To-day, for instance, towards 11 p.m., a regular tropical thunderstorm, combined with a curious phenomenon. The clouds were mostly high up, but a single white cloud which looked as if it possessed its own means of illumination was lying quite low over Golden Hill. It covered the hill half-way down, and its white colour contrasted sharply with the dark background. During the flashes of lightning it turned purple. Does this forbode anything? How stupid!

"June 3.—Our destroyers returned at 8 a.m. in safety. They saw nothing and did nothing, but at least they are unhurt, and we must be thankful for that much; besides, it is a good omen; they have at least risked something."

These were weary times also as regards physical labour, especially for us cruisers. When we were on guard at night in the entrance, we always had to exchange shots with the Japanese who were bent on laying out mines in the roads. Our men were then only allowed to sleep fully dressed, half the guns' crews at the guns, the other half somewhere near. Moreover, we worked night and day in the land batteries. Of our four divisions¹ we always had one at that work, one on watch, a third just off watch and getting ready for work, the

¹ The crew of a ship is divided into two watches, and each watch into two divisions (called "parts" in the British Navy).

fourth just relieved from work and resting in readiness for the next watch; added to that was the coaling and the boatwork in sweeping for mines. There were days when the men dropped from sheer fatigue or went to sleep all standing.

Yes, it was said; and all because we had lost our "head," as the men said.

That Admiral Vityeft had got the command of the squadron was pure chance. It was only in consequence of Admiral Alexeieff having fled and Admiral Skridloff not having arrived. That Vityeft was personally brave admits of no doubt; he has proved it. For the rest, he had the reputation of being a scrupulously honest man and a diligent worker, but he had served almost the whole of his time on shore. A seaman he was not; he confessed it quite openly. When Vityeft assumed command of the squadron, he said at the first meeting of flag-officers and captains: "Gentlemen, I expect you to assist me with words and deeds; I am no leader of a fleet." Vityeft said this quite honestly and openly. In my opinion he had better have held his tongue.

In war there can only be *one* leader; this is the fundamental condition of any success. An army without a leader *may* perish in consequence, a leaderless fleet *must* perish. The laws of war are based on the teachings of history. It is not for nothing that they lay such stress on the powers of a single leader. For the one supreme leader even a council of war, which he may call together at critical moments, is only advisory. According to our laws the Commander-in-Chief may join his vote to that of the minority in the council of war, or even to a single vote, which he may consider the best, and thus make it decisive. The decision thus arrived at cannot be questioned.

At the famous council of war at Filach (1812) the majority recoiled at the thought of giving up the capital without fighting; what may have passed in Kutusoff's mind? Was he firmly convinced of the infallibility of his personal opinion? Who can tell? But he certainly did not renounce his right as leader of finally deciding, and said: "We will sacrifice Moscow, so as to save the army, to save Russia," and all obeyed.

By his declaration Vityeft renounced his unlimited powers as dictator and left it to the majority. What does majority mean? It seems to me that in every council of war there will always be one man whose courage and determination make him conspicuous (for both these attributes are rare). Then there are a few who approach him. Amongst the remainder there will be a certain number of pusillanimous souls. That is why our law governing councils of war says that the leader is to support the most courageous opinion, without reference to the number of votes recorded for it.

With us things were different.

On thinking these events over again, which already belong to history, I cannot say that to-day I would write down in my diary the harsh words cited above. There were extenuating

circumstances; there was a factor which weighed heavily on the council of war of our admirals and captains. In 1812 the generals did not want to abandon Moscow, so as to become a prey to the enemy, as they dreaded the reproaches of all Russia. True, Port Arthur was not Moscow, but our admirals did not want to desert it at a critical moment, as they dreaded the reproaches of their comrades in the army. This reproach was already in the air; anonymous writings already began to reach the ships. I will mention one of these: it was a parody on the well-known tale of "Grandfather Masai and the Hares." In this parody the relations between fleet and army was described very transparently. Unfortunately I no longer possess the text, I lost it in the battle; I can only give the contents from memory. "In a big courtyard there lived some white rabbits, and grey-haired dogs watched over them.¹ Once there was great danger; the wolves were coming. The dogs prepared for defence, but the rabbits said: 'Don't alarm yourselves, we know a dodge to keep out the wolves.' But when the fight began and the dogs were worsted, the rabbits got nervous, and one fine day they decamped to the north (read 'Vladivostok') under the leadership of the 'oldest and biggest coward.' They left nothing behind but a mighty stink, which took away the breath of the poor dogs. The dogs were fighting for their lives with the wolves, when Grandfather Masai (read 'Kuropatkin') came to their assistance and drove off the enemy. When he had done this he called back the rabbits and asked them: 'Why did you desert your faithful friends and make off?' The rabbits replied: 'Forgive us, Grandfather, we merely took our furs to a place of safety; our furs are surely more valuable than the skin of a mere dog.'

"Then spoke Grandfather Masai, and said: 'You have soiled your furs and they are no longer worth anything'; and he took up his stick and chastised them."

This lampoon was produced on a typewriter; it was sent by post to all admirals, captains, and executive officers, and officers' messes—that is, a considerable number of copies appeared at the same time. It was clear that some one took a great interest in spreading it.

The relations between army and navy (at Port Arthur) had never been particularly friendly; with the outbreak of war they became very bad.

I believe I am already able to consider the past with comparative calm and impartiality; but I cannot rid myself of the idea that some one had his hand in this from personal interests. Some one suggested to the army that our failures at sea were not the fault of the commanders in the fleet, but of the bad elements under their orders (officers and men). The same thing was whispered to the navy about the army.

¹ Naval officers possess white tunics, whilst military officers have grey overcoats.

The army violently accused the squadron of having been caught unprepared by the enemy's attack. The navy, on the other hand, maintained that the fortress had been taken by surprise by the war. On 9th February, only two hastily prepared batteries had been able to support the squadron. The remainder had not been manned, and the guns were still swaddled up for the winter.

It was the case of the kettle and the pot: still, some one had an interest in furthering this squabble. How otherwise can the following be explained?

In the officers' messes on board the ships whose guns had been landed to strengthen the land front scenes were enacted which were not far removed from mutiny. It went so far that some officers threatened to get up steam, go to sea, and if the fortress tried to prevent them, to fire at the forts. At the same time the people in the forts abused the navy for not wanting to fight and for landing their guns. The irritation against us became so great, that in all seriousness the proposal was made for the fortress artillery to fire on the squadron to force it to put to sea and fight.

A singular misunderstanding. Was it not purposely disseminated amongst the two most important defenders of the Russian cause, of Russian honour in the Far East?

Later on this misunderstanding was cleared up. The instinct of the masses realised that they were not enemies. But did this do any good? Did the army and navy henceforth look upon the Japanese as their common enemy? No; they looked upon their superiors as the common enemy.

However, I must not anticipate; I propose to describe the successive feelings in the beleaguered fortress, as noted in my diary in the same chronological order as the events.

For what are we to blame the late Admiral Vityeft? Was it his fault that he was not born a Kutusoff? Is he guilty, because at the council of war he did not join the two votes who demanded that we should go to sea and plunge into the deadly battle without fear of the reproach of having deserted our comrades of the army? History will decide.

One must be just to Vityeft; he was consistent. In the council of war of the senior commanders he joined the majority. He was equally ready later on to listen to the voices of the other majority—the entire *personnel* of the squadron. This majority was young, perhaps also inexperienced and silly, but it was full of enthusiasm. It was indignant at the part which it had been forced to play, and often nearly mutinied.

Of course I cannot say whether it was due to orders from above or to the pressure of public opinion in the squadron—anyhow, the news soon spread in the ships that the old orders were cancelled and that we were to go to sea as soon as the battleships were repaired. It was received with enthusiasm.

We (*Diana*) had surrendered all our 3-pounder Q.F. guns and rifle calibre machine guns, in addition to the previously

mentioned guns and searchlights. The other ships had landed as much or even more, for, generally speaking, nearly the whole of the light Q.F. armament (including the 6-pounders which we did not carry) had been disembarked. In the general rejoicing no one bothered about them.

"God be with our guns! let us hope they will be of some use. We shall do very well with what we have left," was said in our mess.

The outer anchorage was now diligently swept for mines so as to clear a channel through the hostile minefield out to sea. Many people now came forward who combined the spirit of enterprise with a genius for inventions. Beside the yard craft, the steam-hoppers attached to the dredgers were fitted up as mine-sweepers. These craft were really intended to take the mud, which was dredged up, out to sea. They were clumsy, but strong, and drew but little water, and therefore highly suitable for this new service. They answered their helm even in a seaway or in a swell, and towed hundreds of fathoms of sweeps along. The destroyers also had to learn the art of mine-sweeping. They took the place of the other mine-sweepers outside the range of the coast batteries, and cleared the channel where these hoppers could not be employed.

The Japanese, of course, noticed our renewed activity. They came nearly every night and dropped new mines in the place of those we had fished up. As soon as the moon had gone down or was hidden by clouds they appeared here and there, and the firing from the batteries and guard vessels began. It was a pity that no cruiser was kept out in the roads as guard-ship; that would have been a much more serious threat for the enemy. Port Arthur was cut off, but Alexeieff had abolished Makaroff's measures. That was why no one dared to reintroduce them. The Viceroy was a long way off, but to do anything against his orders seemed highly dangerous. War or no war—what would he think of it?

Henceforth a subdivision of destroyers was sent out on guard. That was always something.

During the night of 6th-7th June our searchlights discovered three small steamers in the roads. Doubtless they were mine-layers; one of them was sunk. The battery on Cross Hill and the destroyers on guard disputed the honour of having destroyed her.

On 9th June, Japanese warships appeared again off Port Arthur after a long pause.

On 11th June, it was foggy; under cover of the fog some destroyers were sent out that morning: six to Pigeon Bay, three to Tache Bay (to the eastward), two others were on guard in the roads. All returned safe and sound the following morning; but they had seen nothing and done nothing.

Work on the damaged battleships was progressing apace; on the other hand, the party which was opposed to going to sea displayed increased zeal. Thus a very positive report was

spread on 13th June that the *Pobieda* was only to get back half the 6-inch guns she had landed, also that it was proposed to sacrifice a cruiser—probably *Diana* or *Pallada*—to complete her armament. Need I say what impression this news created on board us? Actually on the eve of battle we were to be disarmed! Happily, things turned out differently.

At this time our troops had already retired up to the Green Mountains. Dalny was in the hands of the enemy. From Chinese sources we heard that they were busily employed in clearing Talienwan Bay of our mines, and in putting to rights the docks, workshops, quays, etc. I forgot to mention that we had been firmly convinced that our position on the Isthmus of Kintchao was impregnable. Consequently, until this position was captured by the enemy we had not taken any measures at Dalny for transferring to Port Arthur the immense quantities of stores at that commercial port and its *depôt* of railway plant. The powerful dynamos, the plant of the workshops and the stores of all kinds in Dalny were treasures for the besieged fortress and the squadron blocked up there. Even after 27th May there was a week of hesitation. Apparently it was the intention to fortify the heights near Nangalin and to delay the enemy here for a considerable time. When this plan was definitely abandoned and our troops began to retire on the Green Mountains, orders were given to remove as much as possible from Dalny and to destroy the rest. A portion was got away, everything else was burnt, blown up, thrown into the sea, or rendered useless in some other way; but owing to the great hurry we were in, this was not done thoroughly enough. The Japanese were soon able, without special exertions, to get everything at the port into working order again.¹

On 14th June the enemy attacked the Green Mountains with determination. A flanking column was sent along the beach (in the neighbourhood of Sikou Bay), covered by the fire of thirteen destroyers. From Port Arthur the *Novik* and a destroyer flotilla were sent out. The parts were reversed and the Japanese had to retire.

On 15th June the Japanese again came in sight. This time it was not single ships, but a squadron consisting of two battleships, two protected cruisers, and twelve destroyers. We expected the entire Japanese Fleet.

"No wonder," some said; "the Japanese are, after all, no children. They make their dispositions in time. We inform the world how the work is progressing on board our damaged battleships, that the port is not blocked up, and that we mean to attack the Japanese soon. With all that we are still sitting here and dare not show our nose outside! I suppose we are waiting for the Japanese Fleet to assemble here!"

¹ We heard later that the cruiser *Tchiyoda*, which had struck a mine in July, was repaired in the dock at Dalny with the assistance of the local workshops.

On the evening of 15th June a mysterious event happened which was never cleared up. (The Japanese know how to keep their losses dark.) The day had been very hot (77° F. in the shade). In the evening I was on the upper bridge with the gunnery lieutenant; we were enjoying a breath of the cool night air, and at the same time peering attentively into the darkness in which the fortress searchlights were moving backwards and forwards. *Diana* was guard-ship in the entrance; signalmen and specially picked lookout men were stationed everywhere on the bridges, on the upper deck, and at the gangways close to the water.² The sky was overcast, and neither moon nor stars were visible. It was absolutely calm, there was no swell, and there was no sound of the sea breaking on the beach or over the banks near it.

Suddenly—or were we mistaken?—there was a flash far away to the south. No, there was no mistake, we heard the muffled sound of a very distant explosion. In an instant all searchlights were trained in that direction. Their white beams were eagerly searching about in the dark like giant antennæ of some fabulous monster. There, in the same direction, we saw the characteristic greenish-golden flashes. We heard the brisk but intermittent fire of guns. This lasted perhaps ten to fifteen minutes; then everything was still and dark. I looked at my watch: it was 10.50 p.m. I need not say that at the first sound the crew of the *Diana* rushed to their general quarter-stations; every one with bated breath followed this unexpected night action.

"Surely there can't be any of us out there?" asked the gunnery lieutenant.

"No," I replied decidedly. "We are the guard-ship, and nothing could get out without our knowledge. They are certainly not ships belonging to our side."

"Then the Japanese are fighting each other."

We estimated the distance to be about 10 miles. It was just where the Japanese generally cruised about. But what had happened? There were only two possible answers to the question, and equally likely. Either a Japanese had struck one of our mines and had fired aimlessly into the water, or a Japanese destroyer had attacked a ship of its own side in error: both were equally agreeable to us.

On the following day, 16th June, nothing was to be seen of the Japanese; the *Amur* seized the opportunity and went to lay out mines to the westward of Kwantung. On her way back she struck something, and tore open her side; the damage was not serious. Some thought it was a good sign; they maintained that if the *Amur* had sprung a leak in deep water

²At night one often sees better when placed low down close to the surface of the water than when high up.

something must have been lying there; as no rock could have got there suddenly it must be a Japanese wreck.¹

On 17th June the destroyer *Lieutenant Burakoff* returned safely. She had been sent to Inkau: she narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the Japanese cruisers. Thanks to the haziness of the weather, and especially to her speed, she got through.

What bitter irony! Our best, that is, our most reliable and speedy destroyer, was the *Lieutenant Burakoff*. This vessel we had taken from the Chinese² at the capture of Taku, and the Chinese had had her built in Germany ten years previously; she was the only one of the whole flotilla which was suitable for a task such as running a blockade.

During this time our troops were gradually falling back on Port Arthur. At several points they had delayed the enemy's advance for a short time.

On 18th June the *Otvajny*, *Gremyashtchi*, *Novik*, and four destroyers went out. They were to prevent an attack on our left flank by their fire.

¹ Later we realised that these rumours were only circulated to quiet the minds of our people. In reality the *Amur* had struck the wreck of the *Shilka*, which had been sunk by us; it was her own fault.

² That is, the British destroyers, under Captain Keyes, had captured her and handed her over to the Russians.

(To be continued.)

LESSONS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR APPLIED TO THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY.

Condensed and Translated from the Japanese.

Contributed by the General Staff.

PREFACE.

THE author of this work states that, before the war, his duties lay with the training of Reserves; he apologises for any repetitions or crudity of style in his work, on the plea that, "being on active service while writing it, he had very little opportunity for revision." He also gives a list of the recently published works which he consulted before finally putting his MS. into the hands of the publishers—at Nagoya in 1906.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.—OBJECT OF MILITARY TRAINING.

- Section A.—Character of Military Training.
- Section B.—Details of Military Training.
- Section C.—Physical Military Training.
- Section D.—The Real (Trained) Soldier.
- Section E.—Duties of a Japanese subject.
- Section F.—Main divisions into which military training may be divided.

CHAPTER II.—MILITARY EDUCATION.

- Section A.—Summary.
- Section B.—Keeping up training.
 - B¹.—Object of training.
 - B².—Physical training.
 - B³.—Sanitary.
 - B⁴.—Exercises.
- Section C.—System of military education.
 - C¹.—Objects of this education.
 - C².—Developing the intelligence.
 - C³.—Order of teaching.
 - C⁴.—General Scheme of teaching.
 - C⁵.—Models, to live up to in teaching.
 - C⁶.—Unenlightened teaching.

- D¹.—Object of training.
- D².—Making training comprehensive.
- D³.—Will training.
- D⁴.—Active training.
- D⁵.—Higher training.
- D⁶.—Encouragement of training.
- D⁷.—Making training suitable to individual soldiers.

CHAPTER III.—GENERAL PRACTICES.

Section A.—General summary.

Section B.—Education of soldiers with the colours.

B¹.—Gist of this education.

B².—Gist of their education while recruits.

(See Table of Education of Recruits for 1902.)

Section C.—Education of Reserves.

C¹.—General scheme.

C².—Proposed scheme for future work.

Section D.—Education of non-commissioned officers.

D¹.—Gist of general plan.

D².—Lessons from war—unfinished.

D³.—Practical work—unfinished.

Section E.—Special education.

E¹.—Special education of officer candidates (Shikwan Kohosei).¹

E².—Special education of one-year volunteers (Shigwanhei).²

E³.—Special education of six weeks' soldiers (1st Reserve).

E⁴.—Combined training.

CHAPTER IV.—FINAL DEDUCTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

The principles which must chiefly be taken into account in the training of infantry are as follows:—

1. The object of an army is to fight, and all training must lead to the betterment and improvement of the fighting machine.
2. The first duty of a soldier is to obey absolutely the commands of his superiors, so that a whole military unit may act as one man.
 - 2a. To keep up the military spirit.
 - 2b. Handling of arms.

¹ Men from the military schools or middle schools, who have graduated (having put down their names as candidates for commissions) have to go through a course in the ranks.

² Men who pay all their own expenses for uniforms, etc. They have special privileges, and serve only a year.

The soldier must be taught that to fulfil his duty properly he must not alone do it mechanically, but must become imbued with the military spirit.

3. It must be borne in mind that the *personnel* of an army can only be maintained by individual members of it keeping up their physique.

3b. The education of our army is designed to develop not alone the man's character and martial spirit, but also to develop the man physically. (See Section d.)

Military training is designed to inculcate into the soldier certain qualities which are wanting in men who have not served. The spirit of discipline must be inherent, and both the military spirit and the physique of the soldier should be developed as much as is humanely possible.

If this system of education is not carried out in a national army, even though the men have only to serve 3 years, their characters may deteriorate, and great harm will be done to the nation.

Para. b.—The spirit of the soldier must be unswervingly loyal, and must be marked as much by its courtesy as by its fearlessness. The soldier must be a faithful friend to his comrades, and he must be hardy.

b². Honour.—Soldiers must above all things have *moral*; this alone can keep up the military spirit, and keep men cool and fearless in the face of the enemy.

Discipline.—Discipline is the foundation of a good army. Under no circumstances should a soldier question an order given him by a superior, and unswerving obedience should become a second nature with him.

d. Self Control.—To be calm under the stress of privations and hardships is an essential part of the training of every soldier.

e. Devotion to Duty.—Every soldier must perform his duty, no matter what sacrifice he may have to make. It must be looked upon by him as an honour as well as a duty to be permitted to sacrifice his life at the altar of patriotism.

Para. c. Details of Military Training.—Training for war is the object which must always be kept in view. Every soldier should study the lie of the country, both by day and by night. Night operations should frequently be carried out in times of peace, so that plans may be formed to deal with every possible emergency that may arise in war time.

c². The *character* training of the recruit must receive special attention, as otherwise his mind will be disturbed by the dangers and horrors of actual war.

c³. Handling of Arms.—Soldiers must be taught this duty very carefully, and individual attention should be given to them.

c⁴. Shooting.—Soldiers must be taught that the rifle is their most important weapon.

^{c⁵}. *Judging Distance* is also most important. Unless the soldier is thoroughly practised in judging distance he will be unable to select the object at which to aim or to adjust his sights properly when in extended order. Every soldier must be able to judge distance accurately up to 600 yards, and roughly up to 1,000 yards.

^{c⁶} *Field Entrenchments.*

^{c⁷} *Bayonet Work (Kenjitsu).*

^{c⁸} *Skirmishing.*—Soldiers must be taught *always* to *advance* to replace casualties as they occur automatically from the second and third lines, and to concentrate their fire before charging.

Section d.—Physique.—It must always be borne in mind that a battle is ordinarily preceded by a long march, generally made over bad roads. Therefore, the ability to march long distances in full marching order without becoming fatigued is almost the most important duty of a soldier. Marching is greatly affected by conditions of weather—a fact which must be remembered during peace training.

b. Camping.—After a battle, outposts must be thrown out from the reserves, and after a march, from the leading companies. This must be done at once, even without special orders.

In choosing the site for a camp or bivouac in the vicinity of the enemy, tactical advantages are paramount; but camping under insanitary conditions may prove as harmful to an army as would be a lost battle.

Section e.—The Trained Soldier.—The soldier, when fully trained, ought to be inured to all hardships. He may have to fight after marching long distances without food. He should therefore be trained to bear himself with equanimity and to exercise self-control under all kinds of weather or under any conditions of discomfort. By such training he will not lose *moral* when faced with the realities of war.

Section f contains quotations from the Imperial Ordinances.

Section g.—The main parts into which military education may be divided are two:—

1. Training.

2. Keeping up training.

In both of these it must not be forgotten that the character training is most important, and that the character or *moral* of the recruit must in no case be neglected.

PART II.

Principles of Training.—The object of all military training is to make officers and soldiers fit for war. Every manœuvre carried out should be made as realistic as possible; strict discipline must be maintained, and the necessity of developing the soldier's character must never be forgotten.

In manœuvres, however, nothing should take place which might depress the soldier, and no unnecessary hardships should be incurred except with a special object. The military spirit must be maintained by every possible means. If this practice be neglected in peace, the army will suffer for it in war.

Part II. (b).

The principle to be observed in the training of recruits is, that they must learn to walk before they can run. The army may be likened to a great machine, every small portion of which must be perfected in order to make the whole work smoothly. The instructors must practise very great patience, especially in cases of individual instruction, so that men may not become disheartened.

Gymnasium.—Recruits must do exercises varying with their personal strength. If men's strength be overtaxed, more harm than good will be done.

Shooting is valueless unless practised continually. For the first year's service, Morris tubes should be used.

Kenjitsu (bayonet and fencing) is of no use except as a physical exercise, unless men are taught to use their brains, and do it intelligently.

Good Moral is by far the most important adjunct of a soldier, as it inculcates the spirit of duty, and teaches a man to have no fear of death. In military training, the greatest stress must be laid on fostering the spirit of self-reliance, and if only this can be produced, good *moral* and self-reliance can best be impressed upon men during manœuvres, or at any operations where several corps are competing.

Fencing, bayonet work, and gymnastics make a man self-reliant, and active. They also make a man persevering, and prevent him from losing heart, even if defeated at first.

Part II. (d).

The main principle of enforcing a strict discipline is to engender a sense of respect among troops for their superiors; these latter must, therefore, be always just, and conscientiously carry out all duties.

Individual training is the best time during which to inculcate and foster this spirit of discipline. Recruits must feel that they are always under the eyes of their superiors, and they must be taught to look upon their officers as gods, who will reward or punish them according to their deserts. It will, therefore, be seen how important it is that officers should never overlook any fault or slackness. Men must look upon the commanding officer of their unit as the fount and origin of all discipline, and they must feel that their lives are at his disposal.

This, then, is the meaning of discipline, and thus can the trained soldier be evolved. If an officer overlooks faults he will lose the respect of his men, and will never raise his unit to the highest point of discipline.

Uniform.—By means of their uniform, soldiers can always be watched, and the wearing of uniform is a great factor in the creation and maintenance of discipline. There is no better test of the discipline and state of a corps than by seeing the way in which the men are dressed when away from their officers—whether smartly or otherwise.

Discipline is best inculcated in the barrack-rooms; hence the enormous importance of the "superior soldiers" (*jo-to-hei*). It must become the second nature of the soldier. The results will be seen in the skirmishing line, which is the supreme test of the young soldier.

A system of excusing more skilful soldiers from attendance at drills as a reward for their progress is much prized.

The species of drill must be frequently changed, or men will grow tired of it.

Section III. (c).

The training of the recruit in the first few months after enlistment becomes the standard of the whole military training of the soldier.

The various text-books all expound the principle of the extreme necessity for exercising the greatest care in the early training of the recruit, and it is an established fact that it is practically impossible to expunge, in later service, bad habits gained during the recruit period. This principle is applicable equally to the training of the mind as to that of the body. During his early service the character of the recruit must be formed, and he must be given a fair start in his military career.

A soldier who is disposed to argue or to question orders must be dealt with most severely. It is necessary that officers and instructors should know from what kind of home and surroundings the recruit is drawn. The instructors of recruits form the most important factor in military life.

The company is the unit of the army, and the company commander is entirely responsible for the working of the men under him. His daily table of work should be formed upon the following principles:—

1. Watching the character of the men under his command.
2. Seeing to the uniforms, arms, and equipment.
3. Inculcating into the minds of the men that their lives are the property of the Emperor.
4. Making the men do their duty for duty's sake, and to teaching them to seek keenly after prestige.
5. He must be strictly impartial; must never use rough language, and should avoid all appearance of familiarity.

He should, to a certain extent, share his responsibilities with the officers under him, and they in turn should pass down this chain of responsibility through the non-commissioned officers to the "superior soldiers" (*jo-to-hei*).

Old soldiers have no direct influence in training and drilling the young soldiers, but their indirect influence is immense; as they are much more with the men than the officers or non-commissioned officers, they should be very carefully watched, and any evil influences should be sharply checked. We used to have many instances of cruelty and bullying by old soldiers, and although this practice has now fortunately ceased, the effect of old soldiers retiring from active service may not always be advantageous to the recruits, and it is now suggested that these men should occupy rooms apart and mess together, and that only specially selected men should come into direct contact with the recruits.

Jo-to-hei (superior soldiers).—These men form almost the most important branch of our army; they come more and earlier into contact with the recruits than either the officers or non-commissioned officers, and the basis of the character and discipline of the men of a regiment is largely dependent on their *jo-to-hei*. The *jo-to-hei* are the limbs of the Commanding Officer. (This is a Japanese military proverb.—J.L.) It is incumbent upon the officers to support and uphold the authority of these *jo-to-hei* in every possible way, and to differentiate clearly between them and ordinary old soldiers; but it must be borne in mind that these men are not non-commissioned officers, and therefore they should be carefully observed, and any errors they may fall into should be amended with discretion.¹

It is a well-known principle that the company with the best "superior soldiers" is almost invariably the best company in every way.

CHAPTER II.

The early part of the chapter is a long-drawn-out summary, consisting mostly of very obvious platitudes and (b) much repetition.

Section c.—System of Military Education.

Military education aims at 3 main objects:—

1. Military knowledge.
2. Virtue.
3. Physical improvement.

¹ As is the case with all short-service armies, one of the chief obstacles to efficiency in the Japanese Army is the absence of well-trying non-commissioned officers. The War Office endeavours to surmount this difficulty by the following system: Sixty recruits join each company on "enrolment day" each year. After three months ten of these are selected as candidates for the "superior soldier" grade. These men live together, and are specially trained in a non-commissioned officer's course by selected officers and non-commissioned officers. This course lasts six months, and if they pass the required tests the men then go back to their companies and are made non-commissioned officers as vacancies occur. They are saluted by ordinary soldiers, and are responsible in great measure for the discipline and interior economy of their respective sections.—J. L.

In order to secure the best results, the instructor must know thoroughly the physical and mental attainments of each man in his charge.

The instructor must have an elementary knowledge of hygiene; he should know something of anatomy, and the effects and properties of different kinds of food, and how to distinguish good water; he should know something of dentistry and chiropody, and he should have enough medical knowledge to be able to teach his men how to stanch blood, how to deal with those who faint from hard work or during great heat or cold, and simple remedies for skin diseases, such as chaps and chilblains, and for the early stages of venereal. He should pay particular attention to teaching the men how to look after their feet.

The book gives a list of remedies for each of the above complaints. I think that the last is the only thing worth translating, as no foreign officer can fail to be impressed with the marvellous condition of the men's feet after route marches and manœuvres. In a very severe week's work which I did in the north, out of 400 men there were only two casualties from sore feet. The boots hardly deserved that name, the roads and weather were very bad, and the marches averaged in length 24 miles a day. In my opinion, however, this satisfactory result was mainly due to the fact that a large number of zori (the Japanese straw sandal) were carried, and whenever necessary, were worn by the men. These not only greatly relieve the feet, but must be a considerable aid to marching, as linen straps support the ankles.

The feet must be kept very clean, and the toe nails kept short. There should be frequent inspections, and anything amiss must be attended to at once. Stockings with holes must on no account be worn. Any chafing on the march must at once be treated with *bonsoko* (a sort of black plaster with ointment), all water blisters must be pricked with a needle, and anointed with *tsubami-eo* (ointment or oil made from the seeds of the magnolia). The feet should be treated with this ointment before starting to march.

Exercise is most important, but great individual care must be exercised, and it must not be overdone. It must be regular.

During field exercises it is most important to avoid casualties, and men falling out. Climate, weather, and the lie of the land must be taken into consideration.

Kenjitsu.—Bayonets and fencing gives men confidence in the use of weapons, but it is a great strain upon the heart, and only exercises one set of muscles. The body must be well protected, and instructors and skilled men must on no account punish beginners severely with whom they are fencing.

Swimming, gymnasium, fencing, and all kindred forms of exercise can only be made really useful if made interesting.

The points most to be looked to in physical training are the strengthening of the instep, and of joints, such as the knee, and the teaching of men to run short distances (from cover to cover) at a good pace, to climb, jump, and surmount obstacles.

Men must be taught observation, and to remember what they have seen. This can best be done on route marches, and field work generally.

c^a. The order of teaching is, first to give the men a thorough individual grounding, then to make them keep up what they have learnt while doing squad and company drill.

Men must be taught to look after themselves, and to think for themselves when left without their officers.

c^d. The general scheme of instruction after the company drill is over, should be as follows:—(1) Work of the orderly (to take messages quickly and accurately); (2) route marching; (3) work on advanced and rear guards; (4) camping; (5) bivouacking; (6) night work; (7) exercise in training and detraining, and embarking and disembarking; (8) how to bring up and distribute reserve ammunition to the firing line.

A diary must be kept both by the instructor and the soldier, giving full details of the daily work. This must be frequently inspected by superiors.

c^s. All exercises must have some object in view, and must be so contrived as to force the men to think for themselves.

Discipline must include the *moral* and honour of soldiers. If a soldier performs a wrongful action, he must be made to understand that the discredit attaches to the whole army.

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL PRACTICES.

With shooting, as with all other military exercises, early training is most efficacious and important. Soldiers must get a good grounding, not alone in marksmanship, but also in the construction of the rifle and the projectile, in the best ways to preserve the rifle and keep it clean, and in the penetration and flight of the bullet.

A musketry diary must be kept by every soldier, accurately giving his daily score, and any other matters of interest.

Education of men with the Colours.

The unit of instruction is the company; instruction is given in several stages (here follows a detailed list of the stages, and instruction given in each of them).

During the first year their work is mostly physical. The officer commanding a unit must tell off a subaltern in each battalion or unit under him, whose duty will be to instruct the junior non-commissioned officers and superior soldiers, before the recruits join.

In instructing recruits, instructors must speak very plainly and use simple language; they must never lose their temper, and must bear in mind the great difference between civilian and military life. Recruits on joining come into an entirely new life,

and are like infants and very easily become discouraged or flurried.

[Note.—Paras. 311 to 581 consist merely of examples of diaries to be kept by officers, N.C.O.'s, and men, and also schemes tactical and other.]

P. 581 (Training of Reserves).—The first Reserve only do 90 days, and can be taught very little about the real duties of a soldier in that time, but they can be taught the "spirit" of soldiering, and if properly handled may return to their homes impregnated with good *moral* and patriotism. (Literally, the virtue of the Emperor.—J.L.) If this spirit can be produced, their other military training is of small importance.

Their training should be divided into two stages, and after each stage there should be a rigorous and individual inspection by the commanding officer.

Order of Training.—1st Term, two months.—Individual drill, gymnasium, Morris tube, squad drill, judging distance, bayonet and fencing, sectional drill, field work.

They must also learn badges of rank, and distinctions of uniform, first rules of military and martial law, care of rifles, theory of shooting, and they must learn by heart the Emperor's address.

EMPEROR'S ADDRESS.

"Know ye our Subjects."

"Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein lies also the source of Our training. . . . bear yourselves in modesty and moderation, be filial, and be benevolent. Develop intellectual faculties, and thereby advance the public good. Respect the Constitution and observe all laws. Offer your lives courageously to the State when emergency arises, and thus guard and protect the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne, coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. It is Our wish that ye lay to heart with all reverence the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, that we may all thus obtain great virtue. The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meigi—Imperial Sign Manual and Seal."

Second Term for 1st Reserve : One month.—Company training, field entrenchments, and entrenching positions, Red Cross and first aid rules, guards, and outposts, rules of sanitation, then, final instruction by commanding officer.

After this inspection the men generally do a week of forced marches, and are inspected on their return.

P. 583: The Spirit of the Japanese Soldier.—The soldier must be acquainted with the records of his regiment, and must

heartily obey his superiors in all regiments, and not alone those of his own. He must never require to be given any order or told of any regulation more than once. He must cultivate the spirit of patriotism and self confidence, but must always be outwardly modest and self-deprecatory. He must always feel that he is individually a better man than any enemy. He must remember that the attack, if prudently carried out, is always preferable to the defence. He must learn to think for himself and be self-reliant. It is disgraceful to shirk duty when the eyes of your superiors are not on you. He must be true to his comrades. He must remember that his body belongs to the State, and must therefore take all possible physical precautions.

Preparations for War.

Arms and accoutrements must be kept spotless, and special care must be paid to them after night work.

In peace, scouting should be practised chiefly at night. Crawling, silence and invisibility must be sedulously cultivated.

Guard duties, on which the safety of the army may one day depend, must be carried out most conscientiously.

Placing obstacles in the probable lines of the enemy's advance is a very difficult work, and should be much practised.

Running swiftly over short distances is one of the most important necessities for an infantry soldier. At least 10 miles a day should be marched in fine weather, and in marching, men must carry the same weights as they would have to do on service.

Doubling long distances is very important; as also is jumping.

All soldiers must be specially trained in mountain work. in embarking and disembarking from railways and ships, in pitching tents and bivouacking, in cooking, entrenching, surmounting and demolishing obstacles, shooting up to 2,000 yards, particularly at the sky-line. Finding and distinguishing killed and wounded; bringing up and distributing reserve ammunition; judging distance up to 1,000 yards, whenever possible, in walking over ice or frozen ground; but above all, to move noiselessly and skilfully at night, even when in open order, and if left suddenly without their officers, to be able to continue their work without flurry, confusion, or delay; to attain this latter object it cannot be too strictly impressed upon officers that before starting on any work, every man under their command must be absolutely cognisant with the scheme.

NOTE.—The Japanese do an enormous amount of night work, and it is most interesting for any foreign officer to watch. I did some field manoeuvres with the 29th Regiment once in the forests in the north. We always did our work at night.—J.L.

Infantry and artillery must be specially trained in changing their objective intelligently. Cavalry must be specially trained in opening out and closing quickly when moving at a good pace.

p. 626. *Instruction of "Superior Soldiers" (jo-to-hei).*—It must be impressed upon these men that they are the most important branch of the army, that they are the models for the men. General teaching is not so important as the inculcating of the military spirit. Their instruction must be practical rather than theoretical, and should vary individually according to ability. They must have impressed upon them that almost their most important duty is to be absolutely conversant with the character and capacity of every individual man under them.

The rest of the chapter is given up to the special instruction of *shikwan kohosei* (officer candidates), of the *shigwanhei* (one-year volunteers), and of the six weeks' men in the reserve; also a short sketch on combined tactics, with nothing of interest in it.

In the summary, the author states as his opinion that the strength of an army lies in its instructors, viz., officers, non-commissioned officers, and *jo-to-hei* (superior soldiers), especially these latter. He says that his war experience confirms him in his formerly-held belief, that these "superior soldiers," owing to their coming more into contact with the men than either officers or non-commissioned officers, and always living with them, are of the very greatest importance. Duty must be the watchword of all, and every man must make his own personal advantages subservient to the common good.

The author then concludes with a long series of deprecatory references to the book, and in explaining the reasons why it is so badly compiled.

THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA, 1808-14.

VALUABLE NOTES FROM RECENTLY DISCOVERED DIARIES OF THE
WAR, NOW BEING PUBLISHED IN "EL IMPARCIAL," OF
MADRID.

Précis by Major-General J. C. DALTON, R.A.

Continued from August JOURNAL, p. 1076.

IV.

COUNCIL AND REVIEW AT UTRERA—ENGLISH HELP DECLINED.
THE ADVANCE—JUNCTION WITH THE TROOPS OF GRANADA.
GRAVE ERROR OF THE COUNCIL OF PORCUNA—CASTAÑOS'
SECRET.

On 26th June, 1808, the President of the Junta, Saavedra, held a farewell review of the army under Castaños at Utrera, followed by an important Council of War with General Castaños and all the principal commanders and heads of departments, at which no matter affecting the efficiency of the force and strategical situation appears to have been lost sight of.

The superiority of the enemy in cavalry was acknowledged, the Spanish force being able to rely only on 2,500 sabres. Hence it was resolved to avoid as far as possible any ground suitable for that arm, and that the best policy was "to manœuvre round Dupont on his flanks and rear, cut his communications, and isolate him from his source of supply, etc., to which end the irregular cavalry and sharpshooters were well suited. That it was necessary at once to arrange for a strong division to shadow him which would spy out the approach of reinforcements, and if possible attack his two detached corps or interfere between them."

If Dupont persisted in remaining in Andujar he must be attacked at the most opportune moment, "without allowing the clamour and natural impatience of the peasants, due to the short time which had been available for disciplining them, to prevail." Finally it was decided to keep the French constantly on the *qui vive*, "in order that the climate should work its effect on troops not accustomed to the strength of the Andalusian sun."

The Council was over at one, and by 4 p.m. the army was already formed up in the famous encampment of La Dehesa. More than half the force had not got uniforms, but later on this was remedied by making two soldiers divide between them the equipment intended for one.

The work of training now proceeded diligently, and progressed from the most elementary instruction to grand manœuvres. The force rapidly gained discipline, and an English

colonel who was with the President and saw the troops, trained for less than a month, remarked to the latter: "Frederic II. would not be ashamed to adopt this fine army as his own."

The President returned to his post highly content with what he had seen, and resolved to give the general a free hand, "because his prudence and moderation were a security that he would not abuse the trust reposed in him." The Junta confirmed this view, and the result was that Castaños had practically supreme authority at the head of the army.

On the morning of the 29th June, Major-General D. Tomas Moreno appeared before the Junta and informed them that the general had left for Cordova, and hoped the President would accompany him. This the Junta could not grant, but Count Tilly begged hard to accompany Castaños, and permission was granted.

Moreno announced that the English had requested to be allowed to join their force of 6,000 men (drawn from the troops at Santa Maria and from the ships of the squadron) to Castaños' force, but the general had delayed answering on the pretext that the Junta alone could give authority. At the same time it was his own opinion that "the English would wish to carry off all the laurels if the expedition were successful, and would put all the blame on the Spaniards if it were the reverse; moreover, he did not think their assistance necessary, which would always cause him much embarrassment." In this the Assembly concurred.

When Moreno returned he took with him from the Junta the balance of the money, supplies, and ammunition which still remained in Seville, the rest of the train and horse artillery "recently invented, and very useful," together with 150 field tents made in a few days, more than 500 horses procured on requisition within less than 48 hours, and a quantity of mules the gift of private individuals.

At 8 a.m. on 30th June a despatch from General Pena announced that Castaños had departed from Cordova, that the advanced body of 1,909 men and 216 horses, under Brigadier Venegas, had marched and would be followed by the first division, under Coupigné, with 2,828 infantry and 821 cavalry.

"The Junta begged the Archbishop to give orders that in the Cathedral, in all parish churches, and in the convents, prayers should be offered to the God of armies for the success of the Army of Seville going forth to fight for its religion, its King and country."

On 3rd July the 2nd Division (4,488 infantry and 426 cavalry) left Utrera early, under the command of Field-Marshal D. Narciso de Pedro. The same night the 3rd Division, under Field-Marshal D. Felix Torres, with 4,691 infantry and 558 cavalry, and on the 4th the reserve of 10,466 men, including 611 cavalry. "This fine army numbered 26,403 men, including 2,632 cavalry. The artillery consisted of 60 field guns, fully equipped, and 3 companies of horse artillery."

The gallant affair at Jaen and the entry of a Spanish squadron under Fonegra into the Guadiana caused enthusiasm.

On 12th July Castaños reported the arrival near Bujalante of the troops from Granada — some 6,000 men of excellent quality, well clothed and disciplined, under the Captain-General D. Ventura Escalante, with Field-Marshal Reding as second-in-command. The armies were to be united in Porcuna, where commands were to be allotted and the plan of attack formulated.

"The *Express* related the wonderful confidence and joy which animated the towns, impatient for the moment to arrive when the Spanish soldiers could get to grips with the French, whom they believed to be inferior in numbers and quality—a happy error which had spread freely, and in which for the present it was necessary to keep both people and troops."

On 14th July a fresh message detailed the distribution of the enemy (which is well known) and fixed the plan of campaign, "which, somewhat extended, was that laid down in Utrera."

Castaños, notwithstanding that Escalante was his senior in years, "maintained with him the utmost harmony without sacrificing any of his authority."

The Editor of General Girón's Notes is now able to produce a new and important fact which reflects a brilliant light on the character of Castaños. Hitherto historians have credited the Council of Generals at Porcuna with being ignorant of the arrival of the French General Vedel, and have attributed the temerity of Castaños, which resulted so successfully at Bailen, to ignorance and not to cool valour.

The manuscript, however, says: "The Guard Patria, who brought the mail, handed secretly to the President a letter from the general, in which the latter enclosed some states which General Dupont was sending to the Chief of the Staff Beliard, and which were intercepted on 12th July. From these it was evident that as soon as he could join hands with General Vedel, then hourly expected, Dupont's army would amount to 23,964 men, including 3,500 cavalry. He still demanded more reinforcements, insisting that the insurgents, allied with the English, were surrounding him and endeavouring to attack him with very superior forces; that he was short of food; that the heat was unbearable; and that the Spaniards were very enthusiastic on the anniversary of a great battle (Navas de Tolosa) which they had gained over the Moors. General Castaños reserved these states, and did not communicate them to anyone, fearing the bad impression which they might make on the army when it realised that the enemy was so strong. He advised the President to keep it to himself; also because at the present moment nothing could be worse than to unsettle the troops. He spoke of the bad time which the people and even his army were giving him, provoking and urging him to attack, at an unsuitable time, an enemy reported much weaker than it was in reality. He however, would precipitate nothing, and when his measures

were taken he hoped to be able to attack the two generals advantageously before they could unite."

Castaños' position could not be more anxious and difficult. His army, however efficient it might appear, was composed of double the number of untrained troops to old soldiers. He knew from experience of war that in such a force enthusiasm replaces and overpowers discipline; it is irresistible so long as all goes well with it, but it is incapable of waiting patiently for the opportune moment, possibly necessitating a temporary retirement before it can reap the fruits of the first attack. He had to listen to those who urged action, and knew that if he gave way to them the consequences would be disastrous, and that on him alone would the blame descend.

He had not before him (as his army fondly imagined) Dupont's 12,000 men, decimated by dysentery and demoralised by retreats and inaction, but 24,000 French troops whose victorious standards had dominated Europe.

When weighing the relative strengths and qualities of the opposing armies, Castaños felt that he was not justified in leading to disaster his army, one month old, so full of youth and joy, and marching to battle as to a festival. Neither dare he dissipate by one word the general error and thus throw cold water on the enthusiasm and ardour of his men.

"*Alea jacta est*," might have murmured Castaños, who breathed the ever-youthful breath of immortal Rome, whilst Saavedra, compromising himself by keeping that fateful secret, exhorted him "to follow on as he was doing in the footsteps of Fabius the Great."

Ah! in this difficult position the prudent advice to imitate the wise Cunctator, the real commander and sole guide of disciplined and warlike legions, did not apply. The Spanish general was to obey fatally the irresistible impulse resulting from the national enthusiasm, and, yielding to the pressure of those he commanded, to advance to his front; and thus the great conqueror marched to the unequal contest, with the resignation of a fatalist, with the faith of a Christian, obliged to fritter away his prestige in reasonable counsels, more than often hearkened to with impatience and disdain, but preserving in his soul with robust serenity that grave secret which made the General-in-Chief the only prudent—in reality the only rash—personality of the whole force.

V.

CASTAÑOS IN LOS VISOS—TORTURE OF TANTALUS—DUPONT'S FEARS—VILLANUEVA AND MENJIBAR—UNPUBLISHED LETTERS OF CASTAÑOS—HIS SECRET HOPE.

On 15th July, at dawn, the third division, under Field-Marshal D. Felix Jones, and the reserve division, under General La Pena, occupied Los Visos of Andujar, heights which the river separates from that town, and within cannon shot of the bridge over the Guadalquivir. The enemy had fortified a

bridge head with works of some importance armed with sufficient guns; his bivouacs and parks were situated at the debouch of the town and *à cheval* of the Madrid road.

"Our appearance on the heights," writes Giron, "must have surprised the enemy, because we noticed in his camps that hurry which is born of surprise, and, very soon, fire was opened on our troops from the guns of the bridge head, which, being of small calibre, could barely range as far as our lines, The Commander-in-Chief sent out a battery of horse artillery, which replied to the enemy's guns, and a few rounds were fired without result; but under cover of this battery another battery of position was established more to the right to bear on the parks and bivouacs, the fire from which soon put them in confusion and obliged them to shift camp."

At this time the Andalusian sun, which was to play an important part in the battle which was to follow, interfered, and not in favour of the Spaniards. The enemy occupied the right bank of the river, which abounded in trees, whence the French sharpshooters, protected and hidden by the foliage, prevented the Spanish infantry from approaching the left bank, which was bare.

This caused much inconvenience, and hindered the Spaniards from getting at the water. "The heat was excessive, and the streams which ran in the rear of our position were all brackish. Under penalty of life the villagers near our camp were ordered to bring whatever vessels they possessed full of water, and though this provision, punctually made, remedied to some extent the state of affairs, it was, however, so bad that some soldiers, unaccustomed to such burning sun, died of suffocation, and others less patient banding into big groups rushed to the river to drink, some fighting whilst the others drank."

Under other circumstances this difficulty would have sufficed to abandon the position, but it was necessary to keep it in order to hold the enemy and conceal the movements of the first and second divisions. These were approaching Menjibar and Villanueva de la Reina, points on the river occupied by the French, whilst a light detachment, composed of some sharpshooters from Cadiz, and a few more, suitable to the service, under command of the brave Mourgeon, passing the Guadalquivir by the bridge of Marmolejo, were directed towards the passes of the Sierra in rear of the French.

"The enemy, uncertain in his position, but without making up his mind to vacate it, either from pride or fear of his government, seemed not to know how to attack us or retire; he lost valuable time, in which he could have done either, let the opportunity slip, and paid the invariable penalty of vacillation and perplexity."

There is no doubt that Dupont was a prisoner to extreme fear, difficult to explain in so brave a soldier, as the following curious anecdote will prove:—

"The inhabitants of Andujar stated that General Dupont confessed himself at loss on seeing our columns deploy on the neighbouring heights; but his staff officers, in order to set his mind at ease, having assured him that these were our peasant troops who were undisciplined and of no account, he mounted to the church tower at the hour of muster to note if we showed signs of any discipline. On seeing the battalions forming up, marching, then manœuvring with the usual regularity of troops, he expostulated with those who had wished to deceive him, took refuge in saying that those troops he saw were Militia much strengthened by outsiders, and would be useless on the day of battle; to such an extent did they wish to deceive him, trusting solely to his luck."

Nothing fresh occurred during the 16th at the front except desultory firing, and the movement of the 3rd division, which extended its right wing and occupied a neighbouring height. Being conducted under distant artillery fire, it cost a few lives, but was valuable as it tended to familiarise the recruits with the sound of artillery fire, and they bore the test well.

On that day, the 16th, the first division was in Menjíbar, disposed so as to force the passage of the river next day, which was held by the French. The second division cleverly effected a similar operation at Villanueva, sending forward parties of cavalry on to the high road to intercept the enemy's communications.

By evacuating Villanueva, the enemy lost the mills which supplied him with flour, and "his soldiers found themselves obliged to crush the wheat between two stones in order to obtain some food."

On 17th July, at daybreak, Reding's division passed the river by the ford of the Rincon, fighting from 9 a.m., the well-known action of Menjíbar in which the French General Gobert was killed. As their orders directed them to operate in conjunction with the second division, Reding had to return to Menjíbar after the action. The same night both divisions joined hands there and moved on Bailen, a town situated on the high road, which was the enemy's line of retreat.

Thus the Spanish were ready to march at daybreak on the 19th "to attack the enemy in his position at Andujar on his left, whilst the third division and the reserve were to do the same on the right and threaten him in front, the detachment of Mourgeon being *en évidence* in his rear." Such were the dispositions, but the movements of the enemy during the night made it necessary to vary them.

As we see, nothing occurred which had not been foreseen, and if it has to be confessed that fortune favoured the daring plan, it would be unfair to attribute its happy result wholly to chance. In an unpublished letter, which the editor has seen, written by General Castaños in Barcelona, on the 11th November, 1818, the conqueror of Bailen, having been requested by an historical commission (whose work, admirably sketched out, unfortunately never reached maturity) to impart his infor-

mation "to the memory, intelligence, and felicity of penmanship" of Giron, writes thus to the latter, "... and thus, taking you back to the first part of the year 1808, which is not altogether easy, considering the state of exaltation of our minds at the time, and the coolness which on the day took possession of them, you have to supply the information which is demanded that we may have an accurate account of what we then did; it being necessary to repudiate the idea, which generally obtained, that the affair was due to chance; and it will be as well therefore to say something of that which was agreed to in Porcuna, which later had to be varied in form because the actors who were to have played the chief part had to take second place, but should not be deprived of the merit which they really showed in all they carried out."

Not for a moment did the smallest rivalry impair the noble accord which existed between the conquerors, who gained immortal glory on that occasion. Certain uneasy spirits attempted in later years to excite antagonisms and raise comparisons which these veterans would never have admitted, so well-defined were the pre-eminences and responsibilities in the army at that time.

Battle was given when and how it should have been, without impatience or fear, and in some ways favoured by circumstances, so as to draw from Thiers the lamentation: "I do not accuse Providence. After Bayonne we no longer deserved good fortune."

The conviction of the justice of their cause, on the other hand, animated the Spaniards. "Seldom were higher interests trusted to the fate of a battle," says Giron, as a prelude to some valuable military reflections which, for brevity's sake, must be omitted here, "but circumstances imperiously demanded that all risks should be taken. The fact of its being an entirely popular war; the exasperation in the public mind at the delay which it considered voluntary, because it was prudent; the decadence and ruin which further delay would have produced even if it had been convenient; the renewed confidence which would have been imparted to an enemy, who is as easily exalted as he can be dispirited; and the difficulties which the smallest suspicion by the people of irresolution on our part would have caused; these were all powerful reasons for hazarding in so decided a manner the fate of our arms."

"The reasons which decided King Alfonso VIII. nearly 600 years before, to make a frontal attack on the enemy in his position at the *Puerto del Muradel*, against the advice of his generals, who all voted for a more deliberate and safer method of operation, were not so strong as those sketched above; he fought and conquered, not far from the same place and at the same period of the year which marked the battle of Bailen, both the site and date of which battle seem destined by Providence for the most noted triumphs of our arms."

(To be continued.)

THE JAPANESE ARMY IN 1908.

(Translated by permission of the Minister of War from the
Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères.)

THE success which attended the Japanese arms in the late war does not seem to have inaugurated in that Empire such an era of repose as might reasonably have been expected. At no time, and one might almost say in no country, has preparation for war been the object of greater solicitude or exacted greater sacrifices than are now demanded of the Japanese people.

In 1907 the Parliament of Japan approved a plan of Army reorganisation which was, theoretically, to have been completely carried out in eleven years; and the sum of 170 millions of yen (about £17,500,000) voted for this reorganisation was to have been spread over the above period, though the expenditure for the first six years (to 1913 inclusive) would have been much greater than in the remaining five. Lately, however, the Japanese War Minister, under the pressure of financial necessity, has agreed to reductions of expenditure in the first six years amounting altogether to 25 millions of yen, under the head of works, and to 12 millions of yen on account of the actual reorganisation. These reductions would apparently delay to an appreciable extent the completion of the scheme, but it is believed that they will be more apparent than real.

It is tolerably certain that the Japanese Government, having settled its programme for the augmentation and reorganisation of the Army, will find the means—as it did on the very morrow of the war—to carry out its plans in their entirety, and without delay, perhaps much more rapidly than official pronouncements would lead one to suppose.

The scheme includes the creation of certain perfectly new organisations (divisions, etc.). How many such units have already been formed? And to what extent has the scheme already been carried into effect?

It is difficult to arrive at very definite conclusions on these points, for in Japan nothing is published regarding the Army, and all information on military matters is regarded as an official secret, and is withheld from the public. It may safely be said, however, that if the new organisations have not yet been constituted, they will be very shortly. The two new divisions, for instance, include a large number of existing units, and there can be no doubt that if war threatened, all the new bodies would promptly become actual realities. It may

therefore be said that the Army, even at the present moment, is to a great extent in the state aimed at in the scheme.

It is this new organisation which we propose to consider; and the time is not inappropriate, as the eyes of all nations seem to be more and more turned towards the Far East.

We will take first the organisation of the Japanese Army in time of peace, and afterwards its organisation in war.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE.

CHAPTER I.

Recruitment—Territorial Organisation.

Recruitment.—The whole organisation is based on the law of recruitment, and it is necessary to clearly understand its mechanism. The law dates from 1896; it was modified in the course of the late war:—

First, by the Imperial Decree of 29th September, 1904, extending service in the *Kobi* (2nd Reserve, or Reserve Army properly so called), and abolishing the 2nd Class of the *Hoju* (Reserve of Recruitment).¹

Secondly, by the Imperial Decree of 21st April, 1905, placing at the disposal of the Minister of War, for the purpose of strengthening the Army in the field, certain categories of men, in particular those composing the 1st Class of the *Kokumin* (Territorial Army or *Landsturm*), and also those of the 2nd Class.²

Lastly, after the war the annual Act for the training of 1907-08 reduced provisionally the three years' term of service with the colours to two years, in the case of the infantry.

Recruitment in Japan is based on the principle of personal service, obligatory and universal. That is to say, Japan has adopted the European principle of "the nation in arms."

Military obligation begins at 17 years of age and ends at the age of 40. The young men are not called up to the colours until the year following that in which they attain the age of 20.

The operations preceding the call to the colours consist of:—

¹ The *Kobi* answers to the German *Landwehr*. The *Hoju*, which the writer calls the "Reserve of Recruitment," is known in other Armies as the *Ersatz*, or Supplementary, Reserve. This order quoted had *retrospective effect*; that is to say, all the men who for five years back had passed into the Territorial Army, suddenly became liable to service in the field, and they were freely used!—*Trans.*

² Practically the whole of the existing Territorial Army was made liable to service in the Field Army by the first proclamation. The second extended the liability to the *levy en masse*, i.e., the second part of the *Kokumin*, which includes every able-bodied man in the country.—*Trans.*

1. A medical examination of a very stringent character, following which the young men are classified in three categories:—

- The absolutely fit;
- The fit;
- The unfit. These latter are not required to perform any military service.

The exemptions are certain categories of young men who have obtained diplomas or who occupy recognised positions in the scholastic profession or in the clergy; also those entitled by law to exemption for family reasons.¹ The title to exemptions in these latter cases is very clearly defined.

The medical examination takes place in the month of April or August of the year in which the recruit is called up.

2. The drawing of lots among the "absolutely fit" to determine those who are to form the annual contingent.² The number required in each year is announced in an Imperial Decree. If the number of "absolutely fit" should chance to fall short of requirements, those classed as "fit" would draw lots to make up the necessary strength. Such a contingency, however, has not presented itself so far.

Active Army and Reserves.—The Japanese Army comprises:—

- (1) The Active Army, or *Geneki*.
- (2) The Reserve of the Active Army, or *Yobi*.
- (3) The Army of Reserve properly so called, or *Kobi*.
- (4) The Territorial Army, or *Kokumin* (1st part).³

Besides these there is the overplus of the annual classes which is passed into certain categories, forming supplementary Reserves, which receive little or no instruction, and which constitute the *Hoku* and (a portion of) the *second* part of the *Kokumin*. The latter is the mass of men from 17 to 40 years of age who do not belong to any of the categories mentioned above.

1. *Active Army or "Geneki."*—The young men serve two years in the infantry and three years in all other arms, even

¹ Such as eldest sons of widows, and the like. The exemptions generally resemble those which obtain in Germany and most European countries.

² The terms "annual contingent" and "annual class" are frequently used as synonymous. But strictly speaking the latter means all the young men physically fit for service who attain the age of 20 in any given year, while the annual *contingent* is the number of recruits required to fill up all branches of the Army to full peace strength after the departure of those whose term of service with the colours has expired. The balance of the young men who are physically fit is passed to the Supplementary Reserve (*Hoku*).—*Trans.*

³ (2) is entirely absorbed into (1), including its depôts, on mobilisation; (3) is the *Landwehr*; (4) the organised *Landsturm*.—*Trans.*

in the transport train (except drivers, who serve for six months only).

A certain number of young men form a special category. These are the *one-year volunteers*, corresponding to the same class in the German Army. Some of them become officers and make the Army their career for life; others become reserve officers. There are about 1,500 volunteers each year.

Reserve of the Active Army, or Yobi.—After their two or three years' service in the ranks the young men pass into the Reserve, or *Yobi*. They remain in it for five years and four months, or four years and four months, according to whether they have served two years or three years in the Active Army. The odd four months in each case corresponds to the time considered necessary for the class which succeeds them in the ranks to be sufficiently trained to be mobilised in case of necessity.

The men in the *Yobi* are supposed to undergo two trainings of sixty days each; but in practice the Reservists are only called up for two manœuvre periods, one of four weeks, the other of two weeks. Further, in a general way the number and duration of the trainings undergone by the Reservists are limited by the amount of money available.

On mobilisation the men of the *Yobi* raise the units of the Army from peace to war strength. The surplus men remain with the depôts.¹

3. *The Army of Reserve properly so called, or the "Kobi" Army.* — This Reserve is often incorrectly called the *Depôt Army*. It corresponds to the German *Landwehr*. The men pass from the *Yobi* into the *Kobi* Army, and remain in it for ten years (instead of five as before the war). The soldiers of the *Kobi* are supposed to undergo two trainings of sixty days each in their ten years' *Kobi* service. They form the units of all arms of the *Kobi* Army. This force furnishes brigades corresponding in number with the divisions of the Active Army; also troops for service on the lines of communication and troops for sieges or for the defence of fortified places, etc.

4. *"Kokumin," 1st Part, or Territorial Army.* — This organisation corresponds to the German (organised) *Landsturm*. The men remain in it from the age of 37 until the expiration of their military obligations; that is to say, for two years and eight months. They do not undergo any training. The rôle of the *Kokumin* is the defence of the national territory.

Other Categories: The "Hoju."—The remainder of the young men classed as "absolutely fit," after deducting the

¹ If the whole of the men over and above field service strength were really to go to the depôts, each battalion would have a depôt about 800 strong without calling up any of the men from the Supplementary Reserve (*Hoju*).

annual contingent, also those classed as "fit," within the limits of a number fixed annually, form a separate category called the *Hoju*. The proportion of the "fit" annually passed into the *Hoju* to the total number of young men so classed is not known.

The *Hoju* serves as a Reserve of Recruitment (German *Ersatz Reserve*) to ensure the maintenance of the effective strength in time of peace.¹ For this purpose each regiment has constantly attached to it for instruction 150 men of the *Hoju*. In principle these young men remain with the regiment for three months, after which they are released and immediately replaced by another batch of *Hoju* recruits of the same strength. Besides this recruit training the men of the *Hoju* serve in the ranks for 90 days during their first year. They are also supposed to undergo two trainings each of 60 days in their second and fourth years of service. But it must be added that it is doubtful whether these reservists are really compelled to go through such long periods of instruction. Further, it is given out that the Minister of War intends to do away with the instruction of the *Hoju*, and even to abolish the *Hoju* altogether, for with a service of two years in the ranks the number of men receiving a complete training is so largely increased that a supplementary reserve can be dispensed with altogether.²

The men of the *Hoju* remain in it for seven years and four months, and are then passed to the *Kobi*, or Reserve Army, entering it at the same time as their comrades coming from the Active Army.

On mobilisation the men of the *Hoju* fill up to war establishment the transport trains and the units of other subsidiary services belonging to the Field Army. They also reinforce the depôts, etc.³

Kokumin, 2nd Part.—Every Japanese fit for military service and not belonging to one of the categories mentioned above belongs during the period of military obligation, *i.e.*, from 17 to 40 years of age, to a single category known as the second part of the *Kokumin* (*Landsturm, 2nd ban*). This category therefore includes :—

1. All the young men of 17 to 20 years of age.
2. Those exempted from military service.
3. The balance of the men classed as "fit" who have not been passed into the *Hoju*.

The men of this category do not receive any military instruction. During the late war an Imperial Decree placed the

¹ *Sic* in original, but it is obvious that the writer meant "in time of war."—*Trans.*

² See Translator's note at the end of the chapter.

³ The primary object of any *Ersatz* or Supplementary Reserve is to fill up the depôts so as to ensure a constant supply of men to make good losses in the field. But this function may be modified by the increase of fully-trained men consequent on the adoption of two years' period of service. See also note at the end of this chapter.—*Trans.*

Years 17—	Absolutely Fit.	Fit.	Exempted.	Unfit.
18	<i>Kokumin</i> , 2nd Part.			
19				
20	One year Vols. ¹	<i>Geneki</i> . Active Army in time of peace.		
21		Infan- try.	All other arms.	
22			<i>Hōju</i> . Supple- mentary Reserve.	
23				
24				
25		<i>Yōbi</i> . Reserve of the Active Army.		
26				
27				<i>Kokumin</i> , 2nd Part.
28				
29				
30				
31		<i>Kōbi</i> . Army of Reserve properly so called (answering to German <i>landwehr</i>).		
32				
33				
34				
35				
36				
37				
38		<i>Kokumin</i> , 1st Part. Territorial Army (<i>landsturm</i>).		
39				
40				

¹ The one-year Volunteers may do their year of service before the age of 20.

whole of them at the disposal of the War Minister for the purpose of reinforcing the Armies in the field. Thanks to the war-like spirit and natural discipline of the Japanese nation, young soldiers of 17 years of age were seen towards the close of the war behaving steadily under fire, although they had had only a few months' training. The diagram on p. 1214 shows how the various stages of military service are divided over the period of obligation (17 to 40 years of age) in the different categories.

The Resources of Japan from a Recruiting Point of View: Annual Contingent.—The annual contingent has increased largely in the last twenty years. From 17,000 men or thereabouts in 1888, it had risen to 42,000 in 1896, and to 80,000 or 100,000 for the classes of 1904 and 1905 called up during the war. The class of 1906 (which joined the colours in December, 1907) amounted to 120,000. The population of Japan, increasing steadily as it does year by year, can easily supply these contingents. From 45 millions in 1900 the population had mounted to nearly 50 millions in 1906, and the excess of births over deaths is still increasing. In 1907 the number of young men who attained the age of 20 exceeded 520,000.

The Two Years' Period of Service.—The law of 1907-08 introduced the two years period of service for the infantry. According to the declaration of the Minister of War, General Teratsui, it was intended to be a temporary and experimental measure; but there is no doubt that it will become permanent. In fact, the tendency in Japan is to give military training to the greatest possible number of men in order to increase the strength of the reserves immediately available in the event of war. Thanks to the two years' period of service, the Japanese reckon on passing through the ranks 50 per cent. more men than has hitherto been the case. It is thus that the annual contingent which has averaged 80,000 men in recent years has now become 120,000. Japan has obtained this result for an extra expenditure not exceeding 3,600,000 yen (£360,000) per annum, this being the cost of the pay and clothing of the additional men, and of their travelling expenses to and from their homes, increase of non-commissioned officers, etc.

Mobilisable Effectives.—It is not easy to obtain a correct idea of the actual mobilisable strength. To begin with, the exact number of men in each annual class belonging to the different categories is not known; and again, there is no information as to the number of men in the *Hojū*, who should have received at least a rudimentary instruction. Further, for several years back the Japanese Army has been in a continual state of re-organisation.

However, the problem presents itself under the two following heads:—

First,—What would be the number of trained men available for a mobilisation during the present year (1908)? And what reserves would Japan have at her disposal?

Secondly,—What would be the total number of trained men when the new system has come into full operation, supposing that Japan continues to call 120,000 young soldiers to the colours every year?

1. With regard to the strength mobilisable at the present time. We must base our calculation on the strength that Japan had under arms at the close of the late war. At that time Japan had in the field about 600,000 men. This is without counting the men in the depôts, all of whom had had a certain amount of instruction. The above figure includes, however, the two classes of 1904 and 1905, who were actually called out in those years, though they would not ordinarily have been summoned until 1905 and 1906. We must add the class of 1906, say, 120,000 men, called up in December, 1907, and mobilisable in the current year (1908). On the other hand, the two oldest classes, released after the war, have to be deducted. They amount to about 30,000 men. It appears, therefore, that Japan could now dispose of nearly 700,000 men, all completely trained.¹

It is also necessary to take into account the following, who would be available, if not immediately, at least after a few months:—

(a) The trained men who were in the depôts at the close of the war, estimated at about 100,000.

(b) The untrained men called up to the depôts for instruction, and the young men called out in advance of their time.

The grand total of all the men available might reach a total of a million.

2. Mobilisable strength when the new system has developed its full effect. For this calculation we ought to know the actual proportion of the "absolutely fit" and the "fit," in the different categories of the Army. The latest official statistics are those of the year 1902. The number of young men attaining the age of 20 in that year was 539,282. Of these, 187,907, say 34.84 per cent., were declared "absolutely fit," and divided as follows:—

To the *Geneki*, 45,000.

To the *Hoju*, 1st and 2nd parts, the remainder of the "absolutely fit." (The orders of the 29th September, 1904, abolished the 2nd part of the *Hoju*.)

Of the remainder, 108,016 (20.03 per cent.), having been classed as "fit," were passed into the *Kokumin*, 2nd part; 49,354, (9.15 per cent.) were exempted for family or other reasons; 194,003 (35.98 per cent.) were unfit.

If we apply these proportions to the class of 1907 (and the classes of the succeeding years), we arrive at the following figures:—

Total number of young men reaching the age of twenty, 520,000; of these the "absolutely fit" would amount to about 182,000, and the whole would be divided as follows:—

¹The translator is unable to follow this calculation

120,000 to the *Geneki* (this is a known number).

62,000 to the *Hoji* (balance of the "absolutely fit").

104,000 to the *Kokumin*, 2nd part (all those classed as "fit.")¹

52,000 exempted.

182,000 "unfit."

To obtain the total of each category we have only to multiply by the number of years spent in each, and apply the ordinary rule for the annual decrease of strength. We then arrive at the following figures :—

Mobilised Active Army (*Geneki* and *Yobi*, seven annual classes), 742,000 men fully trained.

Hoji (seven classes), 383,780 men partially trained.

Kobi (ten classes), say 780,000 men completely trained from the *Yobi* and 403,000 men partially trained from the *Hoji*; total, 1,182,000.

Kokumin, 1st part (two annual classes), say 115,000 men fully trained, 59,520 partially trained.

Kokumin, 2nd part, three annual classes of young men 17 to 20 years of age, untrained, about one million; also twenty classes of men 20 to 40 years of age, untrained, about two millions. Total of 2nd part of *Kokumin*, three millions of men, untrained but available in case of necessity.

To recapitulate: The new system will eventually give Japan the following strength of fighting men :—

Completely trained, 1,638,000 men, of whom 742,800 will be in the mobilised Active Army or first line, 780,000 in the *Kobi* Army or second line, and 115,000 in the *Kokumin*, 1st part, or Territorial Army.

Partially trained (available to make good losses in the field), 846,000.

Untrained, but can be called up for training as required, about 3,000,000.

This result will not be completely attained for about twenty years, but in the meantime the mobilisable strength, starting with the figures given for the current year (1908) will steadily increase until it reaches the totals given above.

Territorial Organisation.—The territorial organisation follows that of the Army itself; that is to say, it is based on the *divisional district*. To each division of the Army belongs a definite area from whence it draws its recruits, and which supplies its reserves on mobilisation. There are 18 of these divisional districts, the two divisions now in Manchuria and Korea having each their corresponding district in Japan. The Guard Division has no special district; it is recruited from the smaller gentry and landowners of the whole country.

¹ But it is quite possible that a proportion of these men may be passed into the *Hoji* and receive a partial training in the transport, hospital, and other non-combatant corps.

As regards the infantry, the divisional areas are each divided into four regimental districts, grouped in pairs, corresponding to the brigades, and apportioned into battalion sub-districts. Other arms are recruited from divisional districts as a whole. (Each sub-division furnishing its quota?) In case of the local contingent being insufficient, it is made up by borrowing from another sub-division, or even from another divisional district.

The battalions of heavy artillery are supplied from the divisional district in which they are stationed. For the recruitment of the (independent) brigades of cavalry and artillery and of the brigade of "communication troops," certain divisional districts are grouped together, and the recruits are drawn from these areas as a whole.

The special troops forming the garrisons of certain islands are furnished locally from the independent districts formed by the islands themselves. The garrison of Formosa is supplied with its recruits from the capital, and the troops in the island of Tsu-shima are also specially recruited.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE TO CHAPTER I.

The Two Years' Term of Service and the "Hoju."—The effect of the reduction of service with the colours from three years to two is not always clearly understood in this country. The rank and file strength of a Japanese infantry battalion in time of peace appears to be 556 (as will be seen later on). When service with the colours was for a term of three years, *one-third* of this number was passed to the Reserve (*Yobi*) every year, and the Reserve service being four years, the total number of Reservists per battalion would be $185 \times 4 = 740$, less casualties; so that about 700 Reservists might be counted on, of whom not less than 400, and possibly nearly 600, would be required to bring the battalion to war strength on mobilisation. To *maintain* it at that strength in the field, the partially trained men of the *Hoju* (*Ersatz* or Supplementary Reserve) were called up to the *depôt*, where their training was completed, and from whence they were drafted to the service battalion as required.

Service with the colours being reduced to two years, however, *one-half* of the rank and file is passed to the Reserve annually, and they will remain in the *Yobi* for five years instead of four; so that the number of Reservists available per battalion will be at least 1,300 instead of 700. Consequently, it will be possible to dispense with the training of the men in the Supplementary Reserve (*Hoju*) in time of peace, or even to abolish that Reserve altogether, except as regards the men required for the transport and other subsidiary services.

It does not seem, however, altogether likely that this will be done. It hardly seems worth while incurring the expense and making the increased demands on the population involved in the adoption of the two years' system if the additional number of fully-trained men thus produced is to be employed in making

good the waste of war, an object which is doubtless of the highest importance, but one which the experience of two great wars has shown to be sufficiently well served by an *Ersatz* or Supplementary Reserve. In Germany, where the two years' system is now fully established, the balance of fully-trained men remaining available after the battalion or other unit has been raised to war strength will, it is understood, be quite otherwise employed. Every regiment is to form on mobilisation half a regiment of Reserve troops, so that a brigade will form a full *Reserve regiment*, and a division a *Reserve brigade*. And it is at least probable that these new brigades will be incorporated in their divisions when the latter take the field, the more so as in Germany the two years' system has been applied to all branches of the service except the cavalry and horse artillery, and there would apparently be no great difficulty in augmenting the artillery of each division in proportion to the infantry.

These things being so, it is not unreasonable to surmise that Japan will sooner or later take a similar course, even if the training of the men in the *Hoju* should be temporarily given up for financial reasons. But unless these are very pressing one would rather expect to hear that the two years' system has been extended to the artillery, and that Reserve brigades are to be substituted for the *Kobi* brigades now attached to divisions on mobilisation.

(To be continued.)

NAVAL NOTES.

Home The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—

Rear-Admiral—E. E. Bradford, C.V.O., to be a Rear-Admiral in the Home Fleet. Captains—D. R. L. Nicholson to "Inflexible," as Chief of Staff to Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir E. H. Seymour; H. E. Pursey Cust to be Hydrographer of the Navy; A. E. M. Chatfield to "Albemarle." Commanders—H. C. J. Grant to "Iphigenia"; R. F. Parker to "Andromeda."

Royal Marine Light Infantry.—Colonel H. C. Money, C.B., to be Colonel-Commandant of the Plymouth Division. Colonel C. G. Brittan to be Colonel Second Commandant of Plymouth Division.

Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir E. H. Seymour, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., has been appointed Special Representative of the Government at the Hudson-Fulton Celebrations in New York, and hoisted his flag (the Union at the main) on the 1st inst. on board the first-class armoured cruiser *Inflexible* at Portsmouth. The other ships composing the squadron under his orders are the first-class armoured cruisers *Drake* (flagship of Rear-Admiral F. T. Hamilton, C.V.O., Commanding Fifth Cruiser Squadron), *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Black Prince*.

Rear-Admiral R. N. Ommanney hoisted his flag at Chatham on the 9th ult. on taking over charge of the Dockyard from Vice-Admiral G. A. Giffard, C.M.G., whose flag was struck the same evening.

Rear-Admiral Sir Colin R. Keppel, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., hoisted his flag on the 26th ult. at Chatham on board the first-class battleship *Albemarle* as Rear-Admiral in the Atlantic Fleet, in succession to Rear-Admiral W. B. Fisher, C.B.

The first-class battleship *Albion* was commissioned at Chatham on the 25th ult. by Captain C. H. Morgan as parent ship of a special service group of this class, which will be joined by the *Canopus* and *Ocean* on their being relieved in the Mediterranean.

Steam Trials.—Trial of the "Superb."—The new first-class battleship *Superb*, the fourth of the battleships of the *Dreadnought* type to be completed for the Navy, completed her trials in June with marked success, and her service work will be watched with interest, because of the high economy realised by her machinery on trial.

The *Superb*, like her immediate predecessors—the *Bellerophon*, built at Portsmouth Dockyard, and the *Temeraire*, constructed at Devonport Dockyard—is slightly larger than the *Dreadnought*, having a length between perpendiculars of 490 feet, a beam of 82 feet, and a mean load draught of 27 feet, at which the displacement is 18,600 tons. Her armament includes ten 12-inch guns—two in each of the five barbettes—and sixteen 4-inch guns. The machinery is of the Parsons steam turbine type, which on

Home.

trial worked most satisfactorily. On the full-speed run of eight hours' duration, when the legend rate of 21 knots was exceeded by nearly half-a-mile per hour, the shaft power developed was 25,375-H.P. The coal consumption was only 1.38 lb. per H.P. per hour for all purposes. The steam economy of the turbines marked a record for this class of ship, agreeing with the results obtained in the Cunard liner *Mauretania*, which was also engined at the Wallsend Slipway and Engineering Company's works. The average coal consumption of preceding *Dreadnought* battleships and battleship-cruisers was 1.5 lb., so that the 1.38 lb. of the *Superb* is most favourable. On the thirty hours' trial at 70 per cent. of the full power, good results were also got, although the steam turbine works most economically at full power or in excess of full power, as then the range of expansion is greatest. The coal consumption of the *Superb* at this power was 1.62 lb. per H.P. per hour, as compared with an average of 1.7 lb. for the preceding ships of the class. The advantage of the turbine was also established by the short period required for the opening up of the machinery for inspection after the full-power tests. The time taken for this complete examination was under seven weeks—a further indication of the satisfactory workmanship established by the trial results. The ship was built by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd., who were represented on the trial by Mr. G. J. Carter. The whole of the propelling machinery was constructed by the Wallsend Slipway and Engineering Co., Ltd., and the trials were conducted on their behalf by the managing director, Mr. Andrew Laing, who has, by the development of this company's works, added them to our naval construction resources.

The Trials of the "Nubian."—The new destroyer *Nubian* has completed her official trials, and is now being completed for sea at the yard of Messrs. Thornycroft, at Woolston. Her performance has been satisfactory; the contract speed was exceeded and the consumption of oil fuel at full power was very low. The *Nubian* is the first of the 33-knot destroyers in last year's programme to carry out her official trial. The vessel is 280 feet long and 26½ feet in beam, and is of about 1,000 tons displacement. In spite of the extra load carried, the speed attained by the *Nubian* was hardly less than that attained by the *Tartar*, which is still the speediest of her class and the fastest in the world. She created a speed record in December, 1907, of 35.672 knots as a mean of six runs on the measured mile, while her highest speed was 37.037 knots, which was the fastest of a series of runs.

The new ocean-going 33-knot destroyer *Crusader*, built by Messrs. White, of East Cowes, has also completed her trials satisfactorily, having made, when running on the measured mile off the Maplins, 35.21 knots on one run, and during a six hours' continuous run averaged nearly 35 knots.—*Précis* from *The Times*.

Loss of Submarine "C11."—Want of space last month prevented our recording the disastrous collision between the submarine "C11," which was running at the time on the surface, and the s.s. *Eddystone*, on the night of the 14th of July off Cromer, which resulted in the foundering of the submarine and the loss of thirteen of her crew. She was commanded by Lieutenant C. Brodie, who, with Lieutenant Watkins and an able seaman, were the only three saved. It appears that

Home.

the cruiser *Bonaventure*, with eight submarines and eight torpedo-boats, left the Humber on the Wednesday afternoon for the south. The vessels were off Happisburgh (or Haisboro') Light, about 20 miles from Cromer, steaming in line ahead, showing the regulation lights, when suddenly the *Eddystone* ran into the flotilla and scattered them. "C11" was struck by the *Eddystone*, and foundered in about 18 fathoms of water. The other submarines manœuvred to avoid the vessel, and in this attempt, "C16" and "C17" came into collision. The last-named boat was badly damaged, and taken in tow by the parent vessel *Bonaventure*. The place where the submarine sank was immediately buoyed, and every effort has since been made to raise her, efforts which it is hoped will yet prove successful. "C11" was built by Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim at their Barrow yard, from which she was launched in 1906. She was the fortieth submarine built for the Navy. Her principal dimensions were: 150 feet in length, 13½ feet in diameter, displacement 314 tons. She had engines of 600-H.P., and a speed on the surface of 14 knots, and motors of 300-H.P., with ten knots speed, when submerged. She was fitted with two torpedo tubes. The "C" class, to which the lost boat belonged, embody many improvements on those of the "B" pattern, such as the introduction of two propellers, as in the French submarines designed by M. Laubeuf. There were two periscopes provided, one each for the captain of the boat and a look-out man. The internal combustion motors were of the 16-cylinder petrol type. The conning tower was higher placed than those in the "B" class, and was possibly armoured, though on this point, as on many others concerning this latest type of war machine, the strictest secrecy has been maintained.

This is the third occasion upon which the British submarine flotilla has suffered from grievous disaster, attended by deplorable loss of life. On 18th March, 1904, when some of the earliest submarines were manœuvring in the neighbourhood of the Nab Lightship, outside Portsmouth, at the conclusion of the day's work, "A1" did not put in an appearance, and it was afterwards established beyond a doubt that she had been struck when submerged by the *Berwick Castle*, one of the Union Castle mail steamers, and her hull damaged so seriously that she foundered. Two officers and all the crew of the submarine were drowned. On 8th June, 1905, "A8" went down just outside Plymouth Breakwater with 18 men on board, four only of whom were saved. The evidence showed that in the case of this boat she was gradually settling down by the bow through water entering at a leaky rivet into one of the tanks at the fore end, and that she suddenly plunged into the water bow first with her conning tower hatch open. Her buoyancy was thus lost, and she sank, only those who were outside being saved. A third boat went to the bottom in October, 1905, while taking in water ballast, but in this case the officers and crew were saved. Other mishaps which have occurred have been, as a rule, due to explosions of gas. The worst accident of this description occurred to "A5" a short time before the loss of "A8." The explosion was due to a leaky gasoline pump, and several members of the crew were killed or afterwards died of their injuries. The last accident of this kind took place on 13th June, 1907, on board "C8," when Lieutenant Hart died of the injuries he received, and two other men were badly burnt.—*Précis from Times.*

Home.

Hydrographer's Report for 1908.—The Report on Admiralty Surveys for the year 1908, by the Hydrographer, has been published as a Parliamentary Paper (Cd. 4642). In his report, Admiral Moestyn Field states that 11 ships were engaged in hydrographical surveys during the year, in which were employed 84 officers, of whom 59 were surveying officers, the crews of the vessels numbering 811. A total of 368 rocks and shoals dangerous to navigation were reported. Of these, ten were discovered by vessels striking on them; 29 were reported by surveying ships; 11 by other of His Majesty's ships; 38 by various British and foreign authorities; and 280 by Colonial and foreign Governments. In the same period 26 previously reported dangers have been expunged from the charts. A length of 778 miles of coast line was charted, and an area of 8,581 square miles sounded over, by the surveying vessels, which were kept fully employed during the year. In addition to this, plans and sketch surveys of places visited were received from officers of other ships of the fleet. An important feature of the year's work was the Indian marine survey, by which 254 miles of coast line were charted, and an area of 4,458 miles sounded over; two vessels of the Royal Indian Marine, with 188 officers and men, being engaged in this duty.

The publications of the department during 1908 included 67 navigation charts, and 24 plates were improved by the addition of 39 new plans. Four hundred and ninety plates were improved by large corrections and additions, while 7,680 corrections were made to the plates by the engraver. A total of 135,003 charts received minor corrections in manuscript. The number of charts printed for the requirements of the Royal Navy, for Government departments, and to meet the demand of the general public amounted to 434,946.

Remarks on Colonel Foster's Articles on "The Defence of Australia," by Captain W. R. Cresswell, C.M.G., R.N., Director, Commonwealth Naval Forces. Laid by Order before the Commonwealth Parliament:—

The Hon. the Minister of State for Defence.

In accordance with your request for my views on the Defence articles published in the Press, I submit the following:—

In two articles published in the *Argus*, Colonel Foster, Director of Military Studies, Sydney University, has given his views on the defence of Australia.

Purpose of Colonel Foster's Articles.

Colonel Foster's opinions are published at the time that Parliament is engaged in considering the Defence Bill. It is fair to assume that he has done so with the perfectly justifiable purpose of influencing with the prestige of his name and military acquirements the trend of our defence legislation. His articles need only be read for it to be seen at once that they strike at the root basis of the principles to which the new defence scheme is intended to give effect. As the fundamental pre-supposition upon which all defence doctrines depend is naval, the articles naturally invite the attention of a naval officer.

Australia.*Colonel Foster's Point of View.*

Before proceeding to criticise the defence plans he advocates, it will be well to discuss the points of view from which Colonel Foster on the one side, and the Australian Government on the other, regard the defence of Australia, and its place in the general defence of the Empire.

We will take, first, that which appears to be the basis upon which the Director of Military Studies to the Sydney University rears his super-structure of defence; and, secondly, that which, from the Australian point of view, renders necessary the radical change in our defence policy.

Colonel Foster's policy is based on the assumption of a supreme Navy—supreme in every sea, and requiring only that “the land forces must be numerous enough to compel the invader to come with a large force if he is to succeed. If this be the case, naval action will ensure that this invasionary force cannot reach Australia. Her defence rests, therefore, on the interaction of two forces—the naval force (the Imperial Navy), which, though small hostile expeditions may evade it, can certainly stop large ones; and the military force, which can make the success of the small expeditions so impossible that no wise enemy will launch them at all”; and Colonel Foster then “proceeds to consider the defence required for this latter purpose.”

Later, Colonel Foster says: “In considering these possibilities, we cannot fail to see how little purely local defence is required to guard Australia from aggression,” because (it is intended we shall infer) of a supreme Navy—supreme in all the seas of the world. “Command of the sea,” he tells us, “confers on Great Britain the power to move forces to any part of the world, in order to attack and embarrass her foes. This has been exhibited in her past history, and will form her most ready means of defending her daughter dominions in the future. It was never shown in such a scale as in the South African war, where 250,000 men were moved 6,000 miles oversea at an average rate of 1,000 a day—a rate not exceeded by the Russians over the Siberian Railway.”

The extracts have been copious—perhaps unnecessarily so—for Colonel Foster's point of view implies the existence of a *supreme Navy*, supreme even around distant Australia. Also, as preparation for efficient defence is a question not of days, but of years, we may fairly credit Colonel Foster with the postulate that within reasonable limits of time, a length of time capable of being influenced or governed by present legislation, this condition of world-sea supremacy is immutable, our paramountcy is to remain at the same relatively high standard above all rivals.

The Australian Government's Point of View.

Now, we could wish—and who with more earnestness than ourselves—that such were indeed the case. What happier condition than one of such assured, unquestioned, and continued security? But unfortunately the world, the nations that inhabit it, and the relative strength of the great Powers, are neither unchangeable nor unchanging.

With many—and we cannot but honour the sentiment—it is a heresy to doubt the paramount supremacy of the Mother Country's great Navy over all and every conceivable enemy or combination with which it may be faced, or its ability to shelter us from aggression either now or in the years to come. Yet but a few weeks since that distinguished Imperialist, the late Governor-General of the Commonwealth (Lord Northcote), bade

Australia.

us, "as men of common-sense, to remember that there were Powers of greater population who were treading fast on the heels of Great Britain, and that there were other Powers nearer our shores."

Again, we have been recently reminded by English writers on defence that the time is fast approaching when the existence of Australia "will depend on the goodwill of America and the politeness of Japan"—a comment based on a simple calculation of the growth of the world's Navies.

What, then, are the changes of which, as "men of common-sense," our late Governor-General would have us take note? All defence must depend upon the power of foreign Navies. If there were no foreign Navies, possibly one gunboat or cruiser would suffice to ensure unchallengeable supremacy. If there were but weak foreign Navies, a moderate but relatively strong Navy would be required to ensure supremacy. With the growth in strength of foreign Navies, the standard of force to meet them must be raised. There is no law of eternal friendship or indissoluble alliance. The friend of to-day may be the foe of to-morrow. With the whole world building Navies, the Empire's ability to meet them all must gradually fall to ability to meet probable or possible combinations. When the individual Powers of a probable or even possible combination are equal to, if not greater than, our own, and they are determined to construct Navies to the limit of their capabilities and resources, it is not the man of common-sense alone who sees this and understands what it may entail; it is only the wilfully blind who ignore it. Seeing that foreign nations are already treading fast on our heels, it is time, indeed, to take a long farewell to Colonel Foster's comfortable picture of our Navy, supreme over all possible combinations for all time.

The Truth about Sea Supremacy.

Naval supremacy must ever be the *sine qua non* of the Empire, but it is no certain, stable, and eternal physical fact as Colonel Foster's views would have us believe it. It was not so regarded in the past. Then it was regarded as an end in view, the purpose to be achieved and secured, not as something already ours before even war has begun, something "grateful and comforting" to rest in the shade under, but as demanding the whole earnest, unsparing, and combined effort of the whole nation throughout its every part, wherever it might be, to achieve.

India, the West Indies, Canada, each and all did their utmost on sea and land. In our last sea war, sea supremacy was achieved only after a thirteen years' struggle, and made absolute at Trafalgar. To-day, with a far greater Empire and more widely scattered dominions, with the heart of the Empire dependent on oversea for food to a degree never before known, with foreign Navies growing in strength and numbers with such rapidity, and unhampered naval power more vital to us than ever, it is suggested that we sit down comfortably and contemplate how little we need do for our local defence, and it is suggested we continue to take advantage to the fullest of sea defences paid for by our heavily-taxed brothers in Great Britain.

Growing Naval Ability of Foreign Powers and its Consequences.

The numbers of battleships, cruisers, and torpedo craft possessed by foreign Powers are set out in *Brassey, Jane, Clowes, or other Naval*

Australia.

Annals. One or two facts of marked importance may be cited. To-day Great Britain's supremacy is commanding, but the *Dreadnought's* launch marks an epoch, and every year that passes since sees the value of the older type, on which British supremacy mainly rests to-day, sensibly diminishing. Again, the rate of completion of battleships by foreign Powers has advanced at a pace almost, if not quite, equalling our own. The Japanese average rate of construction has been only two years to the British three. Germany has authoritatively declared her ability to build as fast as Great Britain. In 1911 Germany will possess but one less *Dreadnought* than Great Britain. In the same year, Japan will have one, or perhaps two, *Dreadnoughts* less than Great Britain. The superiority in older vessels, which is ours now, is decreasing annually, both in their individual battle value and numbers. Supremacy depends primarily in modern naval warfare not upon the number but upon the class of vessel.

That the present political circumstances in Europe compel the concentration of all the British battleships in home waters is a fact we are all familiar with. Fifteen years ago this, if prophesied, would have been laughed at. There is nothing on the political horizon to indicate a relaxation of that concentration. Unfortunately, the political situation points to its being intensified rather than eased. It is plain that a concentration, imperative even in peace, will not be less so in war. The simple question whether the absence of Australian effort under Colonel Foster's reliance upon a supreme Navy, or local preparation, made as effective as we can afford, will best aid the Empire in the face of that concentration, carries its own reply. Colonel Foster advocates a defence for our shores so weak as to require a naval force to be withdrawn from the home concentration to stave off any aggressor on any but the smallest scale, yet obviously preoccupation by the Mother Country's Navy in Europe will not permit of a diversion of fleet strength to defend us against an hostile alliance including a Pacific Power.

The Respective Values of the Two Systems to the Nation.

What would be the respective values of the two systems to the nation—the British Empire—at war? That is the real test of merit. Colonel Foster's, the avowedly Imperial, or our present defence schemes, avowedly Australian? It is a paradox, but each will be found to merit the name of the other rather than its own.

To an Admiralty charged with the conduct of a great naval war there could be no more weakening distraction than responsibility for the safety of great interests at a great distance. If a raiding expedition escapes, there is first the doubt as to its objective. If bound to Australia, it may be weeks before this even is determined. Squadrons detached in pursuit will not only weaken sea force, possibly strained to the utmost to do all that is required of it, but weaken it for a considerable time. For all the long voyage out and back, the squadrons detached to our relief are "dead stock." They will meet no enemy at sea against whom, by striking a blow, there would be gain in the war balance. For all that time they could be written off as "war force." This is the position under Colonel Foster's professedly Imperial system. Distance, it must be remembered, is ever a main controlling factor. To carry on war operations at the antipodes from the heart of the Empire is like lifting a weight at the end of a pole. The leverage is great, and against the lifter. In proportion to the weight of

Australia.

war, the effort it involves is prodigious. The avowedly Australian scheme, on the other hand, is intended to render us so strong that there may be little concern for our safety for some time ahead. The relief to the Admiralty or its officers needs no statement. The immense gain to the Empire by rendering unnecessary the withdrawal of naval force to our aid in the first grave emergency may be practically measured by the strength of the expedition which, under Colonel Foster's plan, would be threshing around the world for long weeks coming to our aid. There is no doubt as to which scheme would be favoured by the Admiralty or officer responsible for the naval conduct of a war. Under the new scheme, it would be easier to carry out the "standardisation," the production of arms and ammunition, of "equipment and military stores of all sorts," as Colonel Foster suggests. Under the proposals for national training, and under these proposals alone, can Australia then "be a base of supplies of stores, and of reinforcements for the Imperial forces engaged in her neighbourhood."

Seeing, then, that the new defence scheme, the greater, includes all that Colonel Foster's scheme, the less, provides for, it is difficult to account for his appearance on the side of the old system, which the march of events renders it imperative to change.

(To be continued.)

The following are the principal promotions and appointments which have been made.

Rear-Admirals—L. V. Marin-Darbel to be Chief of the Naval General Staff; L. J. Berryer to Command of the 3rd Division of the Mediterranean Squadron; L. H. Dufaure de Lajarte to be Chief of the Staff of the 5th *Arrondissement Maritime* (Toulon); H. De Faubourhet de Monferrand to be Member of the Superior Council of the Navy and President of the Commission for Trial of Ships; J. M. Nény to be Chief of the Department of Commissioned Ships. Capitaine de Vaisseau—L. M. Laporte to "Léon-Gambetta." Capitaines de Frégate—A. L. Champanhac, E. M. Ronin to be Capitaines de Vaisseau; L. R. Exelmans to "Chamois," and Command of School of Pilotage; P. M. Barthes to "Obusier," and Command of Torpedo Flotilla of the Squadron of the North; C. M. Lainé to "Marigot," and of the Senegal Naval Division.—*Journal Officiel de la République Française.*

Vice-Admiral de Marolles hoisted his flag and took up his duties as Maritime Prefect at Brest in succession to Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière, the new Minister of Marine, on the 10th ult. The new Prefect is 58 years old, and as a captain he distinguished himself a good deal during the Boxer troubles in 1900, when he served as Chief of the Staff of the International flying column which, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir E. H. Seymour, attempted to reach Peking for the rescue of the Legations. In his despatch Sir E. Seymour drew special attention to the valuable assistance he received from Captain De Marolles, and to the high services he rendered during the expedition. Captain De Marolles was at that time in command of the first-class cruiser *D'Entrecasteaux*.

Rear-Admiral Dufaure de Lajarte, the new Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, struck his flag on board the *Bouvet* at Toulon on the 15th ult., and took over his duties at the Ministry of Marine on the

France.

23rd ult. Rear-Admiral Berryer, his successor in command of the 3rd Division of the Mediterranean Fleet, hoisted his flag on the 16th ult. on board the first-class battleship *Bouvet* at Toulon.

The 2nd Division of the Mediterranean Fleet, under the command of Rear-Admiral Le Pord, consisting of the first-class battleships *Justice* (flagship of Rear-Admiral Le Pord), *Liberté*, and *Verité*, arrived at Brest on the 11th ult. at the conclusion of the manœuvres, and left on the 5th inst. for New York, where they will represent the French nation at the Hudson-Fulton celebrations. The squadron has been ordered to maintain a speed of 16 knots on the passage across to America.

New Ships.—Work on the new first-class battleship *Danton* is being actively pushed forward at Brest, and the time lost owing to the failure to launch her the first time the attempt was made will not delay her completion at the date originally fixed, in the autumn of next year. Her armour belt was all put in position in fourteen days, and her military masts and her funnels have also been put in place. M. Louis, the head of the constructor's department at the dockyard, has accompanied the new Minister of Marine to Paris, where he will continue to serve under his old Chief at the Ministry of Marine, and he may be trusted to see that there is no more unnecessary delay in completing these fine ships. The same energy in pushing forward the work on a sister ship, the *Diderot*, is being displayed at the yard of the Société des Chantiers et Ateliers de St. Nazaire (Penhoet), her armour, funnels, etc., being already all in place.

A Submarine Salvage Boat.—A vessel recently completed for the French Navy is the submarine salvage boat *Vulcan*, which was constructed with considerable secrecy as to her details and her ultimate service. Her dimensions are: Length, 43 metres (141.078 feet) over all, and 40 metres (131.235 feet) between perpendiculars; extreme beam, 7.72 metres (25.121 feet); draught, just over 3 metres (9.843 feet); her displacement is about 330 tons, and her engines of 450-H.P. give her a speed between 11 and 12 knots. Her hull is of galvanized steel plates, stronger than is usual in vessels of her size. It has fore and aft several water-tight compartments. A double bottom extends all along the vessel, except beneath the machinery space. The boiler is of ordinary cylindrical type with three furnaces, and the engine is triple expansion. Besides the usual auxiliaries there is a large and powerful pump, driven by an independent two-cylinder engine. All the openings on the deck can be closed watertight. The wheel-house consists of a kind of metal box supported at its four corners and raised some 16 inches from the deck; hence the water may cover the deck from end to end without gaining admission.

In salving submerged bodies, the ordinary winches will be employed if the weight is not great. The vessel will be brought over the sunken submarine, and chains running over the guide pulleys fore and aft will be passed round or attached to the wreck. The winches, or if necessary the capstan, will then be employed to pull in the chains and raise the submarine till it lies below the salving vessel at a convenient depth, when the latter will steam with its load to the nearest place or dock where salvage can be completed. If the load is too great for this method, chains will be made fast to the lost submarine. The *Vulcan* will then take in

France.

water ballast and sink to the lowest safe level, and then, when the slack on the chains has been taken up, she will pump out the ballast and slowly rise, lifting the submarine slightly from the bottom. She will then steam away to some shallower place, let the boat down on the bottom, and repeat the operation, and so on until the wreck can be brought to a safe place. Use, no doubt, will also be made of the large pumps on board to empty the submerged vessel.

Relative Cost of Shipbuilding.—It has been stated that the battleships of the *Queen* class, built in England in 1902, having a displacement of 15,000 tons, cost 2,550 francs (£102) a ton, and that this is 1,100 francs (£44) a ton less than the cost per ton of the same class of ship in France. This statement, which was published in the report of M. Brousse, has been proved to be incorrect; nevertheless, it has served a good purpose—that of calling public attention to the relative cost of construction in the different Navies of the world.

It was said that England could build three battleships for the price of two built in France; but not only can England not build three for two, she cannot even build four for three, or even five for four. In comparing the price of construction in different countries, critics have been contented with the simple calculation of extracting the cost from the Budget for such or such a ship and dividing this by the number of tons of the vessel. This plan, though easy and quick, is not a fair or an accurate one, as the different method of drawing up the Budget has to be considered. Does the cost include, besides hull, machinery, and armament, all stores and coal, etc., complete on board and the vessel ready for commission?

Let us compare the estimates for the English battleship *Superb*, ordered on the 6th February, 1907, with that of the *Voltaire*, ordered on 26th December, 1906. These two vessels are as nearly contemporaneous as possible, and both have been built by contract in private yards. Their dimensions are as follows:—

	<i>Superb.</i>	<i>Voltaire.</i>
Length	490 feet.	145 metres (475 feet)
Beam	82 "	25·8 " (84 ")
Draught	27 "	8·26 " (27 ")
Displacement	18,600 tons.	18,318 tons.
H.P.	23,000	22,500
Speed	20·7 to 21 knots.	19—20 knots.

The details of prices given in the Budgets of the two countries are as follows:—

Hull	20,548,675 francs.	23,250,000 francs.
Engines	7,141,500 "	8,370,000 "
Turrets, gun mountings	10,509,575 "	12,663,000 "
Guns (exclusive of ammunition)	2,907,500 "	3,870,000 "
Various expenses	805,975 "	189,300 "
Totals	41,913,225 (£1,676,529)	48,342,300 (£1,983,692)

France.

To the cost of the *Voltaire*, however, must be added expenses incurred in the arsenal, which amount to 870,800 francs, raising her total cost to 49,213,100 francs. From these figures the price per ton works out as follows: *Superb*, 2,253 francs (£90 2s. 6d.); *Voltaire*, 2,686 francs (£107 9s. 2d.); or a difference in favour of the English ship of 433 francs (£17 6s. 8d.) per ton. It is true that the general total which appears in our Budget is 54,247,544 francs, so that in round numbers there is a difference of five million francs in the cost of the two ships; but the following extra expenses charged with us are not included in the English estimates, namely: trials of armour plates, 521,000 francs; munitions, 4,000,000 francs; various, 200,000 francs. It appears, therefore, from these figures that comparisons between the costs of ships in England and France have always been inaccurate, because the expenses of trials and cost of munitions are not included in the English Budget. If we also take into consideration that the cost of materials are higher in France (steel, for instance, costing 10 to 15 per cent. more) and the average price of coal being 15 francs to 11 francs (12s. to 8s. 9d.), it must be acknowledged that French constructors manage very well if their total estimates are only about 16 or 17 per cent. higher than in Great Britain.—*Le Yacht, La Vie Maritime, Le Temps* and *Army and Navy Journal*.

Germany. The following are the principal promotions and appointments which have been made:—Kapitän zur See—Bachmann, von Krosigk, von Dambrowski, to be Rear-Admirals; Schröder to be Commandant of Heligoland. Kapitän zur See—Bossart to “Kaiser Barbarossa”; Schultz to “Lothringen”; Gädeke to “Westphalen”; Wilbrandt to “Braunschweig”; Funke to “Württemberg.”—*Marine Verordnungsblatt*.

Admiral H.R.H. Prince Henry of Prussia is to resign his command of the High Sea Fleet, which he has held for the last three years, at the conclusion of the manœuvres, and to be promoted to the rank of Grand Admiral. This rank was established by the Kaiser some four years ago, Admiral Koester, then in command of the High Sea Fleet, being promoted to it, presumably as an equivalent to our rank of Admiral-of-the-Fleet, so as to have officers, if the occasion arises, who will take equal precedence with the highest in our own Navy.

Grand Admiral von Koester is proceeding to the United States as the Kaiser's representative at the Hudson-Fulton celebrations, a small squadron, consisting of the second-class cruisers *Bremen*, *Victoria*, and *Frey*, having also been despatched to New York to represent the German Navy; as none of these ships is considered of sufficient importance to hoist a Grand Admiral's flag for the cruise, Grand Admiral von Koester is proceeding to New York by one of the German mail steamers.

The “Nassau” and “Westphalen.”—The armament and dimensions of the four ships of the *Nassau* class are now known. Their dimensions are as follows:—Length, 451 feet; beam, 88 feet; draught, 26 feet 3 inches, on a displacement of about 18,500 tons. The armament consists of twelve

Germany.

11-inch guns in six double turrets, one forward, one aft, and two on each beam; twelve 5.9-inch Q.F. guns and sixteen 18-pounder Q.F. guns. Her three triple-expansion engines are to develop 20,000-I.H.P., giving a speed of 19 knots, which it is fully expected will be exceeded. The normal coal supply is 950 tons, but 2,700 tons can be carried.

Both the *Nassau* and *Westphalen* are now practically ready for their trials, and those of the *Nassau*, which has been constructed at the Imperial Dockyard, Wilhelmshaven, are expected to commence this month. Those of the *Westphalen*, however, must be delayed quite another month, as the attempt to bring her down the Weser from Bremen, where she has been constructed, has temporarily failed, owing to there being an insufficient depth of water in the river, in spite of every effort having been made by the use of pontoons, etc., to lighten her draught. The attempt has accordingly been put off until the next high spring tides, and in the meantime dredgers are being employed to deepen the waterway.

The Estimates for 1909.—The Estimates for 1909 amount to 400,471,212 marks (£20,023,560 12s.), as against 339,233,724 marks (£16,961,686 4s.) voted for 1908, showing an increase of 61,237,488 marks (£3,061,874 8s.). The following are the principal items:—

ORDINARY PERMANENT ESTIMATES.

	Proposed for 1909.		Voted, 1908.	
	Marks.	£ s.	£ s.	
Imperial Ministry of Marine and Naval Cabinet	2,167,630	=(108,381 10)	101,719	15
Naval Headquarter Staff	316,340	(15,817 0)	15,707	10
Observatories, etc.	387,384	(19,369 4)	18,893	4
Station Accounts Department	766,018	(38,300 18)	34,228	10
Legal Department	192,375	(9,618 15)	9,133	0
Chaplains' Department and Garrison Schools	180,088	(9,004 8)	8,319	13
Pay of Officers and Men	32,840,378	(1,642,018 18)	1,566,159	15
Maintenance of Fleet in Commission	39,781,806	(1,989,090 6)	1,821,350	0
Allowances for Officers and Men	3,385,724	(169,286 4)	115,616	14
Clothing	429,138	(21,456 18)	21,825	19
Barrack and Garrison Administration, etc.	1,189,306	(59,465 6)	57,150	9
Barrack and Garrison Construction	751,879	(37,593 19)	36,545	9
Lodging Allowance	2,887,341	(144,367 1)	135,834	14
Medical Department	2,751,830	(137,591 10)	124,517	8
Travelling, Transport, and Freight Charges	3,636,000	(181,800 0)	157,389	0
Training Establishments	553,882	(27,694 2)	24,547	18
Maintenance of Fleet and Dockyards	34,202,280	(1,710,114 0)	1,626,658	7
Ordnance, Arms, and Fortification	13,972,607	(698,630 7)	641,051	8
Accountant-General's Department	1,036,658	(51,832 18)	48,609	10
Pilotage and Surveying	790,474	(39,523 14)	37,809	15
Miscellaneous Expenses	1,678,601	(83,930 1)	81,217	1
Administration of Kiau-Chau Protectorate	146,070	(7,303 10)	5,768	15
Total	144,043,804	(7,202,190 4)	6,690,053	14

Germany.

SPECIAL ORDINARY ESTIMATES.

Shipbuilding Programme for 1909.

For the construction of the following ships :—

	Marks.	£	s.
The first-class battle-ship "Nassau" (Ersatz "Bayern),"			
4th and final Vote	4,870,000	(243,500	0)
" " " " "Westfalen" (Ersatz "Sachsen),"			
4th and final Vote	4,870,000	(243,500	0)
The first-class armoured cruiser "Blücher," 4th and final			
Vote	4,500,000	(225,000	0)
The first-class battle-ship "Rheinland" (Ersatz "Wurttem-			
berg"), 3rd Vote	5,800,000	(290,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Baden," 3rd Vote ...	5,800,000	(290,000	0)
First-class armoured cruiser "F," 3rd Vote	7,500,000	(375,000	0)
Third-class cruiser "Colberg" (Ersatz "Greif"), 3rd Vote...	1,500,000	(75,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Jagd," 3rd and final Vote ...	1,500,000	(75,000	0)
First-class battle-ship Ersatz "Oldenburg," 2nd Vote ...	10,500,000	(525,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Siegfried," 2nd Vote...	10,500,000	(525,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Beowulf," 2nd Vote...	10,500,000	(525,000	0)
" " " " "cruiser "G," 2nd Vote	11,000,000	(550,000	0)
Third-class " " "Ersatz "Schwalbe," 2nd Vote ...	2,500,000	(125,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Sperber," 2nd Vote	2,500,000	(125,000	0)
River-Gunboat C, 2nd and final Vote	300,000	(15,000	0)
First-class battle-ship Ersatz "Frithjof," 1st Vote ...	5,500,000	(275,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Hildebrand," 1st Vote ...	5,500,000	(275,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Heimdall," 1st Vote ...	5,500,000	(275,000	0)
First-class armoured cruiser "H," 1st Vote	5,000,000	(250,000	0)
Third-class cruiser Ersatz "Bussard," 1st Vote	2,500,000	(125,000	0)
" " " " "Ersatz "Falko," 1st Vote	2,500,000	(125,000	0)
Tender for Torpedo-boat Flotilla, 1st Vote	200,000	(10,000	0)
Flotilla of Torpedo Boats, 1st Vote	10,000,000	(500,000	0)
" " " " "2nd and final Vote	9,100,000	(455,000	0)
Construction of and experiments with Submarines...	10,000,000	(500,000	0)
Total	139,940,000	(6,997,000	0)

For the Gun and Torpedo Armaments of New Ships, and

Mines...	79,820,000	(3,991,000	0)
Miscellaneous Expenditure : Dockyards, etc. ...	11,723,363	(586,168	3)
	231,483,363	(11,574,168	3)

From which has to be deducted, credited in the Extra-

ordinary Estimates 84,980,000 (4,249,000 0)

Leaving Total 146,503,363 (11,574,168 3)

Summary.

	1909.		1908.	Increase, 1909.			
	Marks.	£	s.	£	s.	£	s.
Ordinary Permanent Estimates	144,043,804	(7,202,190	4)	6,690,053	14	(512,136	10)
Shipbuilding, Armament, etc.	146,503,363	(7,325,168	3)	5,964,875	0	(1,360,293	3)
Extraordinary Expenditure	109,924,045	(5,496,202	5)	4,306,757	10	(1,189,444	15)
Total	400,471,212	(20,023,560	12)	16,961,686	4	(3,061,874	8)

Germany.

The Personnel of the Fleet: The Officers' Corps.—The following are the numbers of the officers of different ranks on the Active List of the Fleet: 4 Admirals, 8 Vice-Admirals, 17 Rear-Admirals, 80 Captains, 189 Frigate or Corvette-Captains, 434 Captain-Lieutenants, 1,003 Lieutenants, 428 Midshipmen, and 185 Naval Cadets. There is thus an increase in the present year of 1 Vice-Admiral, 1 Rear-Admiral, 5 Captains, 11 Frigate or Corvette-Captains, 31 Captain-Lieutenants, 51 Lieutenants, and 30 Midshipmen, or a total increase of 130 officers of all ranks. There are, further, 1 retired Rear-Admiral, 11 retired Captains, 22 retired Frigate and Corvette-Captains, and 6 retired Captain-Lieutenants employed on special duties, while 51 Captain-Lieutenants and 91 Lieutenants are employed in ordnance and torpedo duties at the various dockyards and coast stations.

The staff of the Marine battalions is as follows: 1 Colonel (inspector of Marine Infantry, with the rank of Regimental Commander), 2 Battalion Commanders, 13 Captains, 14 First-Lieutenants, and 22 Lieutenants.

The Marine Field Artillery have 2 Captains, 1 First-Lieutenant, and 5 Lieutenants, and the Pioneer detachment 1 Major, 1 Captain, and 1 First-Lieutenant.

The Engineering Department consists of 11 Chief Engineers and Senior Staff Engineers, 66 Staff Engineers, 110 Senior Engineers and 176 Engineers, being an increase of 52 over the numbers of last year.

The Medical Department consists of 1 Medical Director-General (with rank as Rear-Admiral) and 2 Inspector-Generals (with rank as Captain), 59 Senior Staff-Surgeons, 88 Staff-Surgeons, 54 Surgeons, and 54 Assistant-Surgeons.

In the Accountant Department are 40 Staff-Paymasters and 167 Senior Paymasters and Paymasters.

Seamen, Stokers, etc.

The Seamen's Division number 147 Chief Warrant Officers, 219 Warrant Officers, and 19,337 Petty Officers and Seamen, with 96 Boys' Instructors and 1,554 Boys, a total of 21,353, showing an increase of 7 Chief Warrant Officers, 10 Warrant Officers, and 797 Petty Officers and Seamen.

The Dockyard Divisions number 365 Chief Warrant Officers, 729 Warrant Officers, and 14,264 Petty Officers and men, of whom 978 Chief and Warrant Officers and 11,727 Petty Officers and men form the engine-room *personnel* of the Fleet, which shows an increase of 48 Chief and Warrant Officers and 878 Petty Officers and men over last year, with a total increase in the divisions of 53 Chief and Warrant Officers and 1,015 Petty Officers and men.

The Torpedo Divisions number 117 Chief Warrant Officers, 234 Warrant Officers, and 6,809 Petty Officers and men, of whom 68 Chief and Warrant Officers and 2,917 Petty Officers and men are of the seamen class, while 283 Chief and Warrant Officers and 3,892 Petty Officers and men are of the engineering branch. There is an increase in the divisions of 24 Chief and Warrant Officers and 713 Petty Officers and men of the engineering branch, and of 8 Chief and Warrant Officers and 300 Petty Officers and men of the seamen branch, a total increase in both branches of 32 Chief and Warrant Officers and 1,013 Petty Officers and men.

The Seamen Artillery Division and Mining Detachment numbers 27 Chief Warrant Officers, 54 Warrant Officers, and 3,592 Petty Officers and men, of whom 13 Chief Warrant Officers, 25 Warrant Officers, and 728

Germany.

Petty Officers and men belong to the Mining Detachment. There is an increase of 2 Chief Warrant Officers, 5 Warrant Officers, and 239 Petty Officers and men over last year, of which increase 1 Chief Warrant Officer, 2 Warrant Officers, and 51 Petty Officers and men are on the staff of the mine detachment.

The Marine Infantry numbers 210 non-commissioned officers and 1,153 men, being the same strength as last year.

The Sick-Bay Staff consists of 540 Petty Officers and men of various grades, being an increase of 34 over last year, and there are 363 ships' stewards, writers, and assistants.

The sum total of all ranks is 53,769, being an increase of 3,446 over last year.

Personnel.	Officers.	Doctors.	Non-commissioned Officers and Seamen.				Total all Ranks. 1909.	Increase compared with 1908.
			Warrant Officers.	Pay Officers.	Seamen.	Boys.		
Naval Officers ...	1,778	—	—	—	—	—	1,778	100
Junior Executive Officers...	—	—	—	428	185	—	613	30
Engineer Officers ...	366	—	—	—	—	—	366	36
Seamen, Boys, Dockyard and Torpedo Divisions...	—	—	1,811	9,172	31,238	1,650	43,871	2,910
Seamen Artillery ...	—	—	81	498	3,114	—	3,693	246
Marine Infantry ...	52	—	—	210	1,153	—	1,415	—
Personnel of the Clothing Department ...	—	—	—	27	150	—	177	—
Medical Department ...	—	260	—	229	311	—	800	47
Artillery Administration ...	88	—	120	66	—	—	274	19
Torpedo Personnel (Technical and Administrative) ...	58	—	137	55	—	—	250	29
Mining Personnel (Technical and Administrative) ...	29	—	44	68	—	—	141	12
Accountant Department ...	—	—	87	222	54	—	363	17
Surveying ...	—	—	28	—	—	—	28	—
Total ...	2,371	260	2,308	10,975	36,205	1,650	53,769	3,446
	2,631		51,138					

—*Etat für die Verwaltung der Kaiserlichen Marine auf das Rechnungsjahr, 1909.*

Recruiting for the Navy in 1909.—Among the young men of the 1908 class liable for service, 10,374 have been incorporated in the fleet, and 1,801 in the Naval Ersatz Reserve. In addition, there have been 3,839 voluntary enlistments in the fleet, of which 593 have been One-Year Volunteers.

From an article in the *Wiesbadener Zeitung*, reviewing the growth of the German Navy, it appears that the strength of its personnel has been more than doubled since 1898, from 25,015 to 50,536. The corps of officers grew from 1,229 to 2,667, while the warrant and petty officers now number 2,079 and 9,429 respectively.

MILITARY NOTES.

Home. The following are the principal appointments which have been made :—

Lieut.-General—Sir H. F. Grant, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., to be Lieutenant of the Tower of London.

Colonels—G. K. Scott-Moncrieff, C.B., C.I.E., to be Chief Engineer, Aldershot Command, with temporary rank of Brigadier-General; C. F. N. Macready, C.B., to Command of 2nd Infantry Brigade (Aldershot Command), with temporary rank as Brigadier-General; T. P. Battersby, A.O.D., to be Inspector of Equipment and Ordnance Stores with temporary rank of Brigadier-General.

Battle Honours.—It was announced in Army Orders of 1st July that the King has been pleased to approve of the following regiments being permitted, in recognition of services rendered during the operations at Tangier in the years 1662 to 1680, at Gibraltar in the years 1704 and 1705, and at the battle of Warburg on 31st July, 1760, to bear upon their colours or appointments the distinctions (with dates where specified) as follows :—

Royal Horse Guards (The Blues), 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards, 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays), 3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon Guards, 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), 7th (Princess Royal's) Dragoon Guards—Warburg.

1st (Royal) Dragoons—Warburg; Tangier, 1662-80.

2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys), 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars, 10th (Prince of Wales's Own) Royal Hussars, 11th (Prince Albert's Own) Hussars—Warburg.

Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards—Tangier, 1680; Gibraltar, 1704-5.

Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment)—Tangier, 1680.

Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment)—Tangier, 1662-80.

King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment), Prince Albert's (Somersetshire Light Infantry), East Lancashire Regiment, East Surrey Regiment, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, Royal Sussex Regiment—Gibraltar, 1704-5.

The King has also been pleased to approve of the dates specified in each case being added to the honorary distinction, already awarded for the defence of Gibraltar in the years 1779 to 1783, to the undermentioned regiments :—

Suffolk Regiment, Dorsetshire Regiment, Essex Regiment, Northampton Regiment—1779-83.

Highland Light Infantry—1780-83.

The following information was issued from the War Office, in reference to the above announcement :—

Home.

With this month's Army Orders is published a list of battle honours that have recently been sanctioned by the King for various cavalry and infantry regiments. The honours referred to commemorate respectively the arduous campaigns imposed on the Army by the possession of Tangier in the reign of King Charles II.; the capture and first defence of Gibraltar in the reign of Queen Anne; and the brilliant cavalry action of Warburg during the Seven Years' War. The grant of these honours is the result of a systematic inquiry which is now being conducted at the War Office into the methods adopted in the past of granting such honours to corps. It is notorious that in some cases where a successful campaign or battle has been commemorated, certain regiments which have shared in the operations have, for no apparent reason, been omitted, while others, whose claims appear to be identical, have been included in the grant of the distinction. Similarly, as far as the grant of honours is concerned, certain campaigns and actions had been ignored altogether, although they are at least of equal importance in the military history of the British Empire with campaigns that have been officially commemorated. Such inequalities of treatment are due largely to the fact that the grant of regimental honours for campaigns and actions was hardly known before the beginning of the 19th century, and at first no systematic distribution of such honours, after scientific inquiry, was undertaken. Even the grant of honorary distinctions for the Peninsular War was spread over a period of years, with the result that many anomalies are apparent. Some portions of our military history have been already thoroughly investigated by special committees with a view to ascertaining what honours should be granted; thus, the Duke of Marlborough's campaigns were exhaustively dealt with in the year 1882 by a committee presided over by the late General Sir Archibald Alison, and various Indian campaigns have been thoroughly inquired into under the orders of the Indian Government, but a wide field still remains unexplored.

A general inquiry into many of the applications by regiments for grants of battle honours and distinctions convinced the Army Council that a systematic investigation of the whole matter was advisable. Consequently, rather more than a year ago the Council directed the constitution of a permanent committee, whose business it would be to deal with applications for honorary distinctions, and to advise on all such matters. The Council were fortunately able to obtain for the purpose of this committee the voluntary services of the Hon. J. W. Fortescue, M.V.O., the distinguished author of "The History of the British Army" and other well-known military works, who is acting as a member. The present chairman of the committee is Major-General J. S. Ewart, C.B., Director of Military Operations. The list of honours appearing in this month's (July) Army Orders is the first-fruits of the labours of this committee, which is still prosecuting its inquiries, and it may therefore be expected that further grants of honours will be submitted to His Majesty for approval in due course.

The Territorial Force: The Strength of the Force.—The War Office issued recently a return of the Territorial Force on 1st July, 1909, as a Parliamentary Paper (103).

Home.

The return gives a table showing the number of officers, non-commissioned officers and men serving in all branches, combatant and non-combatant, in comparison with their establishment. The totals of all arms are as follows:—Establishment: officers, 11,267; non-commissioned officers and men, 302,047; strength: officers, 9,505 (not including 729 officers on the unattached list of officers of the Officers' Training Corps and 732 officers of General Hospitals and Sanitary Companies available on mobilisation); non-commissioned officers and men, 260,676. The following are the figures for the various arms:—Cavalry: establishment, officers, 1,345; non-commissioned officers and men, 24,864; strength, officers, 1,173; non-commissioned officers and men, 24,220. Horse and Field Artillery: establishment, officers, 1,211; non-commissioned officers and men, 33,009; strength, officers 982; non-commissioned officers and men, 28,778. Garrison Artillery: establishment, officers, 466; non-commissioned officers and men, 11,808; strength, officers, 386; non-commissioned officers and men, 8,872; Engineers: establishment, officers, 590; non-commissioned officers and men, 14,848; strength, officers, 522; non-commissioned officers and men, 12,753; Infantry: establishment, officers, 5,669; non-commissioned officers and men, 194,966; strength, officers, 5,013; non-commissioned officers and men, 167,114; Army Service Corps: establishment, officers, 322; non-commissioned officers and men, 8,619; strength, officers, 276; non-commissioned officers and men, 7,401; Royal Army Medical Corps: establishment, officers, 1,468; non-commissioned officers and men, 13,919; strength, officers, 1,067; non-commissioned officers and men, 11,538; Army Veterinary Corps: establishment, officers, 196; non-commissioned officers and men, 14; strength, officers, 86; men, *nil*.

The number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men now serving under 20 years of age were 324 officers and 98,335 non-commissioned officers and men. The number of non-commissioned officers and men serving on 1st July last on a one-year engagement (or re-engagement), or with less than a year to serve on a two-year engagement, the return states was 62,506, of the number of men whose period of service expires in July, 1909, is 180.

A New Army Corps.—According to the *Neue Freie Presse*, Austria-Hungary. General Varešanin, the present Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will in the autumn be nominated Statthalter of Bosnia-Herzegovina with extended powers. The command of the XVth Army Corps, stationed in the annexed provinces, will then pass to General von Auffenberg. The military command at Zara will be erected to an army corps and transferred to Mostar or Ragusa, which will raise to two the number of the army corps on Bosnia-Herzegovinian territory, Bosnia and the northern half of Dalmatia forming the XVth Corps, Herzegovina and South Dalmatia the XVIth, the command of which will be given to Lieut.-General Critkovic. Lieut.-General Fanta, at present commanding at Zara, is to retire.

Mobile Field Kitchens.—The *Armeeblatt* of the 24th of June last announces that by next autumn the whole Austro-Hungarian Army will

Austria-Hungary.

be provided with mobile field kitchens. The model which has been finally adopted is styled M. '09, has four wheels, with a front and rear body, and will be drawn by two horses.

This kitchen is equipped with four nickel coppers, one of which is very small, and an oven for roasting; they are heated by means of a large and small stove (the latter serves for the roasting oven). The fore body of the vehicle comprises a large iron receptacle, which serves as a pantry, ventilated by means of blinds, and divided by a vertical bulkhead into two compartments of unequal size, the largest being intended for the fresh meat, and the smaller for the necessary cooking ingredients and utensils. The rear part contains the iron case for the coppers, the stoves and chimney, the large stove being worked from the rear and the small one in front. Each copper is provided with a safety-valve. In cases where it is necessary, the hinder part can be detached from the front and drawn by itself. The whole weight of the kitchen is 569 kgs. (1,254 lbs.).—*La Revue d'Infanterie*.

Austria's Air Fleet.—Negotiations have been opened, according to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, between the military authorities and the Austrian Society of Dirigible Balloons, in regard to the purchase of a *Lebaudy* airship, which will shortly be completed.

The airship will be the first unit of the Austrian aerial fleet. By the end of 1909 two airships of the approved type will be at the disposal of the military authorities:—

A small *Parseval*, with a capacity of 1,800 cubic metres (63,600 feet);

A large *Lebaudy*, with a capacity of 3,600 cubic metres (176,000 feet).

This last will be almost similar to the French *République* type, the dimensions being as follows: length, 60 metres (196·8 feet); maximum diameter, 10 metres (32·8 feet); a 70-h.p. motor, with two screws, making 850 to 1,100 revolutions a minute.

The motor and the envelope will be made respectively by the Daimler Works and the Austro-American India-rubber Factory at Vienna.

The *Parseval* is to be delivered at the end of the present month, and its trials will take place next month.

The military authorities are in negotiation for some important land at Fischamend, not far from Vienna, on which to erect a garage, which will be constructed temporarily of wood, and work will be commenced upon it immediately after the harvest. A gas manufactory will form part of the proposed installation.

These first installations will involve the further creations of ports of arrival for dirigibles, and it is reported that one of these will be at Doerkény (Hungary), where is the firing practice ground of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Artillery Brigades.—*Revue Militaires des Armées Etrangères*.

Budget of the Landwehr for 1909.—The total amount of the Budget voted for the Austrian *Landwehr* for the current year, exclusive of the amount deducted for the Gendarmerie and Military Police, amounts to

Austria-Hungary.

62,450,528 crowns (£2,602,105 6s. 8d.), showing an increase of 7,892,856 crowns (£328,452 14s. 2d.) over the corresponding vote for 1908.

The effective strength maintained stands as follows:—

Officers, 3,324—an increase of 112.

Subaltern officials, 974—an increase of 20.

Civil officials, 178—an increase of 55.

Subaltern employés, 241—an increase of 7.

Re-engaged non-commissioned officers, 3,705—a decrease of 157.

Men (less the re-engaged non-commissioned officers), 35,336—an increase of 2,138.

Pupils in the schools, 488—a decrease of 40.

Horses belonging to State, 5,115—an increase of 373.

Horses belonging to officers, 1,866—an increase of 6.

The figures relative to the calling out of the Reservists and *Ersatz-Reservists* are the same as for 1908.

The increase in the Budget is due to the following causes: 3,000,000 crowns (£125,000) in accordance with the law of 21st July, 1908, to assist the families of necessitous Reservists during the period they are called out; 2,376,000 crowns (£99,000) to increase the pay of officers and the allowance for the morning meal of the men; 600,000 crowns (£25,000) for the adoption of the new grey field uniform.

The most interesting changes to be noted are:—

- a. The grouping of the sixteen *Landwehr* batteries already existing in groups of two batteries, and the constitution of eight corresponding *Cadres* for the ammunition columns and dépôts.
- b. The creation of new machine gun detachments.
- c. The raising of the effective strength of the infantry companies by three men per company.
- d. Certain measures of detail with the view of re-enforcing the Alpine battalions and to give them almost the constitution of battalions forming Corps by the appointment of doctors and accountant officers; the strengthening of the effectives of the machine gun detachments; the creation of a telephone equipment; and supply of field forges for these same detachments, and of light wagons to the battalion for the transport of munitions.
- e. The provision in the non-Alpine regiments of a telephone equipment, the supply of destruction *matériel* to the Pioneers, and the equipping of a force of skiers.

Finally, some unimportant credits which, owing to the use to which they are applied, deserve to be noted:—

20,000 crowns (£833 6s. 8d.) to defray the expenses of officers proceeding abroad for study; and 60,000 crowns (£2,500) to encourage target practice among the civil population (the Tyrol and Vorarlberg not included), where a special organisation is required.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères*.

Germany. *Progress of Military Aerostation in Germany.*—A brief recapitulation of the progress Germany is making in this branch of science may not be without interest at the present time.

I.—Dirigibles.

1. Non-Rigid System :—

(a) *The "Parseval" Airships.* — "Parseval No. 3," completed in the beginning of the year, began her trials at the end of February, and they have been continued steadily since. This balloon has a capacity of 5,600 cubic metres (197,761 cubic feet); two motors, each of 100-H.P.; two screws 3 metres (9 feet 9 inches) in diameter; a car 31 feet long and 6 feet 6 inches wide, with an estimated speed of 15 metres (48·4 feet) per second.

"Parseval No. 2," which was in the early part of the year bought by the military authorities, has received a new envelope, giving it a somewhat longer body.

The military authorities have also ordered from the *Motorluftschiffstudien-Gesellschaft* a new Parseval on a smaller scale, driven by a single 100-H.P. motor, and which is to be used for scouting.

(b) *"Siemens-Schuckert" Balloon.*—This balloon was to have been completed some three months ago. Its principal characteristics are: a capacity of 12,000 to 13,000 cubic metres (423,774 to 459,088 cubic feet); length, 130 metres (426 feet); three cars, in the front and hinder of which are placed two motors of 125-H.P. each, the four motors developing altogether 500-H.P., which are to give a speed of at least 60 kilometres (37½ miles) an hour.

(c) The Rhenish-Westphalian Motor Balloon Society is also constructing a non-rigid dirigible of 2,000 cubic metres (70,629 cubic feet) capacity, able to carry six people.

2. Semi-Rigid System :—

(a) *"Gross" Airships (Military).*—A new Gross dirigible was completed last May, and has been undergoing trials. It is the same size as the preceding one, with a capacity of 4,500 cubic metres (158,915 cubic feet), driven by two motors, each developing 75-H.P. These balloons are now styled as follows :—

"Gross No. 1" is the *Balloon Training Ship*;

"Gross No. 2" becomes "Gross No. 1," and the last completed "Gross" becomes "Gross No. 2."

(b) Other dirigibles under construction are one each by the Durkopp Firm at Bielefeld and the Harburg-Vienna India-rubber Manufactory at Harburg, both of the semi-rigid type.

3. Rigid System :—

(a) *The "Zeppelin" Airships.*—The Zeppelin subscription produced a sum of about 6,096,555 marks (£304,827), and the Count has started with it an institution which, under the name of the "Zeppelin-Stiftung," has received the approval of the Government. This establishment has found the principal funds for a company formed at Friedrichshaven for the

Germany.

construction and working of dirigibles under the name of the "Luftschiffbau Zeppelin."

"Zeppelin No. 2" was completed some three months ago. It is 136 metres (446·2 feet) long and 13 metres (42·6 feet) in diameter, with a cubic capacity of 15,000 metres (529,717 cubic feet). Its two motors each develop 110-H.P.,¹ and drive two double-bladed screws. After a very successful flight from Friedrichshaven to Cologne it was taken over by the military authorities. It is to be permanently stationed at Cologne.

"Zeppelin 1" is 135 metres (442·9 feet) long, with a diameter of 10 metres (32·8 feet); two 85-H.P. motors working two three-bladed screws, and has a capacity of 12,000 cubic metres.

"Zeppelin 3" has been completed and tried, its latest achievement being the trip from Friedrichshaven to Berlin. It has the same characteristics as "Zeppelin 2."

"Zeppelin 4," which is also to be built this year, will be provided with three motors of 150-H.P. each.

(b) Another dirigible under construction at Mannheim is the "Schütte," designed by Professor Schütte, Professor of Naval Construction at Danzig. It will be of the rigid type, and will have a capacity of 19,000 cubic metres (671,340 cubic feet), and will be driven by two motors of 150-H.P. each. It will, however, not be completed before 1910.

II.—Garages for Dirigibles and Works Attached to them for the Manufacture of Gas and for Inflating.

1. Already Constructed.—There are already existing:—

At Manzell (on Lake Constance close to Friedrichshaven) a fixed garage and also a floating one for dirigible "Zeppelins";

At Bitterfeld (to the north of Leipsic, on the Mulde) a garage for "Parseval" dirigibles;

At Reinickendorf (north of Berlin) a garage for "Parseval" dirigibles; two garages for "Gross" dirigibles; and a garage made to take to pieces and intended for transportation for use at the manoeuvres. It consists of two rows of iron poles, forming a framework which is surrounded by canvas. It is 120 metres (393·7 feet) long, 20 metres (65·6 feet) broad, and 25 metres (82 feet) high, and can be put up in 24 hours.

Near Berlin (to the north) a garage for the "Siemens-Schuckert" dirigible.

At Bitterfeld and at Reinickendorf are installations for inflating, and it is probable that another will be constructed close to the garage for the "Siemens-Schuckert."

2. Under construction:—

At Friedrichshaven, a double garage, which will allow of two "Zeppelins" being constructed at the same time, which will be about 200 metres (656 feet) long; and a garage with wooden framework covered with sailcloth, also intended to shelter a "Zeppelin";

At Metz, a garage constructed by the military authorities, which will allow of shelter for a "Zeppelin," a "Parseval," and a "Gross"; it is

¹ These are the engines of the old "Zeppelin 4," destroyed at Echterdingen.

Germany.

about 150 metres (492 feet) long, 40 metres (131·2 feet) wide, and 30 metres (98·4 feet) high, and is now approaching completion;

At Cologne, 10 kilometres (6½ miles) north-west of the town, a garage similar to the one at Metz is also being constructed by the military authorities, which is to be 160 metres (524·1 feet) long, 40 metres (131·2 feet) wide, and 30 metres (98·4 feet) high;

At Griesheim (the drill-ground for the Darmstadt garrison) a garage, which is being constructed by the Pioneer Battalion No. 21 of the VIIIth Corps in garrison at Mayence;

At Leichlingen (half-way between Cologne and Düsseldorf, on the right bank of the Rhine) a garage, which is being constructed by the Municipal Council of Leichlingen and the Rhenish-Westphalian Society.

There is also being built at Friedrichshaven works for the manufacture of hydrogen and oxygen, and a gasometer with a capacity of 25,000 cubic metres (883,333 cubic feet); at Cologne, works for the manufacture of hydrogen; and at Leichlingen, works for the manufacture of both hydrogen and oxygen.

3. Garages Projected.

As the result of a movement emanating from different large towns in Germany, a society is being formed for the construction of garages for dirigibles. A Berlin firm, in conjunction with some of the electrical firms and large industrial manufactories on the Rhine, are considering a plan for the construction of a garage working on a pivot, of which the cost will rise to 500,000 marks (£25,000).

The first towns which will probably be supplied with such a garage will be Berlin, Munich, Cologne, Düsseldorf, and Frankfort-am-Main.

The society has already entered into negotiations for the construction of these garages with the following 16 towns: Zurich (where will be held this autumn the competition for the Gordon-Bennett Cup), Munich, Stuttgart, Nuremberg, Mannheim, Würzburg, Frankfort-am-Main, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Erfurt, Dresden, Halle, Magdeburg, Berlin, and Hamburg.

Creation of a School for Chauffeurs for Dirigible Balloons.—The German Airfleet Company (*Luftflottenverein*), founded last spring, has started at Friedrichshaven a school for chauffeurs and conductors (*Luftmannschule*), which is under the superintendence of Lieut.-General Nieber, late Commandant of the Balloon Battalion. The course of study will last three years; young men will enter the school after having completed their period of studies at the intermediate schools and completed a year of practical work at the Friedrichshaven school. The first year will be devoted to theoretical instruction, the second to practical work in the aeronautical workshops, and the third to ascents and voyages in dirigibles and flying machines. The young men then trained will perform their period of military service in the Balloon Battalion.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères.*

An Armoured Auto-Machine Gun.—According to *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift*, Herr Slayer, a civil engineer, of Heilbronn, has constructed an armoured auto-machine gun, the height of which is only 90 cm. (3 feet). The chassis is raised 40 cm. (1 foot 4 inches) above the ground. The motor, which is of 20-h.p., is placed behind, and can

Germany.

be worked without the driver being obliged to move from his seat. Alongside the motor has been arranged the necessary room for the reservoir of benzine and supply of water, etc. The ammunition is placed close to the gun in the front part, which is protected by steel or nickel armour. The whole is painted grey. When the seats are turned down the automobile can carry several persons sitting on the floor of the car. Experiments are to be carried out with this auto-mitrailleuse during the forthcoming Imperial Manœuvres.

*The Primary Education of the 1907 Recruit Contingent.—***Russia.**

According to the *Ruski Invalide*, the percentage of the recruits of the 1907 contingent who have received primary education is 53.2; of these 40.9 can read and write, and 12.3 who can only read. The Russian organ states that the number of recruits who have received primary instruction has increased, as the following percentages show:—

In 1903, the number of men who could read and write were 32.5 per cent, and of men who could only read, 6.9 per cent., or a total of only 39.4 per cent. who had any primary education. In 1904 the percentages were as follows: 31.3 who could read and write, 8.6 who could only read, making a total of 39.9. In 1905 the percentages were: 32.6 and 8.8, making a total of 41.4; in 1906, 36.8 and 9.2, making a total of 46. The number of recruits, then, who have received primary education has increased during the last few years by 14 per cent.

The *Ruski Invalide* remarks that in these conditions (in 1907 46.8 per cent. of the recruits being illiterates), the Russian Army finds the greatest difficulty in filling the ranks of the non-commissioned officers, who have in these days a very difficult task to fulfil, not only in the field but in time of peace, particularly in the former case, where, in consequence of loss among the officers, they will have to perform the duties of the latter.—*Revue d'Infanterie*.

Suppression of Drummers in the Field.—An Order has been issued doing away with the employment of drummers in the field.

In time of peace the drummers will only carry a revolver, but they will be exercised in rifle drill and firing, and will join the ranks like other soldiers during the summer musters of troops and the manœuvres.

According to *Danzer's Armee Zeitung*, during the Russo-Japanese war the drums came to be considered as useless and only encumbrances, the bugles proving sufficient for all signals. In many companies the drums were thrown away in order to send the men carrying them into the firing line. Their suppression will allow Russia to increase by 10,000 the number of rifles she can put into line.

Defects of the Russian Rifle.—The *Neue Militärische Blätter* quotes from the *Invalide Russe* certain grave defects which, according to General Martinoff, exhibited themselves in the Russian rifle during the war in Manchuria:—

1. The dust easily found its way into the chamber, and the powder, of very bad quality, leaving much fouling, the weapon so rapidly got choked that it was necessary to clean it during action.

Russia.

2. The sight was so badly fixed that it soon got out of line, causing great errors in the aiming.
3. The cartridges did not easily enter the chamber, and the rims were so sharp that the men injured their fingers during rapid firing.
4. The bullet badly fitting caused difficulties in loading and delays in firing.

La France Militaire, on its side states that the long and flexible bayonet bent when it met with any resistance (such as the plate of a belt, etc.) to such an extent that the soldier often found himself disarmed.

New Organisation of the Infantry Depot Battalions.—The organisation of the infantry depot battalions dates from 1885. The partial mobilisation at the time of the war in Manchuria brought to light the defects in this organisation, more especially the following :—

1. These battalions form part of the local brigades, whereas by their destination and service they really belong to the field force.
2. Their effective strength was not definitely settled, and was determined more or less according to circumstances, which often led to its being maintained at two or three times the number more than was necessary.
3. There existed no connecting link between the mobilisation plans of these battalions and those of the regiments to complete which these battalions were intended.

The *Prikaze* No. 23 of January of this year lays down the following organisation for these depot battalions :—

Object.—The depot battalions are charged with the duty, in time of war, of preparing and training the necessary *personnel* for filling up the vacancies in the Regular regiments.

Constitution.—Each battalion to consist of four companies; in exceptional cases a battalion can have more than four companies, but the number is never to exceed eight.

The effective comprises : a *permanent personnel* and a *contingent personnel*.

The *permanent personnel*, selected by name in time of peace, consists of :—

Officers (taken from the *personnel* of the corresponding active regiment) : 1 battalion commandant, 1 assistant to the commandant (charged with the administrative duties, 4 company commanders,¹ 1 adjutant (in charge of arms and equipment), 1 paymaster. If the battalion consists of more than 4 companies, a company commander is selected for each additional unit.

The battalion commandant is appointed by the general of division, and the other officers by the colonel of the active regiment.

Officials : 1 reserve doctor, 1 administrative official (from the active corps).

¹ One taken from the company commanders of the regiment and 3 officers selected from the list of candidates for this employment.

Russia.

Non-commissioned Officers and Men: 91 non-commissioned officers (80 from the reserve), 12 privates, 9 clerks (8 from the reserve), 11 hospital attendants (9 from the reserve), 1 armourer and 14 mechanics (from the reserve); a total of 138.

Horses: 7.

The *contingent personnel* includes: some officers from the reserve, some auxiliary subordinate officers of the reserve on active service, some reservists, some men of the 1st roster of the *Opoltechnie*, some non-incorporated recruits, some volunteers with less than two months' service, and some non-mobilisable young soldiers. This effective consists of 1,000 men at most for a battalion of four companies, with 250 men at most for each company over and above this.

Organisation.—There is formed a *depôt battalion* for each regiment of infantry of the field army and of reserve, as well as for each of the corps specially indicated in the mobilisation returns. In the mobilisation territory of each army corps each *depôt battalion* draws on a particular sector corresponding to the recruiting district of the corresponding regiment.

The formation of the *depôt battalions* is carried out by the corresponding regiment; they take the number or the designation (as the Guard, for example) of these corps.

Mobilisation.—At the moment of a mobilisation (general or partial) all the *depôt battalions* corresponding to the mobilised regiments are also mobilised. The mobilisation plans are settled by the battalion commander under the direction of the colonel commanding the regiment, and must be approved by the general of the division.

Depôt Brigades.—The *depôt battalions* of an army corps form a *depôt brigade*.¹ Certain battalions not included in an army corps are to join the nearest *depôt brigade* or form an independent brigade. The commander of the brigade is nominated during peace by the general commanding the army corps. At mobilisation he has at his disposal a brigade staff (*oupravlenic*) of 2 officers, 1 doctor, 8 clerks and 2 orderlies (nominated during peace time).

Matériel.—Each *depôt battalion* is provided during peace with its complete war equipment; it can, moreover, if necessary take possession of *matériel* intended for other regiments or establishments, and *matériel* left at the *depôt* by the corps in the field on their departure.

Compagnies de Marche.—The losses of each regiment are made good by the *depôt battalion* selected by the General Staff, according to circumstances; but for preference by the corresponding battalion. These drafts are made by whole companies, which are called *compagnies de Marche*. They are made up from the *contingent personnel* of one or several companies of the battalion; their strength is not to exceed 250 men, and they are sent to the front fully equipped for the field.

The effectives of the *depôt battalions* are made up to their full strength by the exertions of the Staff of the Minister. They receive men discharged from hospital; the officers, after they are cured, are sent to join the *depôt battalion* of their corps, the men the nearest battalion. In no case are either officers or men taken on the strength who, although cured, are unfit for service.

¹ Sometimes, in exceptional circumstances, two.

Russia.

Demobilisation.—The demobilisation of the dépôt battalions is superintended by the Staffs of the district, the battalion commander being allowed to retain the necessary *personnel* for clearing up the administrative work. The taking over the stores is carried out by a committee, which includes representatives of the different services (control, commissariat, artillery, engineers, and medical), and three officers at least of the battalions.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères.*

New Marriage Regulations for Officers.—A new Order regulating the marriage of officers has recently been issued by the Minister of War. In the past, Russian officers were not allowed to marry before the age of 23. In addition the *fiancée* had also to belong to a good family, be well bred and of irreproachable character, account being also taken of her social position.

An officer between 23 and 28 years of age had to possess the following pecuniary means over and above his pay: 300 roubles (£46 17s. 6d.) net annual income, or a capital of 5,000 roubles (£781 5s.) in money or securities, capital, which had to be held in trust, and of which not more than 300 roubles could be touched yearly, including his income. Exceptions were made where the *fiancée* was the daughter of an officer of 25 years' service, when half this sum was considered sufficient, and in the case of officers' widows with a young family, and of officers belonging to the Amur district. The colonel of the regiment had to give his consent for the marriage taking place or not, first submitting his decision for the approval of the general commanding the division, who decided in the last resort.

For the future, the obligation of proving the possession of a certain amount of income is done away with. In the case of officers of the rank of captain commanding companies and upwards, it lies with the colonel alone to give his consent to the marriage or not, when he has given due regard to all the circumstances of the case (social and pecuniary position of the family of the *fiancée*, etc.). In the case of subaltern officers, the social position and general suitability of the *fiancée* is settled by the court of honour of the officers of the regiment, who make their report to the colonel, who gives the final decision without referring the matter to the general.

In publishing the new Regulation the *Rouskii Invalid* makes the following comments:—

Since the introduction in 1869 of compulsory military service, admission to the rank of officer has become possible to everyone, including young men without money. To require pecuniary guarantees up to the age of 23 from officers anxious to marry was to force young men in this last category either to remain celibates or to marry without permission, or what was worse still, to contract irregular unions, and consequently compromise their careers.

In 1889, the date when the regulations now modified were issued, the pay of officers was too small to allow of a young lieutenant without any fortune founding a family and bringing up children, and it was therefore logical not to encourage him to marry. Most of the general officers consulted are now, however, of opinion that the considerable increase of pay granted to officers last January allows of the restrictions on marriage of officers without private means being withdrawn.

Russia.

On the other hand, the reference of the request to marry to the officers' court of honour furnishes a sufficient guarantee that the position of the family of the girl and her general suitability will be satisfactorily enquired into, and will assure to the bride a kindly reception into the regimental family, directly interested as they are in the respectability of all their members.

Finally, the definite decision in the matter being left to the colonel commanding is also logical, as he is clearly more competent to decide on matters affecting his corps of officers than the general, and it further raises the authority and prestige of the colonel, on whom alone will fall the full responsibility for the decisions he arrives at.—*Journal des Sciences Militaires*.

NAVAL AND MILITARY CALENDAR.

AUGUST, 1909.

- 2nd (M.) Tsar and Tsaritsa arrived in Imperial Yacht *Standart* at Spithead and were received by the King. Fleet reviewed by their Majesties.
- 5th (Th.) Tsar and Tsaritsa left Cowes. "Zeppelin Airship No. II" voyaged from Frankfort to Cologne.
- 6th (F.) Lord Kitchener accepted position of High Commissioner and Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.
- 8th (S.) Tsar and Kaiser met in Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
- 13th (F.) Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence Committee appointed to examine questions of Naval Policy raised by Lord C. Beresford issued their Report.
- 27th (F.) "Zeppelin III" left Friedrichshaven for Berlin. Compelled to land at Nuremberg through defect in motor.
- 29th (S.) "Zeppelin III" arrived in Berlin.

FOREIGN PERIODICALS

NAVAL.

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.—*Boletín del Centro Naval*. Buenos Aires: May, 1909.—Has not yet been received.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—*Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiete des Seewesens*. No. 9. Pola: September, 1909.—“The Report to the Chamber on the Italian Naval Estimates of 1909-10.” “Progress in Artillery *Matériel* in 1908-09.” “The School of the Captain.” “English Naval Estimates for 1909-10.” “The ‘Nicholson’ Log.” “The Submarine and Submersible Flotilla’s Manœuvres off Cherbourg.” “The Principal Features of the Latest French Battleships.”

BRAZIL.—*Revista Marítima Brasileira*. Rio de Janeiro. June, 1909.—“The ‘Riachuelo.’” “In Commemoration of the 11th of June.” “The Evolution of the Torpedo Boat Destroyer.” “Practical School of Artillery.” “The Brazilian Navy” (*continued*).

CHILE.—*Revista de Marina*. Valparaiso: May, 1909.—“Our Obligation at the Present time.” “Political and Military Study of Japan” (*continued*). “The Engraving and Printing of Marine Charts.” “The Climate of the Coast of Chili” (*concluded*). “Halley’s Comet.” “Atlanto-occipital Dislocation.” “Observations on the Gun Armament of Large Battleships.” “Torpedoes, Mines, and Submarines.” “Reform in the matter of Projectiles and Coast Artillery” (*continued*).

FRANCE.—*Revue Maritime*. Paris: June, 1909.—“The Parsons-Turbine Motors of Torpedo Boat No. 293.” “Obituary Notice: Capitaine de Frégate Georges Pierre.” “Are Battleships of Very Large Tonnage Economical?” “Battle Tactics of the Single Line.” “The Defence Proposals of the Danish Government.”

La Marine Française. Paris: August, 1909.—“The Enquiry into the State of the Navy.” “The Progress in the Navy.” “Our Fleet and its Harbours.” “The Launch of the *Danton*.” “Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière’s Evidence before the Commission of Enquiry.” Correspondence: (1) “The Dockyard Plant at Toulon”; (2) “The Trials of the Destroyer *Chasseur*.” “The Brussels Exhibition of 1910.”

La Vie Maritime. Paris: 10th August, 1909.—“The New Minister of Marine.” “Our Law Suit.” “At the Ministry of Marine.” “Loss of Submarine *C11*.” “The Utilisation of Naval Officers” (*concluded*). “The

Naval Promotions." 25th August.—"The Concentration of Forces." "Secret Documents." "The Firing at the *Iéna*." "Some Considerations on the Administrative Working of the Fleet in Commission" (concluded). "Naval Artillery." "The Question of Projectiles" (concluded). "Organisation of our Fleets in Commission in 1910."

Le Yacht. Paris: 7th August, 1909.—"The Great Naval Councils." "Yachting Notes." "The U.S. Dreadnoughts." 14th August.—"The Under-Secretary of State of the Navy." "Yachting Notes." 21st August.—"The General Inspections." "Yachting Notes." "Apropos of Dreadnoughts." "The New German and Japanese Battleships." 28th August.—"The New Distribution of the French Naval Forces." "Yachting Notes." "The Torpedo Experiments against the Italian Battleship *Francesco Morosini*." "The Submersible *Archimède*."

Le Moniteur de la Flotte. Paris: 7th August, 1909.—"The Crisis of the Flotillas." "The Administrative Personnel." 14th August.—"For the Fleet." "The Minister of Marine at Toulon: The Firing at the *Iéna*." 21st August.—"Firing Questions." "The Plan of our Armaments." "The Naval Estimates." "The Food of the Sailor."

GERMANY.—*Marine Rundschau*. Berlin: August-September, 1909.—Contents given last month.

ITALY.—*Rivista Marittima*. Rome: June, 1909. — "Advantageous Tactical Positions." "Reflections on Naval Command." "Sea-borne Trade in the Italian Ports in 1906." "The Supply of Funds for Ships of the Royal Navy."

PORTUGAL.—*Revista Portuguesa, Colonial e Marítima*. Lisbon: July, 1909.—"Unpublished Documents for a History and the Geography of Ethiopia." "Native Manners and Customs of the Lourenço Marques Country." "Colonial Problems" (continued). "Genealogical and Biographical Data of some Fayal Families" (continued).

Annaes do Club Militar Naval. Lisbon: July, 1909. — "Practical Schools." "Fire Control." "Naval Hygiene."

SPAIN.—*Revista General de Marina*. Madrid: August, 1909.—"The London Naval Conference." "Causes of the Erit." "The Naval Estimates for 1909." "Torpedoes and Mines."

MILITARY.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—*Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*. Vienna: 5th August, 1909.—"Mene Tekel! (Melilla-Madrid-Barcelona)." "The New Position of the Chief of the General Staff." "The Ammunition of Field Artillery in its Tactical, Technical, and Moral Importance." "A Soldier's Letter out of the Year 1866." "Montenegro and Albania." "The Teheran Military

Academy." "Fortified Field Positions." 19th August.—"A Glorious Campaign (the Battle of Novi, 1799)." "The Swing of Russian Policy."

Strenge Militärische Zeitschrift. Vienna: August, 1909.—"History of the War for Freedom, 1813-15." "The Military-Political Events in Constantinople and the Operations of the Salonika Army in April, 1909." "Scouting Service in General and the Artillery Scouting Service in Particular." "A New Mounting for High-angle-fire Guns." "The Patrol Conference of the Italian Cavalry."

Kavalleristische Monatshefte. Vienna: July-August, 1909.—The contents given in last No. of JOURNAL.

BELGIUM.—*Bulletin de la Presse et de la Bibliographie Militaires.* Brussels: 15th July, 1909.—"Grand French Manœuvres in 1908" (continued). "Field Artillery in Conjunction with other Arms" (continued). "Manœuvre Regulations for the German Army." 31st July.—"Grand French Manœuvres in 1908" (concluded). "Field Artillery in Conjunction with other Arms" (concluded).

FRANCE.—*Journal des Sciences Militaires.* Paris: 15th August, 1909.—"Initiative in War." "Studies on the Sanitary Service in the Field." "Our Cavalry is Badly Saddled, Badly Clothed, and Badly Equipped." "Les S.A.G." "The 29th August, 1870, and the Army of the Meuse" (concluded).

Revue d'Infanterie. Paris: July, 1909. — "The Infantry Fight." "New Firing Regulations of the Russian Army." "The New Manœuvre Regulations for the Spanish Infantry" (continued).

Revue de Cavalerie. Paris: August, 1909.—Has not yet been received.

Revue d'Artillerie. Paris: June, 1909.—"On the Elastic Equilibrium on the Action of Variable Forces." "War Firing Practice in the Artillery." "The 75-mm. Field Gun in the Night Action of Bou-Denib."

Revue Militaire Général. Paris: July, 1909.—"Study on the Period from the 5th to the 14th June in the Campaign of 1807." "Waterloo." "Two Studies of Alpine Tactics" (concluded).

Le Spectateur Militaire. Paris: 1st August, 1909.—"The Letters of Major Kretschman (1870-71)." "Principles which should Serve as a Base for the Organisation Laws." "The Conscription of Native Mussulmans in Algeria" (concluded). 15th August.—"Souvenirs of an Officer of the 13th of the Line." "The Letters of Major Kretschman (1870-71)" (continued). "Principles which should Serve as a Base for the Organisation Laws" (continued). "Manœuvring in Woody Country."

Revue d'Histoire. Paris: August, 1909.—"The Battle of Mollwitz." "The Campaign of 1813: The Preliminaries." "The Causes of the Austrian Defeat in 1866." "The Mitrailleuse in 1870." "The War of 1870-71: The National Defence in the Provinces" (continued). "Unpublished Letters of Napoleon I." (continued).

Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères. Paris: August, 1909.—"The Budget of the German Empire for 1909." "The New Manœuvre Regulations of the German Cavalry." "The New Foot Artillery Regulations."

GERMANY.—*Militär-Wochenblatt.* Berlin: 3rd August, 1909.—"The Pay Regulations of the 15th July, 1909." "A Hundred Years Ago" (continued). "The German Small Arms Experimental Establishment at Halensee, near Berlin." 5th August.—"The French Left Flank on the Lissaine from the 15th to the 17th January, 1871." "Malingering and Self-inflicted Injuries in the different Armies." "From the Netherlands Army." 7th August.—"The French Left Flank on the Lissaine from the 15th to the 17th January, 1871" (concluded). "Malingering and Self-inflicted Injuries in the different Armies" (concluded). 10th August.—"The New Service and Instruction Regulations of the Military Technical Academy." "Halkett and Cambronne." "French Experiences in the Chuja Campaign in Morocco." "Intelligence from the Belgian Army." 12th August.—"A Hundred Years Ago—Kunersdorf" (continued). "The Commanding Generals of the German Army from 1889 to 1909" (continued). "Promotion Questions in Italy." "On the Acquisition of Manœuvre Areas." 14th August.—"The Military Employment of Balloons." "A Hundred Years Ago" (continued). "Recollections of the Battle of Sedan and the Last Days of the Commune in Paris, 1870-71." 17th August.—"Spain's War in Morocco." "A Hundred Years Ago—Kunersdorf" (continued). "The Military Employment of Balloons" (concluded). 19th August.—"Frederick the Great and the Artillery of his Field Army." "Montenegro." "Medical Establishment of the Russian Army in War." "Coloured Distinguishing Marks for Field Guns." 21st August.—"From the Hard Times at Belfort." "Cavalry Recruiting in 1546." "Montenegro" (concluded). 24th August.—"The English Mediterranean Command." "From the Hard Times at Belfort" (concluded). "Once More Provision of Manœuvre Areas." 26th August.—"Appeal for the Erection of a Memorial to General von Alvensleben." "Gymnastics and Military Service." "The Mobilisation of an English Division." 28th August.—"To Count Zeppelin." "The Royal Saxon Jäger and Rifle Regiments during their 100 Years of Existence." "Insurance against Accidents and the Army." "Reform in the Courts of Honour of Russian Officers." "Flags to show Losses." "Spain's War in Morocco" (continued). "Reorganisation of the Artillery in Portugal."

Artilleristische Monatshefte. Berlin: August, 1909.—"Report of the Military Commission on the Reorganisation of the French Artillery" (continued). "Field Artillery in Ambush." "Development of the Field Artillery Question and the 3-inch Field Gun in the United States." "Foot Artillery Considerations." "Some Applications of the Calculation of Probabilities to Musketry Instruction." "Statistical Calculation of a Wheel."

Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine. Berlin: August, 1909.—"How can we get rid of Red Tape?" "Organisation Questions regarding the Russian Technical Troops." "Supplement to the Training

of the German Infantry for Fortress Warfare." "Punishment of Men on Furlough for Breaches of Discipline." "Inferior Armies." "Submarine Gun and Submarine Weapons on board a Battleship." "A Parallel between the Campaigns of 1828-29, 1877-78, and 1904-05."

ITALY.—*Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio*. Rome: May, 1909.—"Considerations on the Reorganisation of the Artillery." "Automobiles in the Different Armies." "Rules for Executing Panoramic Military Sketches." "Windlasses on the Ressa System."

Rivista Militare Italiana. Rome: July, 1909. — "Speech of the Minister of War in the Chamber of Deputies on 11th June, 1909." "Points on the Psychology of Command." "Advanced Guards and their Duties" (concluded). "Men of Other Times." "The Military Decadence of Venice" (continued). "The Armies of the States of Europe." "The War Office and the Central Organs of the Army" (continued). "From Novara to San Martino" (concluded). "Some Geographical Military Notes on the Territory between Massowa, Asmára, Acsùn, and Adigrat" (continued). "Notes on the New Infantry Tactical Regulations."

SPAIN.—*Revista Técnica de Infantería y Caballería*. Madrid: August, 1909.—Has not yet been received.

Revista Científico-Militar y Biblioteca Militar. Barcelona: 10th August, 1909.—"The Lessons of Casablanca and their Application to the Riffs." "Some Maxims of Napoleon." "Infantry Attack Formations from the Artillery Point of View" (continued). 25th August.—"The Preliminary Period of the Campaign." "Rules for the War in North Africa." "The Armies of the Future." "The French and Moroccans."

SWITZERLAND.—*Revue Militaire Suisse*. Lausanne: August, 1909.—"The Swiss in Italy" (continued). "The German Cavalry." "Firing Practice with the 75-mm. Gun." "The Psychology of the Horse." "Infantry Drill Regulations."

NOTICES OF BOOKS

The Naval Annual, 1909. Edited by T. A. BRASSEY, A.I.N.A. Portsmouth : Griffin & Co. 1908.

Although the *Naval Annual* this year fully maintains on the whole the high standard of excellence to which we are accustomed to look in this well-known work of reference, yet it does not quite come up to last year's issue, for instance, which contained more than one article of exceptional interest by well-known expert writers, wanting in the present edition.

In his preface, the Editor again draws attention as he did last year to the practice now obtaining in our own and certain foreign Navies of withholding particulars of ships for the construction of which provision is made in the Estimates—a practice which he holds as being most unlikely to prevent those who wish to obtain the information from procuring it. In the United States no such concealment is attempted; the designs of ships are openly discussed, and Congress insists on being furnished with information as to the leading features of new ships before voting the money for their construction, and there is no reason to suppose that the U.S. Navy in any way suffers from this publicity. There is, on the other hand, Mr. Brassey considers, good grounds for believing that the practice initiated by the British Government in the case of the *Dreadnought*, and copied with greater success in Germany, is in no small measure responsible for the scare produced by the Debate on the Navy Estimates in March last, and he further thinks that the danger to our naval supremacy at the present moment and in the immediate future has been much exaggerated.

As usual, the first three chapters, which are the work of the Editor, assisted in the data in regard to foreign Navies by Mr. John Leyland, are devoted respectively to our own Navy, to foreign Navies, and to comparative strength, with the usual tables. In Chapter I., on the British Navy, Mr. Brassey expresses the opinion that, in view of the large additional burthens thrown on the British tax-payer for various purposes during the past year,

"the resources of the United Kingdom are insufficient for the maintenance of a Navy up to the Two-Power standard. The command of the sea, which is absolutely vital to the safety of our scattered dominions and world-wide trade, cannot for much longer be secure unless the resources of the whole Empire are drawn upon for the common defence."

This, of course, was written before the recent meeting of the Imperial Defence Conference. He is of opinion, also, that as regards our building programme, it would have been far wiser to have devoted a large proportion of the sum allotted to submarines and some of that to be spent on destroyers to the laying down of two more battleships.

Chapter II., on foreign Navies, is full, as usual, of valuable information, the writer drawing attention to the deplorable condition into which the

French Navy has been allowed to drift; while the great extensions to German armaments are also touched upon. In Chapter III. he points out that the most noticeable features in the year under review have been the increased rate of progress of construction and the large addition to ship-building resources in Germany, and the delays, owing to labour troubles, in the completion of several of our own battleships and large armoured cruisers, as also the refusal of Congress for the second time to embark on the large programme of naval expansion proposed by the Naval Department, in spite of the vigorous support accorded to it by President Roosevelt. From the tables he gives it is evident that our present supremacy is only due to the generous building provision made in the past by previous Admiralties. Chapter IV., on Dockyard Administration, by Vice-Admiral W. H. Henderson, assisted by Mr. Herbert Russell, is an interesting and instructive one, as the Admiral writes with authority, having been for over three years Admiral Superintendent of Plymouth Dockyard; he has made a special study of the subject and is thus able to point out many of the weak points in the organisation of the Government Yards. Chapter V. is devoted to Alternative Systems of Propelling Machinery. It is interesting, but calls for no special comment.

In Chapter VI. the Marquis of Graham discusses the present position of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The Marquis, who has gained practical experience himself in the Mercantile Marine, is an enthusiastic Reserve Officer, holding the rank of Commander, and being in command of the Clyde Division. After tracing the history of the present Volunteer Reserve movement, Lord Graham points out how necessary it is, if the training of the R.N.V.R. is to be put on a really efficient footing, that every encouragement should be given to actual work at sea.

"There is no question," he observes, "but that the distressing malady of sea-sickness and the strangeness of sea routine and new surroundings much handicap the men in their work during first days afloat. There will be no time to acquire the ways of the sea in a Naval War. These things should be sought now in the time of peace."

In his concluding remarks, Lord Graham calls attention to the way the Naval Volunteer movement has taken root in the great Colonies of the Empire. Though not formed on exactly similar lines to the United Kingdom Reserve, the members are excessively keen in their work, and have always been well reported upon in respect of their drill, although they have been much handicapped as regards efficient and up-to-date naval training by reason of the small encouragement given to them by the Admiralty at home.

A most interesting and thoughtfully written chapter by Mr. John Leyland, on the Naval Expansion of Germany, follows, which will well repay reading. "Close, meditative, laborious, indefatigable was the process of inception, expansive the spring of inevitable development, and remarkable in the highest degree is the success with which the work has been put into execution," he writes in his concluding remarks. "The policy of Germany was declared long ago by Frederick William I.: 'Wenn Man in der Welt etwas will decidiren, will es die Feder nicht machen, wenn sie nicht von der force des Schwertes soutenirt wird.' This pregnant phrase was repeated by the German Emperor at the Zeughaus in Berlin on New Year's Day, 1900. The force behind the diplomatic pen of Germany, deciding her place in the world, is the strong fleet which she is bending all her efforts to create and maintain." In Chapter VIII. Mr. Leyland treats of

last year's naval manœuvres of our own and foreign fleets, and he sums up those of our fleet as "entirely uneventful, and from the tactical point of view disappointing."

Part II. of the Annual consists of the usual lists and plans of ships of our own and foreign Navies; but an important and very useful feature has been introduced, on which Commander Robinson and Mr. Leyland, who are jointly responsible for this part of the work, are to be congratulated. The leading particulars of ships are given under the diagrams setting out their chief features, as well as in the usual list of ships. This will be found very useful, and will save students much trouble. Part III., on Armour and Ordnance, has again been undertaken by Commander Robinson and contains much useful information.

Part IV. is devoted, as usual, to the First Lord's Memorandum, with his speech in the House, when introducing the Estimates, and to our own and foreign Naval Estimates. Two interesting letters to *The Times*, by Mr. Frederic Harrison, on the question of our National Defence and the Aims of Germany, are also given.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY DURING AUGUST, 1909.

Sailing Ships. The Story of their Development from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. By E. KEBLE CHATTERTON. 8vo. 16s. (Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd.) London, 1909.

The Nelson whom Britons Love. By HORATIO, Third Earl NELSON. Crown 8vo. 1s. (Presented.) (Jarrold & Sons.) London, 1909.

The State of the Navy. An address delivered to the London Chamber of Commerce by Admiral Lord CHARLES BERESFORD on the 30th June, 1909. Pamphlet. (Presented.) London, 1909.

Hohenlinden. By E. PICARD. 2 Vols. 8vo. 12s. (Henri Charles-Lavauzelle.) Paris, 1909.

Les Régiments de la Division Margueritte et les Charges à Sedan. By General ROZAT DE MANDRES. 8vo. 5s. 6d. (Berger-Levrault et Cie.) Paris, 1908.

Règlement sur les Exercices de la Cavalerie Allemande du 3 Avril 1909.

Traduit de l'Allemand par le Général P. SILVESTRE. Crown 8vo. 2s.
(Berger-Levrault et Cie.) Paris, 1909.

Education and Training of the German Infantry. General Staff, War
Office. Crown 8vo. (Presented.) (Mackie & Co., Ltd.) London, 1909.

Notes on Organization and Equipment. By Lieut.-Colonel BRUNKER.
6th Edition. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Presented.) (William Clowes & Sons,
Ltd.) London, 1909.

Wellington's Campaigns in India. Division of the Chief of the Staff,
Intelligence Branch. By Maj. R. G. BURTON. 8vo. Calcutta, 1908.

*Journal of an American Prisoner at Fort Malden and Quebec in the War
of 1812.* Edited by G. M. FAIRCHILD, Junr. 8vo. 4s. 6d. (Frank
Carrel, Ltd.) Quebec, 1909.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF MILITARY INTEREST.

COMPILED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE.

JULY, 1909. PUBLISHED QUARTERLY.

*Communicated by the General Staff and reprinted by permission of the
Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.*

Continued from August JOURNAL, p. 1182.

CONTENTS.

Part II. Section I. Books

PAGE.
1258

PREFATORY NOTE.

This Pamphlet will be issued quarterly, in April, July, October and January. Its purpose is to draw the attention of Officers to British and Foreign publications of Military interest which are likely to assist them in their professional work. Copies of the pamphlet will be distributed to the Headquarters of Commands, Educational Establishments, Units and Reference Libraries.

PART II. SECTION I. BOOKS.

NOTE.—1. When the price is not given in Part II., Section I., it is not known.

2. In Part II., Section I., books whose titles are given in foreign languages as well as in English, are published in those languages, and are not translated.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

Infantry Fire-Tactics (Schießtaktik der Infanterie). By Captain Jaxa Dembicki, of the Austrian Infantry. 163 pp., with tables of figures and results of shooting. 8vo. Vienna, 1909. Seidel. 4/-.

The author in his preface lays stress on the fact that in the official regulations, the question of tactics and development of fire effect are perhaps insufficiently dealt with in their relations to each other.

He therefore strives in his book to blend on one basis the tactical portion of the "Musketry Instructions" with the provisions of the drill and training manual which deal with the fire-fight.

The arrangement consists of three parts. The first part is merely a summary of points governing the application of shooting necessary for intelligent application by the individual. The second part is the major portion of the book. It is divided as follows:—

- A. Historical development of fire action from the introduction of the breech-loading weapon up to the time of the South African campaign.
- B. The provisions of the official manual (1903) and subsequent developments as learnt from the Russo-Japanese campaign.
- C. General principles: The "Kerngarbe" (literally "sheaf-core" viz., the cone of fire at a given range, calculated from the ballistic properties of the weapon together with the individual errors of a squad or party firing, 30 per cent. of the rounds being disregarded as altogether un-aimed). Sighting in conformity with the known "Kerngarbe." Natures of fire. Volley firing. Zones of fire, &c.
- D. Long distance firing.
- E. Firing at medium ranges—in the case of defence and in attack.
- F. Ditto with regard to short-range firing.
- G. Sudden or surprise opening of fire.
- H. Machine-guns.
- J. Influence of the ground.

The third part is devoted to the subject of direction of fire by leaders, followed by numerous examples and tables of results.

Hints for Instruction in the Study of Ground. (Leitfaden für den Unterricht in der Feldkunde). 13th edition. Official. 65 pp. 8vo. Berlin, 1909. Mittler. 3/3.

This is a text book of topography issued officially for use in the war schools. Part I. contains elementary definitions of natural features. Part II. discusses the military importance of the features described in Part I. Part III. gives the points which should be noted in reconnoitring railways, roads, villages, positions, &c. Parts IV. and V. contain information on map reading, setting the map, sketching in the field and triangulation with the plane table.

Austro-Hungarian Regulations for the Training of Troops (Vorschrift für die Truppenübungen). Official. 180 pp. 8vo. Vienna, 1909.

The previous edition of this manual appeared so far back as 1890, and consequently the present publication is practically an entirely new compilation. Details as to the training of units are not entered into, these appearing in the manuals for the various arms, but the general principles under which such training should be carried out are prescribed at some length, as also are details for the exercise of larger bodies, the carrying out of local and other manoeuvres, and special exercises.

The general idea on which the system of training is based consists in careful progressive advance from the instruction of the individual up to the combined work of all arms. In each period the work should gradually proceed according to a well-conceived programme, suitable to the circumstances of the locality and the actual needs of war.

Attention is directed to the question of fitness for the severe physical exertions required in war, and troops throughout the year should be gradually trained in this respect; it is recognised, however, that in the case of reservists this is a difficult problem.

Formal inspections are prohibited. Inspecting officers should combine their inspections as far as possible and carry them out by means of an instructive exercise.

The training of the smaller units should conclude by the end of June, that of regiments three weeks later. All the larger bodies should work together for two to three weeks, and, if possible, in conjunction with opposing bodies.

Great stress is laid upon the carrying out of field-firing exercises, combined shooting of infantry and artillery, and the co-operation of these two arms. In fact the regimental training of infantry and artillery should in great measure take place concurrently. Cavalry are also encouraged to devote time to training for the fire-fight.

Marches and the carrying of equipment occupy several pages. Full peace kit should be carried by the infantry in the first instance, subsequently complete field equipment. Artillery should always have their limbers and wagons filled. Cavalry should carry out one exercise a week with complete peace kit, to be followed later by parades with full field equipment.

Separate sections are devoted to the following points:—(a) Acquaintance of officers with the working of arms other than their own. (b) Opportunities for all officers of handling units at full strength, when reservists and horses are called up for training. (c) Means of communication and the use of the telephone by all branches. (d) Night operations. (e) The "rencontre" engagement. (f) Mountain operations. (g) Passage of rivers. (h) Entrenching. (i) Attack of entrenchments with service ammunition. (j) Fortress operations. (k) Operations in conjunction with the navy, including the Danube flotilla.

French Infantry Training (Décret du 3 décembre 1904 portant règlement sur les manœuvres de l'infanterie). Official. 106 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Lavauzelle. 1/.

The last edition of this book was published in 1904, and presumably the present edition has been produced owing to the fact that the 1904 edition is exhausted. The two editions are word for word the same with the following exception:—Page 15, line 11.

In the original 1904 edition it was laid down that recruits were expected to be fit for service by the 15th March in each year. This was amended by a subsequent War Office order which is now cancelled and the original text of 1904 restored.

Problems in Tactics and Fortification (Thèmes de Tactique et de Fortification). By Captain R. 130 pp. 8vo. Angoulême, 1908. Imprimerie militaire du Sud-Ouest. 1/8.

In this small book are to be found exercises in entraining and detraining, tactical problems, and exercises in field fortification.

These problems originally appeared in the review "L'armée moderne," and were prepared with a view to assisting officers to study for the Staff College. They deal with the various situations in which a force might find itself in war, and each problem is followed by a well-reasoned solution.

Elementary Military Training. By Lieut.-Colonel A. W. A. Pollock. 182 pp. 8vo. London, 1908. Clowes. 4/.

The author has had much experience in training young soldiers, both with his regiment and when in command of the "Spectator" company; many of his methods have therefore a practical value. It is, however, impossible to accept all his conclusions and criticisms without reserve.

Mistakes in the Solving of Tactical Problems. By Lieut.-Col. J. Layland Needham. 66 pp. 8vo. London, 1909. Rees. 1/6.

This is the second edition of this little work. It is a useful collection of the more frequent mistakes committed by candidates in the tactical papers set in examinations for promotion, as pointed out by the examiner in their reports, with explanatory notes by the author.

The example of orders given on pages 65-66 is not quite in accordance with Field Service Regulations, Part I, which has been issued since the publication of this book.

The Franco-German War, July 15th to August 18th, 1870. By T. M. Maguire. 82 pp., including 4 maps and 2 appendices. 8vo London, 1909. Clowes. 4/.

This book is intended to assist officers in preparing for the Promotion Examination in Military History, and covers the selected period. Notwithstanding the shortness of this period, the author has curtailed the volume by dismissing the battles of Woerth and Spicheren in four pages, and referring readers to other works for further details. The battles of Colombey, Vionville, and Gravelotte are dealt with at rather greater length, but in a somewhat perfunctory manner.

FORTIFICATION AND MILITARY ENGINEERING.

Armour in Fortifications (Fortification cuirassée). By Lieutenant Colonel L. Piarron de Mondésir. 360 pp. 8vo. Paris, Octave Doin. 4/2.

The author traces the effect of the introduction of melinite more than 20 years ago, and shows how metal has come to be employed in fortifications, in order to furnish protection to the guns and gun detachments, and to observation parties and sentries. The book is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with the improvements in weapons in the 19th century, and the effect produced by these on fortifications. The second part deals with the employment of armour in fortifications at the present time in France.

Engineer Field Service Regulations (Provisional) (Instruction pratique provisoire du 8 Juin 1897 sur le service du génie en campagne). Official publication issued by the French War Office. 297 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Lavauzelle. -/11.

This is the fourth edition of this publication, the previous edition having appeared in March, 1906. The present edition professes to be corrected up to October, 1908, but as a matter of fact it is verbatim the same as the last one, except that after the heading of Section xvi. (page 193), which deals with the railway service in war, a note is inserted to the effect that there is a duplicate Section xvi., which is a confidential document.

A Treatise on Permanent Fortification (Etude sur la Fortification Permanente). By General Dupommier. 56 pp., with 1 plate. 8vo. Paris, 1907. Berger-Levrault. 1/8.

This book contains four chapters dealing respectively with the rôle generally played by permanent fortifications, with "forts d'arrêt," fortifications as a means of protection, and "covering" fortifications.

MEDICAL.

Medical Service and Sanitary Duties in the German Army (Sanitätsdienst und Gesundheitspflege im deutschen Heere). By Generalarzt u. Inspekteur Dr. A. Villaret, and Generalarzt Dr. F. Paalzow. 160 pp. 8vo. Stuttgart, 1909. Ferdinand Enke. 4/-.

This is the first volume of a manual for the instruction of army medical officers on the active list or reserve in all matters connected with the duties of the army medical service in time of peace. It will be completed in six volumes, the last of which is promised by the end of September at the latest. Field medical organisation and duties are not to be included. Both authors occupy high and responsible positions on the active list of the German Army, and they have a long list of contributors who are also on the active list of the Army. The object of their publication is to help officers who from one cause or another may have got out of touch with the various regulations, to make themselves acquainted generally with their duties when they return to routine work.

The present volume contains only two out of the nine chapters of which the complete work will be composed. The first chapter is a history of the development and organisation of the army medical corps, and the second explains the various duties connected with recruiting and voluntary enlistment. Chapter III. will contain sections on the hygiene of barracks, clothing and equipment, rations, examination of food supplies, and general hygiene of military service. Chapter IV. is to deal with the supply of medical and surgical stores; Chapter V. with the medical service in regiments, including medical attendance on soldiers' families, officers, prisoners, etc.; Chapter VI. with medical duties in military hospitals; Chapter VII. with special medical treatment; and Chapter VIII. with invaliding. Chapter IX., which is to complete the series of volumes, deals with reports and statistics. The handbook generally appears to be modelled on lines similar to those of the well-known handbook on the Austro-Hungarian army medical service, by Dr. Paul Myrdacz.

War with Disease. 5th edition. By F. F. Maccabe. 120 pp., with index. 8vo. London, 1909. Baillière, Tindal and Cox. 1/-.

Dr. Maccabe's volume is well known amongst officers of the Army. In its original form it consisted of a series of four lectures delivered to the Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh in 1906; to the present edition is added a fifth lecture, given to recruits of the cavalry at Dublin and the Curragh, and two lectures on first aid and prevention of disease, arranged originally for the ambulance section of the South of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry, of which the author is the medical officer. Dr. Maccabe also answers some criticisms of previous editions in a short appendix.

It is unnecessary to examine too closely the matter of a series of lectures which are intentionally popular, and in which, in order to make his points more impressive, the author has in several instances wandered away from strict scientific and historical fact. These shortcomings will not prevent officers who read and follow his advice from doing very much towards keeping both themselves and their men fit. Dr. Macabée's volume may well take its place in military libraries amongst the numerous other volumes that are now published with that object in view. The language is clear and to the point, and there will be no difficulty in following the author's meaning in his endeavour to initiate laymen into the mysteries and causes of disease, and to explain to them the methods of disease prevention.

A Course of Lectures on Military Hygiene (Cours d'hygiène militaire). By Monsieur G. Mathieu, Médecin-Major in the French Army. 350 pp. 8vo. Meulan-Hardricourt, 1906. Maréchaux. 3/2.

This volume consists of a series of lectures delivered at the French Military School of Versailles in 1904, 1905, and 1906 to the young candidates for commission in the French artillery and engineers on the subject of military hygiene. The value of such instruction requires no explanation, and these lectures appear to contain much that is likely to be useful in aiding officers to take care of the health of their men in peace and in war.

Précis of Military Hygiene (Précis d'hygiène militaire). By Dr. Monéry, Méd. Aide-Maj. 1^{er} Cl. 216 pp. 12mo. Paris, 1908. Lavauzelle. 2/8.

This *précis* is written as a "cram" book for officers who are candidates for admission to the French Staff College and for appointment to the General Staff. It is in two parts, Part I. dealing with military hygiene in peace, and Part II. with field hygiene. It contains chapters on physical education and training of the soldier, personal hygiene, food, clothing, equipment, alcoholism, venereal diseases, hygiene of barracks, disinfection, methods of purifying water, the importance of hygiene in the field, diseases of armies in campaigns, field rations, or accessories to rations (coffee, tea, chocolate, alcohol, sugar, kols), on the hygiene of transport by rail, hygiene of marches, hygiene of billeting, of camps and of bivouacs, first aid to the wounded, and the sanitation of battlefields. The volume is interesting as showing the extent to which General Staff officers of the French Army are expected to study hygiene. It is not quite up-to-date from a scientific point of view, as, for example, in the statement that Malta fever is due to contagion from polluted soil and faecal matter, and that for the prevention of yellow fever it is necessary to disinfect baggage, clothing, and bedding, and that white races acquire immunity from an attack of the disease by prolonged residence in the yellow fever zone.

The Red Cross in the Far East. Bulletin No. 2 of the Red Cross Society of Japan. 75 pp., with chart and 7 photographs. Tokyo, 1908. Not on sale.

The report of the Japanese Red Cross Society, which has just been issued in English, is interesting reading. It gives a concise and clear account of the organization and work of the Society, including the complete text of its regulations for relief service in time of war and of calamities. The former regulations are in fourteen chapters and 93 articles, the latter in three chapters and 13 articles. They embody clear practical instructions for the organization and use of voluntary aid and for its work in war as an auxiliary to the medical services of the army and navy. The bulletin contains several short notes on relief work in Formosa, ambulance service in Tokyo, honours and rewards, description of local Red Cross hospitals, and Baron Osawa's impressions of the International Conference of Red Cross Societies in London in 1907. There is an interesting table of the distribution of membership in the Empire, and an instructive chart showing the organization of the Society. The Society has ready for war in organized detachments 4 directors, 237 physicians, 141 apothecaries, 84 clerks, 5 assistant apothecaries, 262 chief female nurses, 89 chief male nurses, 3 chief stretcher bearers, 2,953 female nurses, 572 male nurses, and 131 stretcher bearers. The relief detachments, as they are called, are formed of 2 medical officers, an apothecary, a clerk, 2 chief nurses and 20 nurses, and are intended for taking over the charge of 100 patients in military hospitals. They are mobilised by order of the Minister of War or of the Navy, and carry out such work as is entrusted to them by the military or naval authorities. The stretcher bearers are organised into a transport column capable of transporting 30 patients, the composition of the column being 1 director, 1 medical officer, 1 clerk, 3 chief male nurses, 3 male nurses or sick attendants, 3 chief stretcher bearers, and 120 stretcher bearers.

The total membership of the Society is 1,307,344, or one in every 38 of the population of Japan. This proportion is very evenly maintained throughout all the provinces of the Empire.

The Japanese Red Cross Society may justly be regarded as the model of what a Red Cross Society should be, in that it is ready without confusion and in the simplest possible manner to take over the ward duties of the regular medical service in all the large garrison hospitals of the country, and thus set it free for duty with the field army. Its organization and work have been evolved out of the practical experience of three wars.

"*Pappatacifever, a Three-Day Fever Endemic in the Adriatic Littoral Districts of Austria-Hungary.* (Das Pappatacifeber. Ein endemisches Drei-Tage Fieber im Adriatischen Küstengebiet Österreich-Ungarns.) By R. Doerr, K. Franz and S. Taussig. 166 pp., with 2 microphotographic prints and 1 chart. 8vo. Leipzig and Vienna, 1909. F. Deuticke.

In this work are published the initial results obtained by a Commission of Army Surgeons appointed by the Austrian War Office to investigate a form of fever which was giving rise to anxiety on account of the large amount of sickness and inefficiency which it occasioned among the troops quartered in certain parts of Herzegovina and Dalmatia.

This fever, which had long been known to the inhabitants of these countries, had been variously considered to be due to malarial, influenza, typhoid fever, gastric catarrh, or to the effects of exposure to the sun. It occurred only in the summer months from May to October, and newcomers were almost inevitably attacked. Although the fever only lasts three days, the after effects are severe, and sufferers are, as a rule, totally incapacitated for 8 to 14 days. As many as 30 per cent. of the strength of a unit have been incapacitated at one time, and the disease has therefore interfered gravely with the execution of military duties.

Taussig, on epidemiological grounds, had thought it might prove to be caused by the bites of a minute "sand-fly," whose numbers and distribution he had found to correspond closely with the occurrence of cases of this fever, in point of time and locality, and the work of Doerr and his colleagues, as recorded in this book, has clearly established the correctness of Taussig's hypothesis, and has proved that the virus of the fever is transmitted to man through the bites of this fly, the *Phlebotomus papatasi*.

Doerr's experiments upon medical men and other volunteers showed that the blood taken from a patient in the first day of the fever, if injected into a healthy man, would produce a typical attack, after the usual incubation period. No germs could be isolated from the blood nor could any be seen on microscopic examination; on this account, and as he was able to prove that the virus could pass through a fine-grained filter, Doerr considers that it belongs to the class known as "invisible" or "ultra-microscopic" organisms.

Experiments carried out with the flies themselves were also successful; thus, a number of the flies were caught and allowed to feed upon a patient suffering from the fever and were then transported to Vienna, where the disease does not occur. They were then permitted to feed once more upon healthy volunteers, 50 per cent. of whom contracted the fever and went through typical attacks. These experiments further showed that the flies do not become infective until eight days after they have fed upon fever blood, which points to the germ most probably belonging to the protozoa and requiring to undergo a regular developmental stage in the body of the fly.

No treatment has proved specific, and it is obviously a case for the elaboration of an effective system of prevention or prophylaxis. Doerr advocates certain measures, such as the isolation of the sick at a distance of 200 to 300 metres from barracks, the selection of sick attendants from those who have been rendered more or less immune by a previous attack, &c., but it is evident from the description that the problem is peculiarly difficult. The measures which have proved of such value in the case of malaria prophylaxis are, for various reasons, inapplicable here.

Knowledge of the life-history of the fly is still very incomplete. They infest low-lying and warm localities and enter the living rooms in swarms at night; the females only are blood suckers and they bite only in the dark and rarely out-of-doors. The bites may give rise to great irritation. The larvæ are considered by Grassi, who has written a monograph on the fly, not to be aquatic in their habit, but to develop in small collections of dirt or decaying rubbish, chiefly in latrines and privies kept in a badly ventilated and insanitary condition. Net-protection is unsatisfactory on account of the minute size of the fly necessitating a material so closely woven as to render a sleeping room almost unendurable on a hot night.

A somewhat similar fever is known to be prevalent among the British garrisons of the Mediterranean, and Lieutenant-Colonel Birt, R.A.M.C., has recently been sent to Malta to investigate the subject in the light of the above work of the Austrian Army surgeons.

Hygiene in the Colonies: with Special Reference to Indo-China. (Hygiène coloniale appliquée. Hygiène de l'Indo-Chine). By Dr. Charles Grall, Médecin Inspecteur, French Colonial Army. 500 pp., with 4 photographs and 73 diagrams. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Baillière. 10/-.

This work deals with the question of military hygiene in the tropics. The author goes into considerable detail on many and varied subjects, viz., rains, water, climate, soil, food, clothing, customs, cleanliness, different diseases, latrines, barracks, &c. He has had considerable experience, and has produced a book which should be of value to nations which have colonial armies, especially when these troops are serving in tropical climates.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

The Royal Prussian War Ministry, 1809-1909 (Das Königliche Preussische Kriegsministerium 1809-1909). 458 pp., with numerous portraits. 4to. Berlin, 1909. Published by the Prussian War Ministry. 25/-.

This book is published in commemoration of the centenary of the Prussian War Ministry.

In addition to its merely historical value it contains much which is of interest from the point of view of army organisation. In this respect the second chapter, pp. 39-140, which gives a detailed description of the measures taken for the mobilisation of the Prussian Army in 1866, is perhaps the most interesting; pp. 158-178 contain a history of small-arms during the last 100 years, concluding with descriptions of the '98 rifle and ammunition; pp. 179-207 are a treatise on the development of power-traction vehicles, concluding with the conditions under which bounties were recently offered to private firms for constructing and maintaining motor vehicles suitable for use in war.

Two chapters are devoted to the history and organisation of the departments dealing with equipment and supply, and two chapters to the organisation of institutions for sick and invalid soldiers; a list of the latter institutions is given at the end of the book.

Attention is drawn to the following tables, which will be found useful for reference:—

Page 38, Table showing organisation of the War Ministry. Pages 117, 125, Tables of strengths on which the mobilisation of 1866 was based. Page 423, Composition of the Prussian Army at the present date.

In addition, the book contains portraits of King Frederick William III., in whose reign the War Ministry was founded; of Scharnhorst, to whom it may be said to have owed its origin; and of many other generals who have filled the positions of War Minister or Chiefs of Sections in the Prussian War Ministry.

BOOKS OF REFERENCE.

The Territorial Year Book. 294 pp. 8vo. London, 1909. Hodder and Stoughton. 2/-.

This book deals primarily with the constitution, organisation, administration, and distribution of the Territorial Forces, but there is also a considerable amount of up-to-date information on matters of general military interest.

It contains lists of the Military Forces of the Crown, the principal ships of the Royal Navy, divided according to classes, regiments of the Army, with historical notes, Territorial units and county associations.

Maps have been supplied showing the division of England, Scotland, and Wales into Territorial commands, districts, etc., and coast-defence zones.

It will be found a useful and interesting publication by all, but especially by members of the Territorial Force.

The Armed Forces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Das Heerwesen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie). 11th edition. By Lieut.-General Karl Glückmann. 368 pp., with 1 map. 4to. Vienna, 1909. Seidel. 5/-.

The above is the annual edition of an extremely useful handbook. The work appears usually in May, but owing to recent events the publication this year has been expedited.

As in most Austrian handbooks, war organisation is scantily dealt with, but few details are wanting in regard to peace arrangements and the system of organisation generally.

Servia by the Servians. Edited by Alfred Stead. 366 pp. 8vo. London, 1909. Heinemann. 12/6.

This work consists of a series of articles by prominent Servians on the history, ethnography, government, religion, military and civil institutions, material resources, etc., of their country. As the writer of each article is an expert on the subject about which he writes, the book should prove valuable as a general book of reference on Servia.

TRAVEL AND TOPOGRAPHY.

In Viking Land. By W. S. Monroe. 332 pp., with numerous illustrations and an Index. 8vo. London, 1908. Bell. 7/6.

This book is a general account of Norway and the Norwegians, written in a popular form. It contains chapters on the geography, history, constitution, ethnography, art, literature, educational system, and architecture of the Norse race. As regards the Norwegians of to-day, the author remarks that their most marked characteristics are clear insight, honesty, unconquerable pertinacity, and a sturdy sense of independence. Their opinions are formed deliberately but adhered to tenaciously.

The appendix contains some useful hints for travellers in Norway.

Problems of the Middle East. By Angus Hamilton. 480 pp., with 2 maps. 8vo. London, 1909. Eveleigh Nash. 12/6.

This volume is the result of journeys which the author made, and contains suggestions in respect to the Baghdad Railway, the Hejaz Railway, and the British sphere in Persia.

On the Frontier of Central Asia (На Границах Средней Азии). By D. H. Logoiot. 3 vols. 661 pp., with 2 maps (1 coloured) and illustrations. 8vo. St. Petersburg, 1909. Beresovski. 7/10.

The author accompanied the inspecting general in a tour along the cordon of posts of the Trans-Caspian and Amu Daria Brigades of the Frontier Guard. The first volume deals with the Persian frontier from Chikishiyar to Zulfiyar. In the second volume the author describes his journey along the Afghan frontier from Zulfiyar, by Kushk post to the post of Karaul Khana on the Murghab, then by the Central Asian Railway from Sariyasi on the Kushk branch by Merv to Charjui, by steamer up the Amu Daria to Kerki, and by the Kara Kum posts and Kelif to Termez. The third volume describes the journey from Termez up the right bank of the Amu Daria to Shaugon, south-west of Kila-i-Khum. From Shaugon to Khorogski, the right flank post in the Pamirs, there is a gap of 233 miles without frontier guard posts.

The book gives an interesting description of the conditions of life on the Russian frontiers in Central Asia. It is possible that life on the Atrek, south-east of the Caspian and in the Kara Kum posts, south-west of Kerki, is even more lonely and less attractive from the sybarite's point of view than a tour of duty in the outposts of our north-west frontier in India. Still, one can only feel that British officers similarly placed would try harder to adapt themselves to their surroundings, and would drink less and complain less. Sport in some form or other is everywhere obtainable. The Murghab is covered with wild fowl. No less than 50 tigers are killed every year on the Amu Daria. Skirmishes with raiders are frequent in some parts of the line. The Russian officer in the Frontier Guard seems often to be a married man, and naturally the rough life in a frontier outpost is trying for a wife and family. He seems to be ignorant generally of the local languages, and this fact in itself deprives his life of half its interest.

The Short Cut to India. David Fraser. 381 pp., with 90 illustrations, maps and sketches. 8vo. Edinburgh and London, 1909. Blackwood. 12/6.

This is an entertaining and instructive account of a journey along the route of the Baghdad Railway. The chapter dealing with the railway convention, and the last four chapters dealing with the route of the railway, the population question, mail contract and gulf shipping, and the general question of the railway are of peculiar interest from a military point of view.

Travels in Western South America, 2 volumes (Reisestudien aus dem westlichen Südamerika). Princess Theresa of Bavaria. About 800 pp., with 6 maps and 167 illustrations and engravings. 8vo. Berlin, 1908. Dietrich Reimer (Ernst Vohsen). 20/-.

An interesting description of travels in South America, extending over six months, and carried out in 1898. The main object of the expedition was research in geology, botany, and natural history, and the Bavarian Princess appears to be well equipped as regards scientific knowledge for such an undertaking. The chief military interest of the work lies in the descriptions of the inhabitants of the various countries, the troops seen, the physical features of the districts traversed, the climate, the railways utilised, and the existing means of transport.

The Bavarian Princess was much struck with the progress of German commerce and influence in South America, which have made great strides of recent years. Her impression appears to be that Germany is already ahead of Great Britain in most countries of South America, and is rapidly outstripping us in the remainder.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Submarine Cables (Die Seekabel). By H. Thurn. 288 pp., with map and 105 illustrations. 8vo. Leipzig, 1909. Hirzel. 9/-.

This is a useful popular account of submarine telegraphy by a German postal official. The first chapter deals with the instruments and apparatus for laying and working a cable; the second is historical; the third is entitled: "The necessity for Germany possessing submarine cables of her own and the limitation of the English

cable monopoly"; the fourth gives an account of the German submarine cable lines, and cable manufacturing companies; the fifth, the management of cable traffic; the sixth, the importance of submarine cables for business, political and strategic purposes, and plans for the future. In discussing the latter, the writer complains of the "stage of stagnation into which the German cable-laying policy has fallen," although it has already accomplished "much that is beautiful." He insists that Germany "must have her own network of cables connecting her with all important overseas countries, and independent of the help of foreign States." The statistics of the various telegraphic companies which the writer gives are, however, hardly encouraging to an investing public.

The seventh chapter deals with the competition of wireless telegraphy with submarine cables; the eighth, the international and municipal laws for the protection of cables; the ninth, cables in war and neutrality.

From the facts given by the writer there would appear to be little cause to complain of want of progress in the schemes for providing Germany with her own network of cables. In 1898 Great Britain owned 208,747 miles of submarine cables, in 1908 253,898 miles, while between the same dates German cables increased from 6,186 miles to 29,600 miles (including two cables to the United States), and since that date Germany has acquired landing rights at Teneriffe, and is laying a cable thence to Brazil, so that messages from Germany to South America will no longer be necessarily sent over English or French lines.

The Evolution of the Army. Part III. Wishes and Grievances of Officers (*L'Armée évolue. Désirs et Plaintes des Officiers*). By General Pédoya, formerly commanding XVth Army Corps. 131 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Chapelot. 2/2. (For Part II., see No. 9, p. 103.)

This is the latest of the series of volumes on the evolution of the French armies, which is being produced by General Pédoya. In this volume the writer shows very clearly the restrictions and disabilities which weigh so heavily on the French officer. For example, he is liable to be placed under arrest for the most trivial errors; if he is unmarried he lives practically always under the surveillance of his superiors; he cannot marry without permission; he can get but little leave, and that at most inconvenient times; he is not allowed to have the smallest interest in any commercial enterprise, and he may not publish anything, except under a pseudonym, without the authority of the War Office. The main grievances of French officers, however, are those connected with their pay, pension, and promotion. *Appropos* of pay, General Pédoya gives an interesting table showing the rates of pay of French and German officers. From this it can be seen that in every rank the latter receive considerably more pay than French officers. As regards pensions, French officers have to contribute 5 per cent. of their pay to the pension fund to obtain a pension. The stagnation in promotion is indeed alarming. The writer suggests that the American plan of superannuating a large percentage of old and infirm officers should be adopted.

In conclusion, General Pédoya says that it is now so generally recognised how poor the position of a French officer is as compared with his civilian compatriot, that it will shortly be difficult to get officers at all.

The Modern Officer (*L'officier d'aujourd'hui*). By Guy Roland. 250 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Lavauzelle. 3/-.

This is a good picture of the life of a French officer at the present day. The author sketches the career of a young officer from the time he joins his regiment, and shows very clearly the many difficulties which he has to encounter and the small amount of encouragement which he receives. In France, as in England, the pay of the officer is extremely low, though the expenses of a French officer are less than those of his British comrade. However, there is no lack of candidates for commissions as yet, owing to the fact that in France compulsory service causes the Army to occupy a high position in the eyes of the nation. M. Roland is of opinion, though, that the class of officers is no longer quite as good as formerly, owing to the democratic tendencies of recent French Governments and the low rate of pay, which makes it impossible for men without private means to keep up their position in society. He complains that the real mission of the Army, viz., European warfare, is neglected, and that the Army is merely looked upon as an instrument for repressing strikes and fighting small wars in the Colonies. The book concludes with a plea for a more just and reasonable treatment of the Colonial Army.

"More Japonico." By James S. de Benneville. 600 pp. 8vo. Yokohama, 1908. Printed by the "Japan Gazette." 12/-.

This work deals with the evolution of Japanese character and customs, and for purposes of comparison examples are taken from the history of other nations. It begins with a general account of Japan from earliest times, and subsequent chapters are devoted to such subjects as the internal communications of the country and their effect on its development; to religion and philosophy, commercial expansion, politics, the status of women, etc. The book contains much of interest, but its title is somewhat misleading, as Japan occupies but a small portion of its space.

German Secret Service in France (L'espionnage allemand en France). By Paul Lanoir. 250 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1908. Cocuand and Co. 3/-.

An interesting work, showing the organisation, ramifications, and working of the German secret service system from 1848 up to the present day, with special reference to the methods of Stieber. This extraordinary man, for many years head of the Prussian secret police, organised a most efficient system of spies in Austria and France before the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 respectively, and the work of these agents contributed in no small degree to the success of the Prussian and German Armies in these wars.

The author goes very deeply into the German methods of secret service, and the information given by him is of considerable value, as it shows the thoroughness of the German system, and the length to which Germans are prepared to go when they require intelligence about a country on which they intend to make war. The details of present-day German methods are most instructive, and the book is well worth reading.

Manufacture of Explosives. Twenty Years' Progress. By O. Guttman. 69 pp., with 11 illustrations, 2 appendices, and index. 8vo. London, 1909. Whittaker. 3/-.

These four lectures delivered before the Royal Society of Arts at the end of 1908 deal for the most part with technical questions of manufacture, though the history of the subject is lightly touched upon, they can hardly be said to be of interest to the general military reader. At the Royal Gunpowder Factory, Waltham Abbey, improvements in the manufacture of nitro-glycerine and gun-cotton, devised by the superintendent and his staff, have been introduced, and descriptions of these will be found in Mr. Guttman's lectures, who examines closely into their advantages.

The author, at the conclusion of his last lecture, makes a prophecy as to what will be the composition of the military powder of the future.

Mr. Guttman is a well-known authority on the subject he deals with, to which his lectures are a valuable contribution.

Indian Financial Statement for 1909-1910. Parliamentary Blue Book. 242 pp. Fo. London, 1909. 2/-.

The Financial Statement of the Government of India, published this year, is of particular military interest for two reasons—the current financial year 1909-10 is the first “lean year” since the inauguration of Lord Kitchener's reorganisation and redistribution schemes, and secondly, the expenditure on these schemes, which has hitherto been treated as “Special,” has now been merged in the ordinary Budget.

In Appendix II. (page 91) of the Statement will be found a clear explanation of the position of affairs as regards Army finance for the two years, 1908-09 and 1909-10.

Dealing first with the “Special” expenditure for 1908-09, it will be seen that the revised estimates for the year show a decrease of £408,400 as compared with the sum budgeted for. This lapse is due to the postponement of certain measures or inability to carry them out to the extent anticipated and the necessity of restricting expenditure in view of the general financial situation. Thus the outlay on the following items fell short of the sums allotted to them:—

- (i.) Reorganisation of Horse and Field Artillery Ammunition Columns—the completion of five columns has been deferred till 1909-10.
- (ii.) Construction of lines for Indian troops—the original programme was reconsidered and considerably reduced.
- (iii.) Working expenses of ordnance factories—these were arbitrarily restricted.
- (iv.) Increase to the Indian Army Reserve—new enrolments were fewer than anticipated.
- (v.) Addition of 350 British officers to the Indian Army—the full number of sanctioned appointments were not filled.

In addition to these a lump sum was also provided for certain other projects which were not carried out or for which payment was not demanded.

A certain proportion of the lapses, however, were diverted to other objects, and funds were allotted to the purchase of rifles and Maxim guns and binoculars in England; the delocalisation and transfer to India of a Burma battalion and the establishment of a Chemical Bureau connected with the manufacture of cordite.

The increased charges entailed by the raising of the pay of the Indian Army from the 1st January, 1909, were also met from the above savings. Thus, as mentioned above, it was found possible to reduce the total lapse in the “Special” grant to £408,400.

The Budget Estimate for 1909-10, under the four military heads “Army,” “Marine,” “Military Works,” and “Special Defences,” amounts to £29,708,200 (including provision for measures which have hitherto been shown under “Special”), and thus shows a decrease of £46,300 as compared with the Budget of 1908-09.

“Marine” charges remain practically the same.

"Military Works" charges and expenditure on "Special Defences" show very considerable decreases.

"Army" expenditure shows an increase at home of £354,700, and in India of £23,700. The increase in home expenditure is attributable to the extra charge now paid to the War Office, increased furlough allowances, larger store demands, and the normal growth of non-effective charges.

The increase of expenditure in India is due mainly to the increased pay and allowances given to the Indian Army and to the rise in prices of food and forage.

In order, therefore, to provide funds for the increased charges under "Army," it has been necessary to restrict expenditure on new measures as much as possible in the coming year.

Allotments have, however, been made under "Military Works" and "Special Defences" for carrying on works already in progress, and provision has been made under "Army" for further expenditure on the following important measures:—

- (a) Completion of the eight Horse and Field Artillery Ammunition Columns.
- (b) Rearmament of Horse and Field Artillery.
- (c) Increase, Indian Army Reserve.
- (d) Establishment of young stock (Remount) depôt at Sargodha.
- (e) Increase of reserves of rifles and Artillery ammunition.
- (f) Expansion of dairies.
- (g) Revised scale of medical and surgical equipment.

The general character of the Budget for 1909-10 may be summed up in the words of the Finance Member of the Government of India: "The Army has taken its full share in helping us to face a lean year."

Army Reform and other Addresses. By the Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane, K.C., M.P. 312 pp. 8vo. London, 1907. Fisher Unwin. 2/6.

This is a reprint of speeches by the Secretary of State for War, and includes three on Army Reform delivered in the House of Commons, three on Fiscal Policy, one on Modern Logicians and Economic Methods, and the Rectorial Address delivered to the Students of the Edinburgh University in January, 1907.

The Conventions and Customs of Duelling (Die konventionellen Gebräuche beim Zweikampf). By Colonel von Spohn. 60 pp. 4to. Berlin, 1909. Eisenschmidt. -/9.

This is a handbook of the customs and etiquette of duelling for the use of officers of the German Army. The author classifies the different degrees of provocation, which may give occasion for a challenge, under three heads, viz., (1) *simple* (e.g., discourteous conduct); (2) *aggravated* (e.g., abusive language); and (3) *extreme* (e.g., a blow). It is important in each of these cases to understand which is the party insulted, as it is he who has the right of challenging. Thus, if the victim of abusive language (case 2) retorted with a blow, the recipient of the blow would then become the insulted party, and would have the right to challenge. Any further interchange of blows would not, apparently, affect the situation. Duels may be fought either with swords or pistols. Of the latter class of duel six different methods are generally recognised: (1) firing from a fixed point, within a given interval of time from the signal; (2) as above, but with no time limit; (3) firing while advancing; (4) advancing and halting to fire; (5) firing while moving on parallel lines; (6) firing at a given signal.

The book also contains specimen forms for the use of seconds when arranging duels, and for the reports which have to be made to the Court of Honour before the duel can take place.

Extracts from Prussian Army Orders dealing with duels and Courts of Honour are given at the end of the book.

German Troopers in South-West Africa (Deutsche Reiter in Südwest). By Lieut.-General Freiherr von Dincklage-Campe. 480 pp., with numerous portraits, illustrations, and sketches. 4to. Berlin, 1909. Bong. 15/-.

The author has induced a number of participants in the suppression of the recent rebellion in German South-West Africa to describe their experiences.

These narratives are collected in the large volume under review, which thus contains much interesting, though possibly somewhat exaggerated, first-hand evidence on the events of the Herrero war. Each article is signed by the narrator.

The vivid recitals in the letterpress are illustrated by numerous admirable pictures of an equally vivid and imposing character.

Lessons from 100 Notes made in Peace and War. By Major-General E. A. H. Alderson. 128 pp. 8vo. Aldershot, 1909. Gale and Polden. 2/-.

"When you see a thing done, either good or bad, which gives a lesson for the future; when you hear, when you read, when you think of a thing, and even when you dream of a thing, jot it down at once, though it entails striking a light at three o'clock in the morning. Be assured that the same good ideas, like good opportunities, do not often come twice over."

This note, on which the author has acted, explains the origin of this collection of notes, which are now published in the hope of benefiting others. The book covers a wide field, and contains much sound advice and excellent ideas, which are only too apt to be forgotten or overlooked.

(To be continued.)

S

M

65

Asso

App

Illus

The

S

MI

Sp

req

Ser

and

Th

D

B

Th

Hig

His

Imp

Dic

C

SW

H

in

t

Colo

S

Such

of

SCHOOL OUTFITS

... AT ...
Moderate Charges

FROM
SAMUEL BROTHERS, LTD.,
65 & 67, Ludgate Hill, London, E.C.
ESTABLISHED SEVENTY YEARS.

Assortments forwarded on approval to any part of the country.
Appointments kept in London & Suburbs free of charge.
Illustrated Catalogue and Patterns post free.
The "Wear-Resisting" Fabrics (Regd.)—Speciality for Boys' Hard Wear.

Suits
Overcoats
Shirts
Underwear
Boots
Hats
Hose
Trunks, &c.

ALL APPLICATIONS for ADVERTISEMENT Space in THIS JOURNAL

... SHOULD BE MADE TO ...
The Sole Advertisement Contractor,

C. GILBERT-WOOD,

DACRE HOUSE, and
GRANVILLE HOUSE,
ARUNDEL STREET,
STRAND, LONDON, W.C.
TELEPHONES—4680 Gerrard.
TELEGRAMS—"Gilberwood, London."

SWAN SONNENSCHN & CO., LTD.

Promotion Examinations.

MESSRS. S. S. & Co. beg to call the attention of Officers to their **Special Campaign Series**, specially designed to meet the requirements of Officers preparing for Promotion Examinations. The Series are all got up in similar style, all copiously supplied with Maps and Plans, and are sold at the uniform price of **5s. net** each.

FOR THE EXAMINATIONS IN NOVEMBER, 1909.

The Campaign in Manchuria.

Down to the Battle of Liao Yang.
By Captain F. R. SEDGWICK, R.F.A.

From Saarbruck to Paris. By
Lieut.-Col. SISSON PRATT.

FOR THE EXAMINATIONS IN MAY, 1910.

The Valley Campaign and other Operations in Virginia,
1861-1862. By Major G. W. REDWAY (in preparation).

OTHER MILITARY WORKS.

History of the 45th Regiment. By Col. P. H. DALBIAC. With Maps and Coloured Frontispiece. Demy 8vo, **3s. 6d.** Edition de Luxe, with Extra Coloured Pictures. Half morocco, **21s. net.**

History of the Sherwood Foresters in the Boer War. By Capt. C. J. GILSON. With Four Portraits and Ten Plans. Demy 8vo, **5s. net.**

Imperial Defence. By Col. E. S. May, C.M.G. Demy 8vo, **7s. 6d. net.**

Dictionary of Battles. By T. B. HARBOTTLE. Demy 8vo. Cloth, **7s. 6d.** Crown 8vo. Cloth, **3s. 6d. net.**

SWAN SONNENSCHN & CO. Ltd., 25, High St., Bloomsbury, W.C.

HISTORY OF THE XIIIth HUSSARS.

For the purposes of this Book, the Historical Record Committee of the Regiment ask for **INFORMATION** as to the existence of—

1. **Letters, Papers, and Diaries of those who have served in the 13th Hussars.**

2. **Portraits of distinguished officers, particularly that of Colonel Richard Munden, who raised the regiment in 1715.**

3. **Historical Relics.**

Such information would be most gratefully received by Mr. C. R. B. BARRETT, care of Lieut.-Colonel A. LEETHAM, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.

THE ARMY ANNUAL

Edited by Major BADEN POWELL.

JUST PUBLISHED.

SOME of the CONTENTS for 1909.

All information of use and interest to Officers and others connected with the Service, including :—
NEW INVENTIONS OF THE YEAR.
CHANGES IN EQUIPMENT, &c.
NEW REGULATIONS.
IMPROVEMENTS IN AERIAL NAVIGATION.
PROGRESS OF the TERRITORIAL ARMY.
MANŒUVRES OF BRITISH & FOREIGN ARMIES.
ETC., ETC.

LORD ROBERTS says:—
"The 'Army Annual' is most useful, and supplies a want."
LORD KITCHENER says:—
"The 'Army Annual' will be most useful as a book of reference to all branches of the Service, and as such will fill a want."

Post free 8/- from—

**THE ARMY PRESS,
124a, Fleet Street, LONDON, E.C.**

HEIDELBERG, GERMANY

COMFORTABLE HOME,

with Tuition in

FRENCH AND GERMAN,

offered to Officers on
Language leave and
others by a German lady
(highly recommended).

**Address, MISS M. FISCHER,
Rohrbacher-Strasse, 50,
Heidelberg, Germany.**

Cunliffe, Russell & Co.

(Established 1888).

Bankers and Dealers in Government,
Municipal, Land, Bank and other
Bonds or Debentures issued by
responsible public bodies on the
Continent.

Best-known experts and largest
Dealers in this form of Security in
the World.

No connection with any other Firm.

SOLE ADDRESS SINCE 1890:

10 & 12, Place de la Bourse, PARIS.

Reg'd. Tel. Address: "CUNRUSSELL, PARIS."



The Journal of the Royal Artillery.

THIS Journal, which was formerly known as the "Proceedings" of the R.A. Institution, contains articles and information on Artillery matters, some highly technical and some general. Articles on general Military topics also appear.

In the Translations and Précis, which are an important feature, an attempt is made to keep up with the progress of Artillery on the Continent.

All members of the Royal Artillery Institution receive the Journal.

Any officer serving in the Navy, Army, Special Reserve, Territorial Force and Colonial Permanent Forces can receive this Journal post free on application to the Secretary, R.A. Institution, at an annual subscription of 20s.

WOOLWICH: ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.

Sold by Messrs. **DULAU & Co., 37, Soho Square, London, W.**

Price 2s. 6d. each, postage extra.

Sole Advertisement Contractor, **C. Gilbert-Wood, Dacre House and Granville House, Arundel Street, Strand, W.C.**

Telegrams:—"GILBERWOOD, LONDON." Telephone:—4680 Gerrard.

Mr. Murray's New Books.

NELSON AND OTHER NAVAL STUDIES. By James R. Thursfield, Joint Author of "The Navy and the Nation." With Maps and Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 12s. net.
CONTENTS.—The Anniversary of Trafalgar—Trafalgar and the Nelson Touch—The Life of Nelson—The Secret of Nelson—Duncan—Paul Jones—The Dogger Bank and its Lesson—The Higher Policy of Defence—The Strategy of Position—The Attack and Defence of Commerce.

SECOND EDITION NOW READY.

KUROPATKIN'S REVELATIONS, suppressed by the Russian Government, entitled—**The Russian Army and the Japanese War.** Illustrations, 2 vols. demy 8vo, 28s. net.

"The all important value of General Kuropatkin's book is that it is of vital interest to every nation which has an army or a problem of national defence."—*Daily Graphic*.

RASPLATA (The Reckoning.) By Commander Vladimir Semenov, Imperial Russian Navy. His diary during the blockade of Port Arthur and the voyage of the Fleets under Admiral Rojdestvensky. With Maps. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

THE LIFE OF MAJOR-GEN. SIR CHARLES W. WILSON, ROYAL ENGINEERS. By Colonel Sir Charles M. Watson, K.C.M.G., C.B., late Royal Engineers. With Maps and Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 15s. net

THE LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN ARDAGH. By his Wife, Susan, Countess of Malmesbury (Lady Ardagh). With Illustrations, demy 8vo. 15s. net.
 "His record is certainly one of the most remarkable in the annals of the military and diplomatic history of our generation."—*Globe*.

NEW AND REVISED EDITION.

CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS. By His Excellency Lt.-General Frederick Von Bernhardt. Translated by Charles Sydney Goldman. With an Introduction by Lt.-General Sir John French, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

"Here at last, in the English language, we have a really important work on the German Cavalry at first hand."—*Broad Arrow*.

JOHN MURRAY, Albemarle Street, W.

THE



Cavalry Journal

Published by Authority of the Army Council, and under the direction of General Sir J. D. P. FRENCH, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Colonel 19th Hussars, Inspector General of the Forces, assisted by Lieut-General R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, C.B.

Published Quarterly, Price 2/6 net. Postage 4d.

NOW READY. No. 15.—JULY, 1909. NOW READY.

CONTENTS.

GENERAL THE EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY. By B. E. SARGEAUNT. (With Frontispiece.)
THE FORGING OF THE PASS OF SAMOSIERRA BY THE POLISH CAVALRY OF THE GUARD, NOVEMBER 30, 1809. By Colonel H. C. WYLLY, C.B. (With Map and Illustrations.)
THE CAPE MOUNTED RIFLEMEN. By The COMMANDANT. (Illustrated.)
CANADA AS A COUNTRY FOR BREEDING REMOUNTS. By Lieut. Col. V. A. S. WILLIAMS, A.D.C. R.C.D.
SOME SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE ENGINEERS OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION (EXCLUDING TELEGRAPHS). By a R.E. Officer.
RUSO-JAPANESE WAR.—IV. By Colonel W. H. BIERBECK, C.B., C.M.G. (With Map.)
A REMARKABLE CAVALRY RIDE. By Lieut. BERTRAND STEWART, West Kent (Q.O.) Yeomanry.
TAMING A COLT. By Lieut-General R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, C.B. (Illustrated.)

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE MOUNTED FORCES OF PERSIA FROM A.D. 1600 TO THE PRESENT TIME. By Major C. B. STOKES. (Illustrated.)
ORGANISATION AND TRAINING OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN HORSE ARTILLERY. By Lieut.-Colonel H. BURSTALL.
WHAT THE FRENCH ARE DOING TO ENCOURAGE THE BREED OF THE SADDLE-HORSE: A VISIT TO THE CONCOURS DE SAUMUR. By Lieut. CHARLES BRIDGE, R.F.A. (Illustrated.)
TRANSPORT SERVICE WITH THE CAVALRY DIVISION. By Captain H. F. PERCIVAL, D.S.O., A.S.C.
ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT. By Major J. C. BRINTON, M.V.O., D.S.O. (Illustrated.)
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAVALRY SADDLE. By Major J. HOBBS. (Illustrated.)
THE GERMAN CAVALRY TRAINING OF 1909. By Colonel H. WYLLY, C.B.
RECENT PUBLICATIONS. EDITORIAL NOTES. SPORTING NOTES. By the SPORTING EDITOR.

SUBSCRIPTIONS should be sent direct to:—The Managing Editor at
**THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION,
 WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.**

or Copies may be obtained by ALL Booksellers, Newsagents and Railway Booksellers, from

THE GILBERT-WOOD PRESS,

3 & 5, ARUNDEL STREET, STRAND, LONDON, W.C.

Telephone Nos. 4880 & 4880A GERRARD.

Telegraphic Address:—"GILBERTWOOD, LONDON."

National Defence

THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
COUNTY TERRITORIAL ASSOCIATIONS, AND
THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ASSOCIATION

WHOSE OBJECT IS TO SHOW THE NECESSITY FOR
LAND AS WELL AS NAVAL FORCES ADEQUATE TO
THE NEEDS OF THE EMPIRE, AND TO ASSIST IN
REMOVING ARMY QUESTIONS FROM THE ARENA
OF PARTY POLITICS.

PUBLISHED MONTHLY. Price 1/- nett.

POSTAGE WHERE REQUIRED, 3d. EXTRA.

The Editor invites contributions from all who are interested in any aspect of the problem of National Defence, and particularly from Officers holding His Majesty's Commission at home and in the Colonies.

CONTENTS OF LAST TWO NUMBERS:

No. 10.—August, 1909.

Note by the President—The Right Hon. Sir George Taubman-Goldie, K.C.M.G.
The Feet of Clay of our Foreign Policy. H. J. Darnton-Fraser.
An Independent View. Colonel the Duke of Bedford, K.G.
Week End Camps. "A Divisional Commander."
Sports and Territorials. Joseph Lyons, D.L.
The Working of a County Association. Capt. T. A. Harvie-Anderson.
Yeomanry Training. Colonel H. Le Roy Lewis, D.S.O.
A Foreign Chronicle. "An Old Hand."
National Training, a Suggestion. John Boyd Kinnear.
The Training of Territorial Officers. H. M. Bellamy.
Table showing the Strength of the Territorial Force in certain Counties on June 30, 1909.
Miniature Rifle Ranges. Lt.-Colonel the Hon. A. B. Bathurst.
Our Land Defences in War. Major Holmes Wilson, R.F.A.
Compulsory Service and the Regular Army. "H."
Books worth Reading.
The East Lancashire Division. Colonel Campbell Hyslop.
The Shropshire R.A. "Spectator."
Table—Training Arrangements, British Regular Troops, 1909.
The Census of Horses in Devonshire. Colonel the Earl Fortescue, A.D.C.

No. 11.—September, 1909.

The Sinews of War.
The Comparative Value for War of Regular and Irregular Troops. Captain A. H. C. Kearsley, D.S.O.
The Protection of the Arteries of the Empire. "Captain, R.N."
The Cost of National Defence. W. M. J. Williams.
A Territorial Red Cross Brigade. Colonel Sir G. T. Beaton, K.C.B., M.D.
A Frenchman's Week with the Territorial Army. Reginald Kann.
A Foreign Chronicle. "An Old Hand."
The Expeditionary Army and Special Reserve. "Hoplite."
How to Defend England. Captain Sir Francis Vane, Bt.
Anglo-French Co-operation in North-Eastern France. Lieut.-Colonel Alsager Pollock. With Map.
Territorial Artillery: I. Colonel F. D. V. Wing, C.B., R.A.; II. Lieut.-Colonel G. R. F. Talbot, R.F.A. (T.F.); III. Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Bedford-Pim, R.F.A. (T.F.)
Some Notes on the Training of the Two London Territorial Divisions. "Spectator."
The Lowland Mounted Brigade. Major Sir W. Stewart-Dick-Cunyngham, Bt.
Degeneracy. Constantine Ralli.
Books Worth Reading.

Publishers—HUGH REES, Ltd., 119, Pall Mall, London, S.W.

Wholesale Agents—SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT & Co., Ltd., or copies can be obtained of all Booksellers, Newsagents & Railway Bookstalls.

IMPORTANT TO ADVERTISERS.

This invaluable Publication is subscribed for by all the leading Clubs, Home, Indian, Colonial, and Territorial Messes.

"NATIONAL DEFENCE" is officially in the hands of all Secretaries and Authorities of the County Associations, who are the sole authorised buyers of Uniforms, Equipment and general supplies for the Territorial Army of Great Britain.

All Applications for Advertisement Space in this Magazine should be made to—

C. GILBERT - WOOD.

DACRE HOUSE AND GRANVILLE HOUSE, ARUNDEL STREET, STRAND, LONDON, W.C.
Telephones—4680 GERRARD. Telegrams—"GILBERTWOOD, LONDON."


S. FISHER, LTD., 188, STRAND

"Kwikchange."

Fisher's Last New

SUIT CASE

Sole Leather.
New Principle.
Extra Light.
Extra Strong.



38/-

24 in.

With Claw
Catches.

FISHER'S KIT BAGS.

This
Special
Kit
Bag,

All latest
improvements.
Full size. 24 in.

£5 15 0



30/- to £6

FISHER'S "EIFFEL."

£5 to £100

This Case
£23

Silver
Fittings,
Ivory
Brushes.

CATALOGUES
FREE.



S. FISHER, Ltd., 188, STRAND, LONDON.

Connoisseurs of **COFFEE**
RED DRINK THE
WHITE
& BLUE.

DELICIOUS FOR BREAKFAST & AFTER DINNER
 In making, use LESS QUANTITY, it being much stronger than ordinary COFFEE

JOSEPH TUCKER Telephone: 2177 Dalmia
 "Turbin, London."

Contractor to H.M. and
 the Dutch Governments.

Military Equipments.

SPECIALIST IN ALL REQUISITES
 REQUIRED FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL,
 ETC.

Military Men, Explorers, Miners, etc., should send
 for Illustrated Catalogue, 160 Pages.

Tents.
 Sleeping Valises.
 Sleeping Bags,
 Blankets, etc.
 Portable Camp and
 Barrack Furniture.
 Rifles, Revolvers
 and Cartridges.
 Saddlery.
 Scientific
 Instruments.
 Mosquito Nets
 (a Speciality).
 Field Kits.
 Chop Boxes.
 Kitchen Boxes.
 Watertight Trunks.
 Canteens.
 Clothing of every
 Description.

DETAILED ESTIMATES AND
 ADVICE re CLIMATE, etc., FREE.

Expeditions completely Fitted Out and Provisioned for
 all Parts of the World.

**79, NEWINGTON GREEN ROAD,
 LONDON, N.**

GAUTIER'S
BRANDIES.

GAUTIER FRÈRES, COGNAC. Estd. 1755.

